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ABSTRACT 
THE BEGINNING OF INTERVENTION: A STUDY OF THE WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND 
UNDERPERFORMING SCHOOLS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW 
SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY 
SEPTEMBER 2005 
SUSAN BOWLES THERRIAULT, B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
M.ED., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSCHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Kathryn A. McDermott 
New school accountability policy alters how the state department of education (SDE) and 
underperforming school interact by creating a direct connection between the two. The 
“beginning of intervention” is when the SDE and the underperforming school commence 
their working relationship. Challenges to the development of a relationship include 
limited capacity at the SDE level and the local educators’ perceptions of new school 
accountability as a deterrent policy. The working relationship is the vehicle for bridging 
the state’s externally imposed and school’s internally pre-existing accountability systems; 
to negotiate the implementation of the policy for the dual purpose of making sense of the 
policy for the school and the SDE and meeting the end goal of the policy by improving 
the educational outcomes of the school; and to alter educators’ perceptions of new school 
accountability policy from that of a deterrent and threatening policy to one which is 
enabling and empowering of local educators. Document analysis, observations, and 
v 
interviews of Massachusetts state education administrators, local district administrators 
and underperforming school educators were used to gain an understanding of how the 
state and local levels perceive one another during intervention. Results from the 
qualitative study were analyzed using Scheberle’s (1997) “Working Relationship 
Typology” which uses trust and involvement levels as variables to determine the type of 
working relationship between organizations. Findings indicate that the working 
relationship between the SDE and the school improves during the beginning of 
intervention, but remains distant. The surprising finding is that the district is seen as the 
key lever for improvement by those in the underperforming school and SDE. The 
existing relationship between the district and school, however, was negative, as the 
elementary school educators blamed the district for neglecting their schools. Giving the 
district capacity to facilitate school improvement, the SDE designed a system of early 
intervention that places a “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) at the district level whose sole purpose 
is to work with underperforming schools. The findings indicate that this contributed to 
dramatic improvement in the working relationship between the district and the 
underperforming school as well as the relationship between the SDE and the district. 
vi 
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In 2001, during the first round of Massachusetts Department of Education reviews 
of potentially underperforming schools, I participated as a monitor/evaluator of the 
process. It was the first time the schools and the Department of Education had met under 
the state mandated new school accountability policy, which was part of a comprehensive 
state education reform legislation passed in 1993. I volunteered to be a monitor on the 
visits because I was interested in school accountability policy, and how the Department 
of Education would approach its responsibility to intervene in underperforming schools. 
The experience of these pilot reviews that would become the School Panel Review visits 
has stayed fresh in my mind; because I began to wonder what impact these visits really 
have on the local school, and how the Department of Education would be able to manage 
the support of all of the potentially underperforming schools within the state. 
During these visits, principals discussed how the state review had been all over 
the local newspapers and the school had become a “bad word” within the local education 
system and the community. At another visit the principal and staff nearly thanked the 
review panelists and were looking forward to the state’s help. The dramatically different 
responses made me curious about what and how this process impacts the state and local 
education system and leadership decisions within that system. 
Since that time, I have been fortunate enough to work on many research projects 
analyzing aspects of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and through this 
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research have come to realize that there is a potential for some monumental changes in 
how public education is delivered. I also realize that Massachusetts is not the only state 
grappling with these major education reform initiatives. With the onset of the federal No 
Child Left Behind Act, 2001 every state in the nation is facing some sort of alteration to 
its education system. School accountability provides the context to explore the issues 
that arise as the tectonic plates of public education shift. 
As with any reform effort, I can feel and see the pain of change that many feel 
within the system. Looking at Massachusetts public education, I find myself constantly 
tom between the long-term intent of improving education for all children in all schools, 
and the short-term ramifications manifested in confusion and frustration of educators 
about the state’s Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and later the federal No 
Child Left Behind Act, 2001. The school accountability system is just one part of 
comprehensive reform legislation that reflects this stmggle. I cannot help but simply 
wonder: what is good and what is bad about school accountability? Having read the 
research and editorials about new school accountability, I have sometimes found a 
“good” or “bad” determination without any middle ground. Naturally, the dearth of 
middle ground conclusions has made me suspicious. 
I can understand that the label of “underperforming” is damaging to a school and 
a community. I can also understand that the additional resources that come with the label 
can actually help a struggling school. Whether the response to underperformance is to 
give up or to unite under a common vision of improvement is an interesting question. It 
does not take research to guess that different schools will react differently. But to begin 
to understand how even one school and one state department of education react and 
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develop a working relationship during new school accountability policy implementation 
is a beginning step. Perhaps with better understanding, there will be no need to feel tom 
between the short- and long-term goals or to place the state and the school on opposite 
sides of the same coin. Perhaps a humane and reasonable process can be developed in 
the short-term as the school follows the path to the long-term benefits for students. 
One thing is for certain. Accountability in public kindergarten through twelfth 
grade education within the United States is going through a major overhaul because of a 
combination of state and federal policies. Once primarily focused on a mixture of 
educational inputs (such as textbooks, library books, teacher training), teachers’ 
professional judgment, and priorities of the local community, accountability in schools 
and districts is now focused on educational outcomes (student assessment results) and 
standards determined by the state. Referred to as “new school accountability,”1 the shift 
in focus from internal school accountability to external state accountability standards 
places much of the responsibility for the quality of public education in the hands of the 
state departments of education (SDE’s) and moves the responsibility further away from 
where it once resided within the local community and ultimately the teacher in the 
classroom. 
Internal accountability within a school is controlled and defined by the principal 
and professional educators within the school and the classroom. An internal 
accountability system relies on the professional judgment of teachers to set standards, 
develop assessments, and measure progress. External accountability is controlled and 
defined outside of the local school and establishes common learning standards and 
1 Fuhrman, S. (1999) refers to “New Accountability.” This term has been modified and adapted to 
specifically address the portion of accountability focused upon schools. 
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assessments and measures the progress of schools towards these standards. External 
accountability is often thought to be imposed upon the school from the top down, while 
internal accountability is thought to be a bottom-up approach with the classroom teachers 
setting the standards as professional educators. 
Internal and external accountability are frequently placed on opposite poles and 
reflect opposite sides of arguments for and against external, state (and federally) imposed, 
new school accountability systems. The polarization of internal and external 
accountability is a mistake. Rather, both are elements of a comprehensive accountability 
system. Without intending to eliminate internal accountability functions entirely, new 
school accountability policy uses additional, external state standards and measures to 
improve the overall quality of public education and to ensure that the state’s 
constitutional responsibility for ensuring an adequate education to its citizens is being 
met. 
“New school accountability” is the tool states use to ensure their constitutional 
responsibility of providing an adequate, free, and public education is accomplished2. 
Derived from Fuhrman’s (1999) “new accountability,” and applied specifically to the 
school accountability system, new school accountability policy: 1) links school level 
accountability measures to outcomes that are wholly or primarily determined from 
student performance on state standardized tests; 2) uses the school as the unit of 
measurement; 3) establishes statewide performance standards for schools to meet; 4) has 
a system of interventions for schools that do not meet the established standards 
(underperforming schools) that are administered by the SDE; and 5) includes a system of 
2 Since the passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 all states are required to implement a new 
school accountability system to comply with the law. Because the details of the policy are determined by 
the individual state governments, there is variance in its rigor among states (Hoff, 2002). 
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sanctions administered by the SDE for schools that persistently do not meet the state 
standard (chronically underperforming schools). 
Direct interaction between the SDE and the underperforming school during the 
interventions and the sanctions challenges the very organization of the public education 
system. As Elmore, Abelmann, and Fuhrman (1996) state, “Underlying the new 
educational accountability is a belief that states should reorient their relations with 
schools...away from passive, maintenance-oriented oversight to the active creation of 
incentives for improvements in student learning” (p. 94). Beyond the goal of improving 
the quality of public education, new school accountability necessitates a new kind of 
intergovernmental relationship between the state department of education (SDE) and the 
underperforming school. The working relationship that develops between the SDE and 
the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention is the vehicle for 
administering support and developing congruence between the state’s external and 
school’s internal accountability systems. 
By making it impossible to hide the poor quality of education in a single school, 
the policy aspires to meet the explicit outcome of ensuring all children are receiving an 
adequate education. Interestingly, new school accountability policy relies upon a 
deterrent system (Bardach, 1977), which uses external threats like SDE (external) 
intervention in an underperforming school as the incentive to conform to the criteria 
within a policy. Generally, however, an external accountability policy is dependent upon 
an organization that commands and controls from the top and is contrary to that of a 
loosely coupled organization (Weick, 1976), which characterizes state public education 
systems. Moreover, the external threat is imposed, but the underperforming school’s 
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internal accountability system remains untouched and poses a challenge because state 
school accountability policy will only be effective if it motivates the alignment of the 
external mandates with the pre-existing internal accountability mechanisms in an 
underperforming school (O’Day, 2002). 
As a policy, new school accountability defines statutory powers of the SDE and 
the end-goal of improving the delivery of education within underperforming schools, but 
it does not dictate how improvement is realized. Between the identification and the end 
goal lies an area that is ambiguous and thus creates a place for the SDE and the 
underperforming school to negotiate the manner and process of implementation that best 
serves the existing strengths of the school’s internal accountability system and the state’ 
external accountability system - new school accountability. 
The alignment of accountability systems creates a middle ground and leaves room 
to accommodate the unique needs of the specific school, within the constraints of 
resources and skills of the SDE and school together. Switching from a deterrent to an 
enabling strategy of implementation during early intervention is necessary to 
accommodate the limitations of the SDE’s capacity. The working relationship between 
the school and the SDE is the context and the vehicle for communicating the SDE’s 
willingness to negotiate the implementation of policy and to enable the underperforming 
school and district to take ownership of improvement efforts with some support from the 
SDE. 
Therefore, the SDE and the underperforming school follow the traditional mode 
of policy implementation identified by Lipsky (1977) and Elmore (1979) in which 
negotiation occurs at the level of implementation. The SDE and the underperforming 
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school will negotiate school accountability policy implementation so that it: 1) makes 
sense for the strengths and weakness within their organizations (Lin, 2000); 2) connects 
the external and internal accountability mechanisms (O’Day, 2002); and 3) achieves the 
intended goal of providing adequate educational outcomes. The working relationship 
between the SDE and the underperforming school is an essential component, which 
enables the underperforming school and connects the internal and external accountability 
systems. Without a better understanding of early interventions the transition from a 
deterrent to an enabling approach is missed, and how the foundation of the bridge 
between the state external and underperforming school internal accountability 
mechanisms develops remains unknown. 
Conceptual Framework 
Understanding the working relationship between the SDE and the 
underperforming school is important to understanding the effectiveness of policy 
(Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Scheberle, 1997; Seidman, 1980). Together the SDE and the 
underperforming school are navigating a new relationship within the public education 
arena. By implicitly switching from a deterrent to an enabling approach, the SDE is 
attempting to share the responsibility with the underperforming school and to expand its 
capacity by using the technical expertise existing among the teaching professionals 
within the underperforming school and district. Understanding the evolution of the 
working relationship, and its negotiation as the policy is fitted within the context of the 
two organizations is critical to understanding the effectiveness of early intervention. 
7 
To investigate the evolution of this key relationship, I use a “Working 
Relationship Typology” developed by Scheberle (1997). Scheberle’s typology (1997) 
conceives of categories in which a working relationship is classified in a study of the 
intergovernmental relationship between the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the state environmental agencies because “...implementation is a complex 
process and ... working relationships make a difference in how implementation unfolds” 
(p. 11). Lin (2000) sees a context within organizations where “institutional values and 
needs are continually being reinterpreted” (p. 168), implying that relationships, especially 
new relationships, are moving targets that are in a constant state of flux. Because the 
SDE and the underperforming school are developing a new relationship within the new 
context of new school accountability, it is important to account for the changes within 
their working relationship over time. For this reason the typology throws a wide net to 
capture the status of the working relationship at several points during the beginning of 
intervention (identification, diagnosis, and early technical supportive assistance), to take 
the temperature of the working relationship between the two organizations. 
The typology relies on two variables that are crucial to the development of a 
relationship: 1) involvement and 2) trust. Involvement is defined as the level of 
participation between the SDE and the underperforming school within the context of 
school accountability. The involvement of the SDE with the underperforming school will 
naturally increase because intervention dictates greater involvement. Trust, on the other 
hand, is more elusive. For the purposes of this study, trust is the degree to which each 
party believes the other will cooperate to achieve the end goal of the policy, improving 
the educational outcomes. I suggest that trust will increase as the deterrent approach is 
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left behind and the enabling approach is fully understood by those within the 
underperforming school. It is likely that the SDE and the underperforming school 
commence their relationship, with low involvement and thus fall within Scheberle’s 
“coming apart with avoidance” or “cooperative but autonomous” categories. As time 
passes and involvement increases, the manner in which the SDE implements school 
accountability policy will dictate whether the working relationship with the 
underperforming school moves into the arena of “coming apart and contentious,” 
“cooperative but autonomous,” or “pulling together and synergistic” (Scheberle, 1997). 
Regardless of the direction the relationship takes, the SDE is at once more 
powerful and more vulnerable within this new relationship with the underperforming 
school. The effectiveness with which the SDE is able to convey its need to share 
responsibility, use an enabling approach that depends upon the underperforming school’s 
professional expertise, and build a bridge that connects the internal and external 
accountability system will likely dictate the ethos and level of cooperation between the 
SDE and the underperforming school. Information about the need for cooperation will be 
conveyed in the early interactions between the two entities. 
This qualitative study relies on the perceptions of state and school actors of one 
another and about new school accountability policy as well as observations, analysis of 
documents and history of the policy to tell the story of the implementation process. 
Using a relationship typology and a review of the literature on trust and involvement, I 
have developed the following hypotheses. 
First, the working relationship between the state and the underperforming school 
will change as implementation is negotiated between the two entities. By this I mean that 
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the SDE will use a “bargaining model” of implementation that is reliant on persuasion 
rather than punishment (Gormley, 1998), to improve educational outcomes within the 
underperforming school. 
Second, due to constraints of skills and resources within the SDE (Fuhrman, 
Goertz, & Duffy, 2004), the SDE is dependent upon a functioning working relationship 
with the underperforming school. The SDE’s dependence on a positive working 
relationship with the underperforming school is greater than that of the school because 
the SDE is ultimately responsible for upholding the state’s constitutional responsibility to 
provide an adequate and free public education through the framework of new school 
accountability policy. Without the expertise or resources to implement such a 
comprehensive policy the SDE is reliant upon the skills and resources where they exist in 
the public education system, with the professional administrators and educators in the 
districts, schools, and classrooms. Therefore, the SDE is dependent upon the 
professionals within the underperforming school and must find a way to develop the SDE 
officials’ skills to empower and focus improvement efforts of the staff within the school. 
Third, initially, the underperforming school does not recognize the SDE’s 
dependence. With only the deterrent language of the policy as a source of information 
about new school accountability, educators within the school are likely to feel threatened 
when their school is declared underperforming. Understanding new school 
accountability in terms of the juxtaposition of internal versus external accountability 
systems, the staff within underperforming schools may expect an SDE to take the most 
extreme measures of intervention and takeover. Because of these presumptions and 
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expectations within the school, the SDE must make a magnanimous initial gesture to 
open the possibility of a positive working relationship with the underperforming school. 
Last, if the SDE can sincerely communicate a desire to cooperate with the 
underperforming school, it will improve the working relationship over time. As the 
working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school increases in trust 
and involvement the relationship will become increasingly positive. If this does not 
occur, the SDE may be forced to implement stronger controls that it is not necessarily 
properly equipped to implement. 
Study Rationale 
Critical of research on policy that is primarily focused on the policymaker and 
policy development, Elmore (1979) describes a process of “backward mapping” when 
studying policy implementation, which . .assumes that the closer one is to the source of 
the problem; the greater one’s ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of 
complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the 
point where the problem is most immediate” (Elmore, 1979, p. 605). Elmore’s idea 
builds on the work of Lipsky (1977), which identifies the indispensable role of the policy 
implementers and the policy targets as those who must interpret and implement policy. 
The manner in which the front line workers or street level bureaucrats implement policy 
within the constraints of values, skills and resources they possess (Maynard Moody & 
Musheno, 2003), is fundamental to the impact of policy (Lipsky, 1977). 
Policy is negotiated throughout its life, from development through 
implementation. Highlighting the importance of this understanding, Elmore (1979) 
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writes, “[t]he encounter of street level bureaucrats with program clients is reputed to be 
the defining moment that actualizes the policy mandate” (p. 188). This element in policy 
implementation is crucial to the implementation of new school accountability policy. 
The SDE, lacking the command and control position that is presumed by the deterrent 
policy, is more accustomed to gathering information and providing inputs while decisions 
about the delivery of education reside with the districts and schools within the loosely 
coupled organization of the state public education system. 
Negotiating policy implementation with locally governed districts and schools as 
partners is a middle ground between the hierarchical, controlling implications of new 
school accountability and the existing and traditional passive, decentralized character of 
public education systems within the United States. The challenge for the SDE is to 
communicate the desire and need to negotiate and build a cooperative relationship with 
the local district and underperforming school and for those in the underperforming school 
to accept and react to this need. 
The study of the beginning of intervention within the implementation of new 
school accountability policy is important because it provides insight for states new to the 
requirements of the policy. The beginning of intervention reveals information on how an 
SDE and school commence their relationship. The early phases of new school 
accountability are the formative stages when the SDE and the school negotiate the 
territory between the presumed and actual implementation of the policy. The first face- 
to-face interaction between the SDE and the underperforming school is the moment when 
the change in the state’s role and responsibility is first acted upon by the SDE and 
potentially first realized by the school. 
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The reason for examining the beginning of intervention is to help understand the 
new context in which the SDE and the underperforming school function. Lin (2000) 
finds that the context in which policy is being implemented can create varying results. If 
one applies this idea to new school accountability policy implementation, studying the 
working relationship is an opportunity to examine the negotiation of policy 
implementation as it is fitted within the public education system context. The degree to 
which the SDE is able to translate accountability policy to meet the needs of the 
underperforming school and the end goal of the policy will have a profound impact on 
policy outcomes. The environment of conflict surrounding new school accountability 
policy makes this translation difficult for the SDE, but as Stoker (1991) notes, “The 
problem is not to eliminate all conflict... but instead to create conditions in which 
participants are more likely to respond to conflict with cooperation” (p. 50). Stoker 
(1991) refers to the idea of incentives as motivators of cooperation, but underlying the 
incentives concept is a foundation of trust within a working relationship. In the public 
education system, which relies on professional integrity within its internal accountability 
system, trust is an incentive. A new relationship must be developed with trust and 
cooperation in mind to effectively produce the incentives for both the SDE and the 
underperforming school to work together. 
Additionally, the study has many interrelated purposes that may be of value to 
those outside of the realm of public education. First, it is an examination of 
intergovernmental relations between a state agency, the state department of education 
(SDE), contractors, and a local agency, the underperforming school and district. 
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Second, it is an investigation into how agents of the state (SDE) use what Lipsky 
(1977) and Elmore (1979) call “discretion” in policy implementation. The SDE will 
likely need to utilize discretion to meet the end goal of the policy, which presumes a 
command and control style of organization within the state’s public education system. In 
reality the public education system is loosely coupled and is not conducive to a command 
and control style of management. Therefore, to achieve the end-goals of the policy, 
implementation must include elements of negotiation and bargaining between state and 
local agencies. 
Third, it is an examination of the policy implementation process. Taking Lipsky’s 
(1977) idea of “street level bureaucrats” using discretion at the front line of 
implementation, the study looks at how negotiation and discretion are used to negotiate 
between the state and “street level bureaucrats,” (a.k.a. those in the underperforming 
school). Early intervention and implementation are important because it is “.. .the 
defining moment that actualizes the policy mandate” (Elmore, 1979, p. 188). 
Last, it recognizes what Lin (2000) found in her study of policy implementation, 
namely that the unique context for implementation matters. Specifically because the 
typical relationship between an SDE and the local district and school consists of low 
levels of involvement and probably low levels of trust, jumping from the passive, locally 
driven organization of the public education system to the centralized control of the SDE 
is unlikely. The context of the public education system from that presumed in the policy 
makes implementation difficult to imagine. To accommodate the difference between 
policy and the organization of the education system, someone or some organization must 
play the role of “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) as policy implementation is negotiated. The SDE 
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is in the position to play this role with the underperforming school through the 
development of a positive working relationship. 
Truly improving the educational outcomes of schools is important, and the SDE is 
at once more powerful and more vulnerable within its new relationship with the 
underperforming school. The effectiveness with which the SDE is able to convey this 
dependency and need for cooperation will likely dictate the ethos and level of 
cooperation between the SDE and the underperforming school. As Stoker (1991) writes, 
“[cooperation] is limited and dependent upon the uncertain and undependable inclinations 




This literature review lays the groundwork for examining the implementation of 
the beginning of intervention as new school accountability policy is implemented. An 
important facet of the examination is the challenges the SDE and the underperforming 
school face, including a lack of pre-existing relationship, limitations in capacity, and 
alignment and link between the state’s external accountability with the school’s internal 
accountability system. The SDE and the underperforming school are forming a new 
relationship and a new context during implementation of new school accountability. The 
negotiation of a relationship within the new context is the focus of this study. The 
negotiation is examined by combining three bodies of research. First, I examine the 
available research on new school accountability policy, and how this study fits into that 
body of research. Second, I look at policy implementation theory and research as it 
relates to the point of implementation, and how policy is negotiated and fitted to a 
particular organization. Last, I consider working relationships and the importance of trust 
and involvement to cooperative relationships. Together these three areas of new school 
accountability, policy implementation, and working relationships provide a rich 
foundation for the examination of the beginning of intervention during the 
implementation of new school accountability policy. 
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The relationship that develops between the SDE and the underperforming school 
is new to the educational policy arena and clearly has a heavy burden. A neutral or 
positive working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school can 
simultaneously expand the capacity of both organizations, provide a bridge between the 
external and internal accountability mechanisms, and change the perception of new 
school accountability policy from a deterrent system to that of an enabling system of 
implementation. By applying a framework of working relationships found in research on 
intergovernmental relations, the discussion is informed and questions specific to the study 
of new school accountability arise. 
After federal and state legislators pass new school accountability laws, and after 
the state board of education and the department of education officials develop the 
regulations, all that is left is to implement new school accountability policy. From a 
linear and hierarchical perspective, it may just be that simple. However, a closer 
examination of policy implementation reveals that the tensions and negotiations during 
implementation of a policy can change the impact of a policy or the very policy itself. 
Implementation is when the divide between the external policymaker’s perspective and 
the actual internal organization of the targets of policy is bridged. As Elmore (1979) 
suggests, the moment when policy meets is target is the point “where the action is” 
(Gofftnan, 1967). 
In fact, while negotiating the external policy arena into the internal organization 
during implementation, a policy can be dramatically altered and the original intent of the 
policy transformed (Lipsky, 1977; Elmore, 1979; Lin, 2000). It is particularly true in the 
case of policies targeted at the public education system because of limitations in 
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resources allocated for implementation and limitations in existing capacity, often “state 
and federal school policies are stated intentions, not school practices” (Cuban, 2004, p. 
112). Elmore (1979), building on the work of Lipsky (1977), emphasizes implementation 
as another important part of a policy cycle in which policy is negotiated and 
accommodated between the implementer and the target of the policy. Bardach (1977) 
identifies a role of “fixer” which facilitates the negotiations and accommodations during 
implementation and Lin (2000) suggests that the “fixer” bridges the worlds of the 
external policy maker and the internal targets of policy. 
Like most policy implementation cycles, when new school accountability policy 
reaches the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention, the hard work 
of connecting the external accountability system to the internal accountability system 
begins. The working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school is 
the vehicle for connecting, negotiating, and making sense of new school accountability 
policy so that it fits within the context of the individual underperforming school. The 
challenges of implementing any policy are many. A challenge specific to implementing 
new school accountability is that public school systems within the United States are not 
organized to function in a system that is over reliant upon an external accountability 
system which is the measure for determining schools underperforming (O’Day, 2002). 
State public education systems are loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) or fragmented 
organizations characterized by decentralized decision-making at the level of the client 
(students), and some degree of ambiguous (school) organizational goals and values 
(Bush, 1995). Educator expertise is at the bottom of the hierarchy, where it is closest to 
the students, in the classrooms. Imposing an external accountability system upon a 
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highly developed, professionally controlled, internal accountability system shakes up the 
premise of how schools function within the United States. 
A loosely coupled organization is characterized as an organization that relies 
heavily on professional integrity and expertise (Weick, 1976). Self-regulation and 
accountability for educational outcomes is a hallmark of the teaching profession and, in 
sum, comprises a school’s internal accountability system. Not surprisingly, the ability 
and the manner with which teachers implement policy have profound influence on the 
impact of policy in action (Fullan, 1991; Quartz, 1995). Therefore, to be truly effective 
within public education a system of accountability must have the flexibility to bridge, to 
negotiate, and to align the state’s outcome based, external accountability system (new 
school accountability) with the school’s own internal accountability system (O’Day, 
2002). 
Negotiation and “making sense” (Weick, 2001) of policy is an inherent part of the 
policy cycle. Tension between the externally imposed and pre-existing internal 
accountability systems, which is present during implementation of new school 
accountability policy, is the context for the negotiation of the policy. With the SDE as 
the implementer and the school as the target of the policy, the study of the beginning of 
SDE intervention in the underperforming schools gains in importance because the 
interaction between the two becomes the foundation of their working relationship. The 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school is the instrument for 
negotiating the implementation of policy so that it fits the unique strengths and 
weaknesses of the underperforming school. The working relationship is also the bridge 
that can connect the external to the internal accountability systems. 
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The Beginning of Intervention 
When the SDE first intervenes in the underperforming school, it engages in the 
first critical point of negotiation of new school accountability policy implementation. 
These first meetings are referred to as “the beginning of intervention.” The beginning of 
intervention is when a school meets the performance and strategic criteria and is found to 
be potentially underperforming, and once a school is found to be underperforming, 
transitions to the diagnostic intervention that includes the first round of state provided 
technical assistance and support (Table 2.1). If policy is truly negotiated during 
implementation, then new school accountability policy’s initial and formative 
negotiations occur during the “early intervention” period. First impressions are lasting 
and because the SDE and the school have virtually no relationship prior to the beginning 
of intervention, these first interactions are highly influential to and become the 
foundation of their working relationship. Negotiation of the working relationship and the 
resulting new context created by new school accountability policy are the backbone of 
this research. 
The new working relationship developing between the SDE and the 
underperforming school faces many challenges. First, there is rarely any pre-existing, 
direct, personal relationship between the two organizations. Up until the point of 
identification of the underperforming school, the relationship has largely been filtered 
through the district. Before intervention, the essence of the relationship between the SDE 
and the school is based on administration, collection of information, and disbursement of 
funds, and the district is the SDE’s conduit for any needs or requirements for information 
from the schools. The school functions within the local district, which is locally 
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controlled and relatively autonomous. To increase the involvement between the SDE and 
the school is seen as intervention and interference in the locally controlled district. 
Therefore, the SDE and the underperforming school are starting their relationship from 
scratch, since SDE’s generally directly interact with districts, not schools. 
Second, as an organization the SDE has skills to collect information, and ensure 
programmatic compliance, but is not skilled in the business of running schools. Limited 
capacity within the SDE (Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Madsen, 1994, Lusi 1997, 
McDermott, Berger, Bowles, Brooks, Churchill & Effrat, 2001; Fuhrman, Goertz, & 
Duffy, 2004; Cuban, 2004) makes the role of new school accountability policy 
ambassador to the school a difficult proposition. 
Third, there is no single prescription for improving the educational outcomes of 
schools (Fullan, 2001). Improvement efforts must be determined on a school-by-school 
basis and much of the school improvement literature is based on the strength of internal 
school accountability systems (e.g., Fullan, 2001; Wagner, 1994). A customized 
approach costs money, takes time, and requires leadership and expertise, all of which 
place added strain upon the limited resources within the SDE. 
Finally, the undercurrent of new school accountability as a policy is based on 
what Bardach (1977) calls a “system of deterrence,” which relies on the threat of 
sanctions to motivate targets to comply with policy mandates. Herein lies the reason 
implementation of new school accountability policy is particularly interesting because its 
“might” is only felt by a handful of schools1. Though the target of new school 
accountability policy is technically all schools within a state, the only schools that will be 
1 This is particularly referring to the number of schools that are intervened in by the state. Under the No 
Child Left Behind Act, many schools are found to be underperforming, but do not require the state to 
intervene until later in the accountability process. 
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intervened in by the SDE are those that are found to be underperforming, generally a 
smaller population of schools. 
The threat of intervention in the deterrent system found within the policy is 
enough motivation or incentive for most schools, because most schools will satisfy the 
minimum threshold of state and federal standards, and thus will never actually feel the 
intervening hand of the state (SDE) or the incremental shift of control away from local 
boards to the state. For the schools that are found to be underperforming, under a 
deterrent system the initial threat is over, and to continue on a deterrent system of 
implementation requires tight controls over actions and standardized implementation 
methods, which requires resources and capacity to maintain control (Bardach, 1977). 
SDE’s do not have the ability to implement such a system due to limited resources, skills 
and capacity. Without the capacity for the SDE to be highly involved in the 
underperforming school (Mintrop, 2003) as required for effective deterrent systems of 
implementation, the SDE needs to change its strategy. The SDE then falls back upon a 
strategy traditionally found in U.S. public education systems. This strategy is what 
Bardach (1977) calls an “enabling” strategy, which is characterized by “high consensus 
on ... goals” and “is buttressed by a common professional identity or commitment...” (p. 
113). 
A shift in approach during implementation poses a challenge for the SDE and for 
the underperforming school. Switching approaches requires a change in the 
understanding of new school accountability policy for those in the SDE as well as those 
in the underperforming school. Negotiations during implementation are the opportunity 
for the change in perceptions to occur and the effectiveness of communicating the 
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necessary change is largely determined by the type and quality of the working 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
The initial threats embedded in the new school accountability policy may initially 
undermine or impede the ability of the SDE and the underperforming school to form a 
positive working relationship. Because of the limited capacity of the SDE, it is the SDE 
that will first recognize the need for a change in strategy, and will therefore need to work 
to change the local educators’ perceptions of new school accountability policy. In short, 
the SDE and the underperforming school must forge a new working relationship which is 
made more difficult because of: 1) the limited capacity of the SDE, 2) the local hostility 
and resentment toward the policy’s threatening nature, and 3) the general disregard for 
the profession of education that educators perceive to be embedded in new school 
accountability policy. Tension created by the shift from a deterrent to an enabling system 
produces a dynamic in which the SDE has power over the underperforming school, but at 
the same time the SDE needs the cooperation of those in the school because of limited 
capacity. The complexity of the relationship adds to the challenges inherent in creating a 
positive working relationship between the two organizations. 
New School Accountability Policy 
To investigate the working relationship between the SDE and the 
underperforming school, it is necessary to take a closer look at a framework for new 
school accountability. After scanning states through literature reviews and phone 
interviews, Bowles, Churchill, Effrat, and McDermott (2002) found that states follow a 
similar framework for accountability systems (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: New School Accountability Framework2 
PHASE EXPLANATION 
Performance criteria These are used as a gauge to measure and rate schools. Generally student 
assessments are at the center of these criteria with some additional factors such 
as attendance rates might be used. 
Strategic criteria These are developed by an SDE to make determinations about school 
performance and improvement and to identify schools that may need further 
supports. 
Diagnostic intervention This is the process of determining the reasons for low performance of a school. 
The diagnostic intervention influences the direction of the corrective intervention 
by identifying targets and tactics based on the strengths and weaknesses within 
the local context of the school 
Corrective Intervention This is determined by the capacity of the state to support, hire consultants, or 
facilitate school improvement. Depending on the type of intervention and 
processes the state identifies: 
Target(s) The targets of intervention may be practices (e.g., instructional practices), 
people (e.g., educators), or organizational structures (e.g., school governance, 
shared leadership) depending on the corrective intervention and strategy. 
Tactic(s) These are the strategies used for the intervention. 
Exit Criteria These are the criteria a state uses to judge whether a school has sufficiently 
improved and is able to function independently. 
(Bowles, et. al., 2002) 
The common components of school accountability systems found in Table 2.1 
define a process of identification, diagnosis and intervention aimed at improving an 
underperforming school. From the point of the performance criteria to strategic criteria, 
new school accountability policy is still perceived as a deterrent system that in theory 
means the threats of intervention are motivators for school improvement. Once the 
school is notified that it will be intervened in by the state, the working relationship 
between the SDE and the underperforming school commences and the diagnostic and 
corrective interventions become the first interactions between the two. If a school does 
not improve after the mild interventions, or does not meet the established exit criteria, a 
2 Once a school is declared underperforming, the levels of intervention may be revisited if the initial 
corrective intervention does not yield improved educational outcomes. An underperforming school, 
therefore, may go through several iterations of diagnostic and corrective interventions until improvement is 
evident. The level of the corrective intervention is dependent on the length of time a school is found to be 
underperforming and the degree to which a school responds to the initial interventions. I propose that the 
initial meeting of the SDE and the underperforming school and the subsequent working relationship 
developed is of great value because it sets the tone and incentive for further cooperation. 
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state may revisit the diagnostic criteria, alter the corrective intervention, and take 
stronger intervention measures. 
Increases in levels of intervention require stronger and different diagnostic and 
corrective interventions. Under new school accountability policy Brady (2003) identifies 
three categories of state corrective interventions or threats of intervention: mild, 
moderate, and strong. Mild interventions have the least impact on the staff and structure 
of the school and include site visits, diagnosis of school problems, and additional 
supports such as technical assistance and professional development. Moderate 
interventions tend to impact the infrastructure or organization of the school and staff. 
These types of changes are fraught with challenges because they impact school 
leadership, unions, staff, and the local community, and therefore, require more intense 
negotiation between these entities and the state. Because of these challenges and the 
increased intensity of the interventions, moderate interventions tend to require more 
resources including: time, commitment, skills, and funding. The last level is strong 
intervention, characterized by loss of local control, such as reconstitution, which can 
entail anything from the firing of some or all staff, and the hiring of new staff (with an 
opportunity for former employees to reapply for their jobs), to school take over by the 
government or some other public or private entity, to school closure. A summary of the 
“graduated” typology of school accountability intervention is found in Table 2.2. 
Interventions are not only typified by the level of resources necessary to 
implement them, but according to Brady (2003), they reflect an increasing element of 
political risk for policymakers, which, in turn, creates a higher stress situation for the 
SDE implementing new school accountability policy. Visible risk in any intervention 
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will likely grow with stronger intervention. However, the threat those in the educational 
community feel toward any (mild, moderate, or strong) state intervention should not be 
treated lightly. Any intervention by the state into the local school has risk because it 
threatens the autonomy of the school and the teaching profession whether the risk is seen 
publicly or remains just below the surface. 
Table 2.2: School Accountability - Levels of Intervention in Underperforming Schools3 
Level Characteristics Examples 
Mild 
Outside directed support that does not directly impact the 
local school structure or make-up, but that may 
encourage improved skills of leaders and staff aimed at 
improving the delivery of education. Alterations to the 
school are internally determined and driven, though the 
strategies may be prescribed by an external agent (state). 
Resources required are minimal. 
■ Diagnosis through data- 
driven analysis of student 
test scores 
■ Improvement planning 
that is data-driven 
■ Technical assistance 
■ Professional development 
Moderate3 4 
Impact to the infrastructure of the school and 
organization. This requires a more hands-on approach 
from an external agent. These changes may be arrived at 
collaboratively by the school staff and state. This type of 
intervention requires more resources than the mild 
intervention and conflict with local community is greater 
because loss of control of the school is evident within 
some of these strategies. 
■ Added school time 
■ Reorganization of the 
school 
■ Revisions of curriculum 
Strong 
Complete or nearly complete loss of local control. Only 
applied when early interventions have heeded no results. 
This requires the greatest level of state resources and is 
extremely controversial in the local community. 
■ Replacement of the 
Principal 
■ School reconstitution 
■ School take over 
■ School closure 
Interestingly, in the early phases of mild intervention, the implementation process 
is predicated upon the cooperation of the SDE and the underperforming school. The need 
for cooperation signals that there is potential conflict and is therefore an indication of the 
change or conflict that arises when the SDE moves from a deterrent to an enabling 
strategy during early intervention. The “beginning of intervention” includes the strategic 
3 The information for this table is from Brady (2003). 
4 Brady (2003) suggests that removal of the principal is a moderate intervention. In this analysis the firing 
of any staff, including the principal is considered a strong intervention. 
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and diagnostic phases, when the SDE and the underperforming school first come face-to- 
face during the mild level of diagnostic/corrective intervention. During this time there 
are implicit and explicit changes in strategy the SDE and the school take as new school 
accountability policy is implemented. The change and negotiation occurs within the 
context of their new working relationship. 
Research on new school accountability policy tends to fall into four categories: 1) 
research on the impact upon all schools; 2) research on strong interventions into schools; 
3) research that synthesizes theory to create a theoretical framework for studying new 
school accountability; and 4) research on the perspectives and products of early 
intervention into schools. Each category brings forth interesting issues and perspectives 
for the beginning of intervention. However, none focus particularly on the formative 
stages of intervention in conjunction with the working relationship that develops between 
the SDE and the underperforming school. 
The first type of research looks at new school accountability policy and its impact 
on all schools (e.g., Goertz, Duffy, & Le Floch, 2001; Hanushek, & Raymond, 2002). 
Generally, the research is concentrated on how policy impacts all schools within a state 
or looks at the perspective of certain stakeholders (e.g., principals, teachers) across a state 
(e.g., Goertz, Massell, & Chun, 1998; Ladd, & Zelli, 2002; Mathers & King, 2001). 
These studies are interesting because they put the voices of all of those who broadly feel 
the threat of and are impacted by new school accountability policy into the forefront. The 
challenge with these kinds of studies is that they examine a larger population of schools 
or stakeholders and provide generalizations about new school accountability policy. The 
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bulk of the stakeholders, however, will only experience the deterrent nature of the policy 
and will never experience SDE intervention. 
New school accountability is a deterrent policy that uses threat of state 
intervention to motivate school improvement. Though the risk of state intervention is 
real, the majority of schools will never feel the ramifications of state intervention. In 
fact, during the 2000-2001 academic year there were 90,640 public schools in the United 
States (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2002) and as of 2001, approximately 
8,600 schools had been identified as underperforming5 (Brady, 2003). Less than 10% of 
the schools within the United States were underperforming. Since the passage of the 
federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 (NCLB), however, many more schools are likely 
designated as “in need of improvement” (a.k.a. underperforming), yet the limited 
capacity of the SDE to intervene in large numbers of schools hinders the level of state 
intervention and may even lessen the ability for the SDE to help a school. 
Due to limitations in state capacity and resources to hold schools accountable, the 
SDE’s use strategic criteria to select a small number of schools out of the many that may 
be labeled in need of improvement or that are identified for state intervention. The SDE 
tends to intervene in the worst of the worse schools (e.g., Massachusetts, Maryland). The 
intent of new school accountability policy is to raise the educational outcomes in all 
schools, and thus a major focus is placed on the schools that are performing at the lowest 
levels. 
Consequently, new school accountability policy is put to the test when the SDE 
intervenes in the small population of underperforming schools. The principals and 
5 Based on the information on underperforming schools, it is not clear that this number is from the same 
academic year as the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) data. 
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teachers in these schools truly experience the threat of the policy and once the initial 
threat is gone, must develop a theory of action with the SDE. It is these stakeholders who 
provide the most insight into the impact of new school accountability policy. By 
concentrating on the stakeholders at large, the small number of voices of those who 
experience intervention is diluted by a majority of stakeholders, who will never 
experience anything more than a threat of intervention. 
A second type of research conducted on new school accountability policy 
converges upon the strongest interventions (e.g., Cobum & Riley, 2000; Erlichson, 
Goertz, & Turnbull, 1999; Lynn & Dreeben, 1999; Malen, Croninger, Redmund, & 
Muncey, 1999; Seder, 2000; Wong, Anagnostopoulos, Rutledge, & Shen, 1999). When a 
school is determined to be chronically underperforming despite mild and moderate 
interventions, the drastic and politically risky move of school take over or reconstitution 
is imposed by an external entity (e.g., state board of education, city mayor). The value of 
this research is the insight it provides in understanding the impact of a policy, and the 
strategies that are effective or not effective when implementing policy. The early 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school, which is predicated on 
mild supportive interventions, such as coaching and training of school personnel, 
however, is less understood (Mintrop, 2004). 
The findings of research conducted on strong interventions indicate that outside 
intervention leads to limited school improvement because it simply does not impact the 
“technical core” of the school, the teacher in the classroom. Until the external interveners 
are able to impose external accountability measures that link to and refocus the internal 
accountability mechanisms developed by professional educators within the school, strong 
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interventions will continue to achieve less than desirable educational outcomes. 
Arguably, at the point of take over or reconstitution the milder interventions have failed, 
thus the motivation (threat of stronger intervention) of new school accountability is gone 
and the policy, having lost its deterrent incentives, has failed. If strong intervention 
means the policy has failed, then it is not surprising that the findings of research on the 
strongest interventions into schools conclude that school improvement is not fully 
realized under these circumstances. 
A third type of research is the theoretical examination of new school 
accountability (e.g., Bowles, Churchill, Effrat, & McDermott, 2002; Brady, 2003; Goertz, 
2001; Fuhrman, Goertz, & Duffy, 2004; O’Day, 2004). From these examinations one 
gains insight into the dynamics and context of schools, principals, and teachers and the 
weaknesses and strengths of a state driven accountability system imposed upon the 
underperforming school. The results of these analyses provide information on what is 
important to consider when implementing new school accountability policy by 
synthesizing existing literature on the organization of schools, school change, and school 
improvement. It lends a theoretical framework for examining what each stakeholder in 
the process is dealing with as they are faced with the possibility of state intervention. 
The studies serve the important purpose of providing implemented and targets of policy 
with a better understanding of one another, and the facets of policy implementation that 
may need to be modified or prioritized to achieve positive results. 
The limitation of such research is that it does not study new school accountability 
in the context of implementation. The existing bodies of research on school improvement 
are valuable, but generally do not approach school improvement in the context of an 
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externally mandated accountability system. The important work of connecting the 
external and internal accountability systems is new territory for an SDE or a city mayor. 
Therefore, synthesizing existing information may lead to conclusions that new school 
accountability policy does not work because the policy has a top down, deterrent nature, 
which precludes the idea that real school change and improvement comes from the 
bottom-up, or at least from within the school (Fullan, 2001). 
Herein lies the challenge of new school accountability policy. It is understood 
and perceived as a deterrent, top down policy by educational stakeholders. However, 
limited resources require the SDE to partner with the most egregiously underperforming 
schools during the beginning of intervention in an attempt to avoid the need for stronger 
interventions, which the SDE has even less capacity to implement. This calls for a shift 
in implementation style that moves away from deterrence. The SDE is more likely to 
need the cooperation of the underperforming school to avoid the strong interventions, and 
thus the two have a common goal. They both want to evade strong intervention. To 
accomplish such a goal they must partner, collaborate, and cooperate (McRobbie, 1998) 
to appease state level policy makers and affect improved educational outcomes. 
The fourth type of research is conducted specifically on underperforming schools 
that are being intervened in by the state (e.g., Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002; Mintrop, 
MacLellan, Quintero, & Keleman, 1999). These studies examine the design and process 
of implementation and the perceptions of the school stakeholders towards that process. 
In just such a study, Mintrop and MacLellan (2002) found that new school accountability 
systems have a “penetrating power.. .in eliciting obligations to external demands and in 
shaping managerial models of change and their limitations in bringing forth broadly 
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based internal development” (p. 297). However, the research tends to focus on the 
experience of those within the underperforming schools and their reaction to and the 
products of intervention. 
Within this body of literature there is a gap. Specifically, the perspective of the 
SDE or the external entity and their challenges and struggles with implementing the 
policy and intervening in the underperforming school are missed. How the SDE manages 
intervention into underperforming schools and how stakeholders at the state as well as the 
local levels perceive the policy and its implementation are not well understood. To 
neglect the role of the state during intervention is to miss an important component of new 
school accountability policy. How the SDE perceives its role in and negotiates the 
implementation of new school accountability policy is important because it directly 
impacts the reaction and perceptions of those within the underperforming school. 
Still, the findings from this research on underperforming schools provide some 
initial insights into local stakeholder perceptions of new school accountability policy and 
interventions. Shedding light onto new school accountability policy’s limitations 
Mintrop, MacLellan, Quintero, and Kelemen (1999) examined schools that were in the 
earlier stages of implementation under new school accountability type policies and found 
that the degree to which the school could internalize the external accountability demands, 
and the provision of a change agent responsible for bridging the divide between the 
external and internal accountability mechanisms, were key elements of new school 
accountability systems, an idea which is supported by the theoretical work of O’Day 
(2002). A major part of early intervention is centered on the development of school 
improvement plans by the school. Mintrop, et al. (1999) found that development of the 
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school improvement plan is an “exercise in shoring up external legitimacy” (p. 58). 
Consequently, the opportunity to internalize and customize improvement strategies for a 
specific school is lost or weakened because educators are focused on proving their own 
worth to the state or external entity. If the exercise of developing the school 
improvement plan is indeed more for external legitimacy than internal change (Mintrop, 
et al., 1999), then the role of an external agent to help to bridge the extemal/intemal 
accountability divide is critical. The SDE is in the unique position to be a bridge that 
connects the two. 
This study of the beginning of intervention attempts to fill the gap in 
understanding of how state and local entities perceive the beginning of intervention. 
Therefore it fits most neatly into the fourth category of research on new school 
accountability policy, though it is informed by all categories of school accountability 
research. From the first broad research, the idea that new school accountability policy is 
perceived by stakeholders in a state as “threatening,” is recognized, and from the second 
body of research on strong interventions one gleans that this level of intervention leads to 
a giving up and dismantling of any internal accountability system within the school. The 
beginning of intervention is an attempt to capture the experience of individuals after the 
threat and before the failure (strong interventions) of new school accountability policy. 
The third category of theory based research on school accountability policy reveals the 
challenges the SDE and the underperforming schools face when implementing the policy. 
The strongest point made by these studies is that bridging the externally imposed with the 
internally pre-existing accountability systems within the underperforming school is 
essential. This idea implies that deterrence and top down, externally mandated change 
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will not occur in the face of the SDE’s limited capacity, local control, and the tradition of 
professionalism among educators in the public schools. Each of these entities play an 
important role in accountability, and the recognition and relationship that develops from 
the beginning of intervention is the bridge between the state’s external and the school’s 
internal accountability systems. 
As a contribution to the fourth body of research focused specifically on 
underperforming schools, this study builds on the idea that the implementation of new 
school accountability policy is multifaceted (Mintrop, et. al, 2002). There is a role for all 
of the parties and the “shared conceptualization of school improvement and 
accountability among state officials who compose the design and the districts and schools 
who interpret it,” (Mintrop, et. al., 1999, p. 60) are critical to meeting the end goal of 
improved educational outcomes. Though new school accountability policy may seem 
like a policy that is linear and rationale and leads to a “cause and effect” relationship, the 
most important finding of such research is that it is “a whole complex of interactions” 
(Mintrop, et. al, 1999, p. 60) between the state and local levels. The working relationship 
between the levels of government within a state’s public education system is an 
important, if not the most important, facet of new school accountability policy 
implementation. Together state and local educators are forming a relationship and a 
theory of action. Understanding the perceptions of those in the SDE and the 
underperforming school during the beginning of intervention gets closest to where the 
action is, and the strategies that support school improvement. 
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Policy Implementation 
Negotiation and adjustment of policy to local conditions are a fundamental and 
essential part of implementation because they are how the extemal/intemal divide is 
bridged. As Cuban (2004) writes, “State and federal school policies are stated intentions” 
(p. 112), and more importantly “few policies are implemented as intended” (p. 113). 
Negotiation and adjustment during implementation is expected. Limitations of capacity 
and resources lead to deviations and make negotiations an inherent part of the policy 
implementation process. Accepting the inevitability of deviations from planned policy, 
other research (e.g., Elmore, 1979; Lin, 2000; Stoker, 1999) follows policy as it is being 
implemented and examines the process as it is negotiated at all levels with particular 
focus upon the implementer and the target of policy. Thus the study of new school 
accountability takes the perspective that there is a natural and an inevitable negotiation 
during implementation that occurs (Lipsky, 1977; Elmore, 1979; Maynard Moody & 
Musheno, 2003). 
Acceptance of deviations and negotiations during implementation points to the 
idea that the context in which policy is being implemented makes a difference (Lin, 
2000). However, the results after policy implementation inevitably will be varied. Lin 
(2000) challenges the underlying assumption within many policy implementation theories 
(e.g., Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979) that suggest policy 
goes awry during implementation. Rather than hijacking a policy, Lin suggests that the 
implementers and targets are merely trying to “make sense” (Weick, 2001) of policy 
within their own context. In an expression of a more sympathetic view Lin states, 
...any group of staff and participants cannot be expected to 
administer, carry out, or participate in any set of activities unless 
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those activities serve some purpose in their understanding of the 
work or life tasks they believe they must do, or unless those 
activities make their lives easier. 
(Lin, 2000, pp. 45-46) 
This point of view of a policy allows for an understanding of the perspectives of the 
targets and the implementers. Lin (2000) sheds light on the contextual factors that may 
lead to different outcomes, by investigating and incorporating contextual differences into 
the understanding of how policy is implemented. 
Implementation choices must be matched to the type of organization in which a 
policy is being applied. In a tightly bound and controlled organization, using force and 
control as the method of implementation might make sense; however, in a loosely 
coupled organization, the effort and resources necessary to implement policy in this 
manner is draining and ill-fitting. “Standardized solutions developed at great distance 
from the problem, are notoriously unreliable” (Elmore, 1979, p. 610), and in any loosely 
structured organization with expertise at the bottom, there must be room for professional 
discretion and adaptation to unique circumstances. Relationships and communication are 
more likely a better option for the loosely coupled organization. 
Bridge building between the external policy environment and the internal 
organization of the target is a key element of negotiation. According to Lin (2000), the 
idea of an implementation “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) is an essential element to 
implementation when negotiating implementation. Lin’s perspective on the fixer role is 
different than that of Bardach’s original conception of the role. Bardach (1977) describes 
a policymaker as the fixer who treats a policy as her/his pet project and therefore, 
continues to oversee and monitor as well as fight for resources for policy implementation. 
Taking a micro perspective, Lin alters the definition slightly by referring to what is more 
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likely an implementer, rather than the policymaker, who is responsible for translating and 
negotiating the policy with the target. Making sense of a policy and creating the 
conditions for congruence within the existing organizational structure creates a new 
context for implementation the fixer facilitates the process. 
Deterrence v. Enabling 
In the simple model of inducements, if society penalizes an 
activity, people will do it less, and if it rewards an activity, people 
will do it more. In the polis, things aren’t so simple. Inducements 
are usually designed by one set of people (such as policy analysts, 
legislators, and regulation writers), applied by another (executive 
branch bureaucrats), and received by yet a third (individuals, firms, 
organizations, lower levels of government). The passage from one 
set to the next is treacherous. 
(Stone, 1997, p. 151) 
New school accountability is based on penalizing schools that do not improve with the 
threat of state intervention. From the state legislature, the state boards of education to the 
SDE’s and finally to the underperforming schools and their districts, the way in which the 
policy is interpreted along the way is altered. Indeed, as Stone states, “passage from one 
to the next is treacherous.” With sanction based policies like new school accountability 
“[t]he biggest problem is a lack of willingness to impose sanctions... on the part of 
officials while meting them out” (Stone, 1997, p. 151). The SDE is unwilling or unable 
to implement sanctions because of capacity limitations and is consequently dependent 
upon cooperation with the underperforming school. Therefore, the SDE takes an 
approach that develops a working relationship between the two rather than punishing the 
underperforming school. 
Adding to the treachery, there is a lack of specific guidance or understanding 
about how states can improve schools. Capacity for the SDE to support and turn around 
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failing schools is a challenge in nearly all states (Bowles, et.al., 2002, Goertz, et. al, 
2001; Mintrop 2003; Olson, 2003). There are no hard and fast rules on what kind of 
resources or the amount of resources needed to achieve improvement (Fullan, 2001). 
New school accountability policy relies on the threat of intervention in the hope that it 
will be motivation enough for schools to improve educational outcomes. 
Negotiation during implementation also confronts the stakeholder perceptions 
about new school accountability policy. The language of new school accountability 
policy uses threats of mild, moderate, and strong intervention to motivate school 
improvement at the local level. Research on the impact of new school accountability 
upon all schools shows that the majority of stakeholders perceive the policy as 
threatening; however, threats may undermine the working relationship between the SDE 
and the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention. Thus, part of the 
negotiation gives rise to the SDE and the underperforming school redefining new school 
accountability so that it is possible to collaborate and provide support for the 
improvement of educational outcomes within the underperforming school. I suggest that 
this requires a negotiation or change in how new school policy is implemented and 
therefore perceived, from a deterrent to an enabling system of implementation. 
Bardach (1977) describes two seemingly opposite modes of implementation: 
“deterrent” and “enabling.” A deterrent system of implementation is one that uses threats 
of punishment (or disincentives) to motivate targets to comply with policy goals. This 
type of implementation is often found in situations where uniformity and standardization 
are primary goals and in situations where professional discretion and adaptation are seen 
a detrimental to the policy outcomes. Paradoxically, an enabling system of 
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implementation is different from the popular psychology term which refers to an enabler 
as someone who supports another person’s less than desirable actions. Enabling for these 
purposes is a more positive term which uses empowerment and consensus to achieve 
common goals (Bardach, 1977). An enabling system is congruent with negotiating policy 
implementation, fitting policy into the existing context and relying on professional 
discretion and adaptation so that policy makes sense for the organization. 
The Bardach (1977) description of a system of deterrence is at least partially 
applicable to new school accountability policy as it is designed by legislators and 
policymakers within a state. In a deterrent type of system “.. .the amount of punishment 
is typically disproportionate to the degree of performance” (p. 120). The inherent 
motivation within new school accountability policy is for schools to avoid SDE 
intervention and maintain the status quo of professional and local autonomy. The failure 
of a system of deterrence, like new school accountability policy, is that it undermines any 
professional respect, trust, or common goals, which are essential in an enabling system 
(Bardach, 1977). Additionally, a deterrent system creates an environment that “presumes 
suspicion and alternative goals” (Bardach, 1977, p. 120). Even worse, a deterrent system 
is only as good as the threat of punishment. Once an SDE is at a point where it must 
administer the punishment, the incentive for the underperforming school to improve is 
negligible, and the professional educators within the targeted school may feel like giving 
up. The threat is more powerful than the actual punishment. 
Stone (1997) finds that the tool of the deterrent system, sanctions may 1) “create 
conflict between targets and givers;” 2) “harden targets’ resistance;” 3) “be sabotaged by 
givers;” or 4) “hurt the people one is trying to protect instead of altering the behavior of 
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the targets” (p. 281). None of these outcomes are ideal for the SDE to encounter when 
working with the underperforming schools and support changing to an enabling system of 
implementation. Stoker (1989) describes implementation theory as an “authority 
paradigm,” which does not view policy implementation as an evolutionary process, but 
rather as a process of developing policy and then implementing it as it was intended (e.g., 
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979). New school accountability 
appears to be an example of Stoker’s authority paradigm, as it is designed to increase the 
consequences or levels of punishment in a system of deterrence. These levels (mild, 
moderate, and strong) of punishment may continue the system of deterrence especially 
for those schools in the earliest phases of underperformance. 
Loosely coupled organizations made up of authorities with what Stoker (1989) 
describes as “diffuse power” can bring about confusion in expectations when a policy 
demands an implementation style that does not fit the organization. Likewise, the gap 
between new school accountability policy that presumes a rational, efficient, mechanistic 
public education system and the reality within the loosely coupled public education 
system brings about confusion about the expectations the SDE and underperforming 
school have for one another. Functioning within the limitations of its skills and 
resources, the SDE is best suited to implement an enabling strategy (Bardach, 1977) or 
what Gormley (1998) calls a bargaining model of enforcement, which uses the power of 
persuasion to improve performance, and is less reliant on control and capacity. The 
ability of the SDE staff to relay the message that they want to work with the school, 
rather than threaten and control the school, is essential to the implementation of this 
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strategy. In the context of new school accountability policy, an enabling system is clearly 
dependent upon trust and cooperation between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Lin (2000) lays out the inherent tension that exists when policy implementation is 
being negotiated. The tension exists within “the choice between solidarity, force, and 
control, or instead communication, individual relationships, and flexibility” (p. 47). 
Interestingly, it is similar to the tension between a deterrent and an enabling approach to 
implementation. The implementation “choice” between force and control versus 
communication and relationships comes with capacity issues. By using a persuasive, 
relationship driven approach, time and effort are needed to commence the relationship, 
and after it is off to a good start, less time and effort are required. When using force and 
control as a method of implementation the implementer needs high levels of capacity and 
resources to maintain the force necessary and ensure compliance to the policy. 
An enabling system of implementation allows for the SDE and the 
underperforming school to work together to fit the policy into the public education 
system and into the underperforming school by negotiating the imposed external and the 
valued internal accountability systems so that it makes sense for both. This detail that is 
critical to understanding how, during the mild intervention level of the 
diagnostic/corrective intervention phases, the shift in strategy between the SDE and the 
underperforming school is plausible, and why it may actually be effective. 
The gap in perceptions has the potential to lead to extra challenges and 
miscommunications during the earliest phases of new school accountability. Under new 
school accountability policy the SDE and the school are required to interact and work 
together in new ways to improve educational outcomes for students. Working together is 
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challenged by a lack of relationship between the SDE and the school. In fact, the 
relationship may be more likely characterized as negative. Cuban (2004) supports this 
possibility when he describes how the organizations within the public education system 
tend to act more like rivals than partners. Adding to the rivalry, the deterrent nature of 
new school accountability policy does not lead one to believe that those in the SDE and 
the schools will be more disposed to partnering. Consequently, working together is not 
necessarily the first thing on the minds of those in the school because of the threatening 
nature of new school accountability policy. 
When schools are found to be underperforming, the motivation (threat) has not 
worked, and the SDE, in a sense, is left “holding the bag” as the organization responsible 
for guiding, supporting, and making decisions about how to improve an underperforming 
school. Looking for an answer to questions about how to improve schools, one finds 
general guidelines for intervention and emphasis upon the idea of taking a customized 
approach to intervention focused on meeting the needs of the underperforming school 
(Datnow & Stringfield, 2000; Fullan, 2001). Customization is in direct conflict with the 
development of a “one best system” (Tyack, 1974) approach to improve schools, which is 
a type of solution organizations such as SDE’s are best structured to implement (Tyack, 
1974) and that which new school accountability policy seemingly mandates. 
Recommendations such as working within the local context along with other general tips 
for turning around a school do not fit the one best way mold of the SDE and contribute to 
a lack of information about the effort and resources needed to improve schools. 
In truth, SDE’s simply do not have the capacity (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997; 
Madsen, 1994) to take over large numbers of schools that are not meeting the state 
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established performance standards primarily based on student test scores (Madsen, 1994; 
Lusi, 1997; Wirt & Kirst, 1997). Limited state capacity (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997; 
Madsen, 1994), increased threats to local leaders in underperforming schools (Mintrop, 
2002; Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001), and downward spiraling fiscal situations 
within states all make it critical for states and local underperforming schools to work 
together, if they are to reach the end-goal of providing an adequate education to all 
children within the state (Center on Education Policy, 2003). 
The SDE and the underperforming school are dependent upon one another to 
accomplish the goals of new school accountability policy. Elmore (1979) suggests that 
the real action is where the policy meets the target and how the policy is negotiated 
between the two entities. Based on that assertion, it is in the best interest of the SDE and 
the underperforming school to develop a working relationship that allows room for 
discretion and bargaining during the implementation process, if they are to be partners. 
New school accountability policy’s external accountability strategy, as it is implemented 
by the SDE, works only if it is connected to the underperforming school’s internal 
accountability system. The SDE must work, with the help of the school, to make or to 
build the intemal/extemal connection. 
Supporting this idea, Lusi (1997) examined this new role of state education 
departments and found that, like the internal and external accountability mechanisms of 
the school, reform must be managed externally as well as internally. She states, “There 
cannot be a disjunction between the principles and goals of the reform effort and the 
principles and goals of the [SDE] because one reflects the other.. .[and] how the [SDE’s] 
themselves function seems to have important implications for the success or failure of 
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complex reform” (Lusi, 1997, p. 157). One of Lusi’s (1997) key findings is that complex 
reform requires continual policy refining and development as it is implemented or 
negotiated. “Legislation, no matter how thoughtfully written, cannot possibly foresee all 
of the problems and challenges that will arise during implementation. It is up to the 
[SDE], then, as the implementation arm of the state to make the intelligent adjustments 
needed in the implementation process...” (Lusi, 1997, p. 158). The adjustment and 
evolution of policy described during implementation makes room for the discretion and 
bargaining Elmore (1979) refers to during the implementation process. 
The SDE, as the new school accountability implementer, must work to “bridge the 
extemal/intemal divide” (Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002, p. 297), much like the role of the 
“fixer” described by Lin (2000) and first conceived of by Bardach (1979). Newman, 
King, and Rigdon (1997) suggest that the greater the degree to which a reform is 
internalized by those in the school community, the more likely the reform is to be 
embedded into the school’s “internal accountability system,” and the better the SDE is at 
mobilizing and motivating alignment between the internal and external accountability 
systems, the more likely it is that stronger SDE interventions will be avoided. During the 
early phases of implementation, the SDE is in the position to build individual 
relationships within the school and facilitate the internalization of the accountability 
system. Because those staff working in the school may only understand the threatening 
nature of new school accountability policy itself, a change in understanding of the new 
school accountability policy must occur if the SDE and the underperforming school are to 
engage in an effective working relationship. 
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The way the policy is perceived prior to intervention may make school staff 
within underperforming schools feel threatened and undermined professionally (Mintrop, 
2002; Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001) and may lead to a throwing up of hands and 
giving up or handing over responsibility of the school to the state. This is particularly 
salient because the public education system relies upon the professional standards of 
administrators and teachers (Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Tyack & Cuban, 1999). By 
undermining this professionalism within a school, much of the capacity within the school 
is weakened or lost. If the professionals within a school feel threatened, then the chance 
of cooperating to bridge the internal and external accountability systems seems unlikely. 
The SDE must communicate and take actions that reflect an enabling strategy, otherwise, 
the new school accountability policy remains external to the school, and improvement 
efforts fall victim to the pitfalls that Bardach (1977) describes in a “system of 
deterrence.” 
Working Relationships 
As with any policy which requires intergovernmental cooperation, during the 
early phases of new school accountability two organizations, the SDE and the 
underperforming school, must work with one another, and, as they do this, they create a 
new context during policy implementation. The context for implementation may be as 
complex as the consideration of the values and priorities of each individual within an 
organization, or as simple as identifying the broad values embedded within an ever 
changing organization. For this reason it is important to identify a guide or framework 
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for exploring the working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school 
during the implementation of new school accountability policy. 
The SDE and the school lack a working relationship history (Madsen, 1994), and 
they are from different organizational contexts, which bring about a variety of possible 
glitches in the policy implementation process. They are both beholden to the state; 
however, the school must also meet the demands of the local school board, parents, and 
community. The SDE must satisfy the state politicians, governor, and legislators, as well 
as those in the state board of education. The school is ultimately responsible for 
implementing the policies, laws, and regulations of the federal, state, and local 
governments. The SDE is responsible for providing information to inform the laws and 
regulations, as well as enforcing these same laws. In the end, the SDE, the school, and 
the district are all working within the public education system, but the constituencies they 
serve, and the requirements of their positions within the system, make them different. 
When considering these differences one expects that policy implementation may not be 
as streamlined as the policymakers might presume. 
The personal and individual relationships the members of the SDE and the school 
develop will dictate how policy is negotiated, and whether early intervention successfully 
avoids the strong interventions and leads to improvements in educational outcomes. 
Indeed, Lin’s (2000) suggestions that solidarity and individual relationships encourage 
cooperation and internalization of policy mandates, both come into play in the work of 
Bryk and Schneider (2002), who found that a combination of individual relationships 
among levels within a school system (e.g., SDE, district and school) as well as the 
solidarity of interrelationships among groups (e.g., teachers) contribute to the success of 
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improvement initiatives within a school. The art of balancing and appropriately placing 
control and individual relationships becomes part of the new school accountability policy 
context. The perceptions of the SDE implementers and the underperforming school 
educators will dictate the level of cooperation and type of working relationship they will 
have with one another. In a study on environmental policy implementation Scheberle 
(1997) draws the conclusion that relationships among implementers are important to 
policy outcomes. This finding suggests the ability of the SDE to develop a positive 
relationship with the underperforming school will have a profound impact on the 
implementation process. 
If working relationships between the SDE and underperforming school affect the 
policy implementation process, then it is necessary to develop a way to examine these 
relationships. Scheberle (1997) developed a working relationship typology (Figure 2.1) 
that is useful for the study of new school accountability policy for several reasons. First, 
it is based on the study of public agencies (environmental protection agencies) that are 
working to implement policy that is intended for the public good. Both public education 
and the environment are public goods. Public education, like the protection of the 
environment, is difficult to look at in purely economic terms. The long term benefits are 
difficult to calculate, but are perceived to some degree to be a benefit to society. Hence, 
public education is an institution of society that has a degree of public faith, priority, and 
trust, which may not be as prevalent in other organizations. Second, within the public 
sector the typology is designed to examine the relationship of two distinctly separate, yet 
dependent organizations that many policymakers may see as naturally cooperative, and 
therefore, overlook the challenges of cooperation between these organizations. Third, to 
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understand how these working relationships function, the typology takes into account the 
negotiation and bargaining that goes on after a policy is developed and places importance 
on the study of this part of the implementation process. Though a policy may be 
developed, it is still being honed during implementation, and evidence of this is found in 
the working relationship between the SDE and underperforming school. Specifically, the 
staff’s perceptions and levels of trust and involvement with one another dictate the type 
of working relationship they have. 
The key elements in the typology are involvement and trust levels within the 
confines of a particular policy. Because a policy is evolving in meaning as it is 
implemented (Elmore, 1979), so too are the working relationships between the SDE and 
the underperforming school as new school accountability policy is being negotiated, 
bargained, and fitted for this new context. 
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(Scheberle, 1997, p. 18) 
Figure 2.1: A Typology of Federal and State Working Relationships 
Scheberle (1997) designed a working relationship typology to examine just such a 
working relationship (Figure 2.1). In this typology Scheberle (1997) identifies two 
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essential elements to working relationships, mutual trust and involvement of both 
partners. Involvement is defined as the interaction between the two entities. Trust is 
defined by Scheberle as the degree to which the other is dedicated to the “intent of the 
policy.” The variables of involvement and trust are examined after a policy or program 
has been implemented. In the depiction, involvement and trust are the crucial variables in 
characterizing a working relationship. 
The four types of working relationships Scheberle (1997) identifies are: 1) pulling 
together and synergistic, 2) cooperative but autonomous, 3) coming apart with avoidance, 
and 4) coming apart and contentious. “Pulling together and synergistic” is high in trust 
and involvement between the two entities. According to Scheberle this is the ideal 
working relationship. It is characterized as a general willingness of both parties to 
contribute, support, and play an active role in the implementation of policy. A 
“cooperative but autonomous” relationship is “cooperative, but lonely” (Scheberle, 1997, 
p. 20). “Coming apart with avoidance” is a relationship that is shallow at best and 
plagued by mistrust. The “Coming apart and contentious” working relationship is 
marked by low levels of trust. It requires one of the entities to dominate and relies upon 
detailed reporting from the other. Missing from this type of relationship is the notion of 
reciprocity, which leads to negative perceptions about one another. The negative 
perceptions turn into a vicious, downward spiraling cycle in which one of the two entities 
must make a move to break the cycle (Scheberle, 1997). 
The variables of trust and involvement lead to identification of the type of 
working relationship that exists using this typology. Taking it a step further, a 
“motivation attributions model” of trust developed by Mumighan, Malhorta and Weber 
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(2003) is used to take into account the uneven playing field between two potential 
partners. By identifying strategies that may increase the likelihood of developing a 
trusting relationship between two entities such as the SDE and the school, the motivation 
attributions model provides characteristics to look for during the process of policy 
implementation and the working relationship negotiation. To examine particular 
elements of trust, aspects of the motivated attributions model of trust developed by 
Mumighan, Malhotra and Weber (2003) specifically takes into account the characteristics 
of: feelings of dependence, sincerity of trusting acts, evaluation of ambiguous 
information (positively or negatively), perceived likelihood of reciprocity of the other 
party, risk reducing behaviors to encourage trust, consistent and clear communication. 
Involvement 
Involvement in simple terms is the level of interaction between two organizations 
(the SDE and the underperforming school) during policy implementation (the early 
phases of new school accountability implementation). Scheberle (1997) describes the 
element of involvement within the working relationship typology as being defined by 
interaction between two entities within the confines of a specific program or policy. Put 
in new school accountability terms, involvement is the degree to which the SDE and the 
underperforming school work with one another. The assumption behind the involvement 
variable is that the greater the involvement between the two during implementation, will 
lead to either a cooperative or a micromanaged working relationship. On the other hand, 
lower levels of involvement between the two will result in a weaker working relationship. 
By adding the trust variable the integrity of involvement may be affected, this is the basic 
premise for involvement when considered as part of the working relationship typology. 
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Because relationships, like implementation and policy making are in a constant 
state of flux or negotiation, to look at a working relationship at one point in time limits 
the understanding of the implementation process and the working relationship as it 
evolves. Since the SDE switches from a deterrent to an enabling approach during the 
early phases of implementation, it is likely that this relationship will change as the SDE 
and the underperforming schools interact and discover this change. In fact, past history 
of involvement can dictate the terms on which the working relationship is functioning 
(Boon & Holmes, 1991; Lindskold, 1978; Swinth, 1967). Additionally, expectations for 
future involvement have been found to impact cooperation, and not surprisingly the past 
relationship has a strong relationship to these expectations (Mumighan, Malhotra, & 
Weber, 2003). If the past and future expectations can influence a working relationship, 
then one can take a short leap and surmise that the involvement and interactions during 
the actual implementation will also impact the working relationship. 
Along with the past, present, and future, the duration of the working relationship 
must be taken into consideration. For example, if a coworker does not particularly like a 
new consultant, but she knows that the consultant is expected to be working in the office 
for a long period of time, she may be more likely to cooperate with the consultant than if 
the consultant’s duration at the office were a shorter period of time. Staff members from 
the schools hold opinions about the state system of education of which they are a part. 
Just the same, staff in the SDE also hold opinions about schools. While new school 
accountability policy brings about a new dynamic between the two, it does not negate the 
understanding among each that they are involved with one another even if they are only 
loosely coupled. Therefore, there is a long term nature to their relationship, which will 
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influence the evolution of the working relationship between the SDE and the 
underperforming school. There is an expectation that the involvement between the SDE 
and the underperforming school is ongoing; however, the level of involvement between 
them is more intense during the early intervention portion of new school accountability 
implementation. 
Involvement and trust are not completely separate from one another. For 
example, if involvement between two parties is positive, or at least not negative, then the 
history of involvement can increase the likelihood of trust (Boon & Holmes, 1991; 
Lindskold, 1978; Swinth, 1967). The history of the relationship between the SDE and the 
school becomes an important factor to understanding from where the two are starting. In 
fact, the perceptions that the SDE and school have of one another may or may not be 
based on actual interaction with members of each others organization. Regardless, these 
perceptions before and during the implementation of new school accountability policy 
influence the expectations each has for the other. The time dimension of past, present, 
and future within the involvement variable is particularly important to the working 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Trust 
Scheberle (1997) defines the level of mutual trust as the degree to which 
participants believe others “are dedicated to effectively implementing the policy” (p. 17). 
Gambetta (1988) identifies trust as a key element of cooperation, and in the typology 
developed by Scheberle (1997) it is trust that is at the foundation of the working 
relationship. Fitting this into new school accountability terms, trust is the degree to 
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which the SDE and the underperforming school believe the other is authentically working 
to improve educational outcomes within the school. 
It is an admittedly oversimplified notion of trust. Buck (1998) suggests that 
missing from the conceptualization of trust in the Scheberle (1997) study is the idea of 
reciprocity. In terms of new school accountability policy, reciprocity means the belief 
that the other (SDE or underperforming school) will come through on promises 
embedded in the policy (e.g., technical assistance, financial support, political support). 
Thus, trust must include the concept of self-perception as well as perception of the other 
as they move through early implementation. A back and forth reflection over time will 
be more likely to capture the concept of reciprocity within the working relationship 
between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Volumes of work on trust have attempted to develop the concept of trust and 
cooperation (e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988; Axelrod, 1984; Mumighan, 
Malhotra, & Weber, 2003; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) signifying that defining 
and researching trust is a prodigious task and suggesting that the Scheberle (1997) 
definition may be limited by oversimplification. Still, even a simplistic definition of trust 
is worthwhile because the importance of the frontline workers relationship, including 
trust and cooperation, and its impact on policy implementation is paramount to the effect 
of policy (Lipsky, 1977; Maynard Moody & Musheno, 2003). 
Rational models of trust describe incremental acts of trust that grow a trusting 
relationship; however, there are acts of trust that are not captured by this type of model 
(Kelley, 1979, Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). The 
switch from a deterrent to an enabling strategy does not set a solid foundation for 
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incremental acts of trust over time. Rather, the switch is swift once the threat of being 
identified as underperforming becomes a reality, and to take an enabling approach is 
seemingly contradictory (and will likely seem like this to those in the school), to the 
initial understanding of the policy. Within a short period of time the SDE and school will 
need to establish the new enabling strategy and begin on a path toward improvement. 
The rapid change in strategy and differences between the two strategies make it unlikely 
that a rational, incremental model of trust will fit this policy implementation 
circumstance, thus the alternative acts of trust may prove a better fit. 
“Irrational” acts of trust occur in every day life, and prove to be an exception to 
the traditional rational models. For example, why would a more dependent person make 
a decision to trust someone who has more power and authority? It happens all of the 
time, and beyond the idea of faith, Weber, Malhorta, and Mumighan (2003) seek to 
redefine the idea that this kind of trust is irrational and call attention that “these acts, 
rather than being irrational and ineffective, can be crucial to trust development” (Weber, 
Malhorta, & Mumighan, 2003, Abstract) through what they call the “motivated 
attributions model of trust.” 
The motivated attributions model of trust calls attention to characteristics that 
may be looked for during the implementation of new school accountability policy. This 
model “portrays the trust development process as one that depends on each party’s 
interpretations of each other’s actions and which, as a result, may be far from smooth” 
(Weber, Malhorta, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 25). This is a natural fit for looking at new 
school accountability policy implementation because of the change in strategy that occurs 
after the threat of underperformance becomes real. 
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The SDE and the underperforming school are in an asymmetrical relationship 
with the policy implying that the SDE has authority over the school, while in reality the 
expertise for improving the delivery of education (the end-goal of new school 
accountability policy) resides within the school (trained, professional educators). So, 
though the SDE is technically above the underperforming school in the hierarchy of 
public education, the loosely coupled system of public education means that the 
connection is not as direct as may be presumed by new school accountability policy. 
Therefore, though the SDE is considered to have authority over the underperforming 
school, it is actually more of a negotiated relationship between the two. 
Initially, one might assume that the underperforming school is more dependent 
upon the SDE, but the actual delivery of education occurs at “bottom” of the hierarchy. 
The expertise for the improvement of education exists at the lowest level of the public 
education system. The SDE relies upon the professionals at the (so-called) bottom of the 
hierarchy, and is consequently dependent upon their expertise to improve the delivery of 
education. A dynamic of one party being more dependent on the other is often found in a 
relationship and the motivated attributions model proposes characteristics of how a 
positive working relationship can be developed in just such a situation. Specifically, the 
model proposes characteristics that motivate trust between two parties when the playing 
field is less than even. 
The model proposes characteristics of mutual trust being dependent upon large 
acts of trust, which then spur on a mutual trusting relationship. It recognizes each 
entity’s understanding of dependency of themselves and the other party, as well as the 
impact of self-image and positive reinforcement. Some of the propositions within the 
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model that are particularly applicable to new school accountability policy implementation 
follow. 
First, when there are two parties involved, the party that is most dependent upon 
“mutual trust”, or perceives the greatest dependency on the other, will be “more 
motivated and more likely to initiate a trusting act” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 
2003, p. 12). This is an interesting proposition because there may be some confusion, at 
least initially, as to who is the more dependent between the SDE and the underperforming 
school. The school staff may feel as though they have failed, lost control, and feel 
dependent upon the will of the SDE and/or may feel threatened and defensive toward the 
SDE during intervention. At the same time the SDE, with limited expertise, resources, 
and overall capacity may actually be more dependent upon the trust and cooperation of 
the underperforming school in order for the enabling strategy to work. 
Second, “as their dependence increases, potential trustors will... evaluate 
ambiguous information about the counterpart positively... [and] be more likely to engage 
in large acts of trust” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 14). As the SDE and the 
underperforming school recognize their dependence upon one another and the switch to 
an enabling strategy, they begin to expect the other is trustworthy and will reciprocate 
acts of trust. Again, the more dependent party must initiate and establish this during 
intervention, and because of the need for cooperation with the school, it will likely be the 
SDE that will need to take a leap of faith and expect a trusting relationship from the 
underperforming school. 
Third, the perceptions of actions of the other party are essential. Weber, 
Malhotra, and Mumighan, (2003) call attention to “sincere” as opposed to “calculative” 
56 
acts of trust and the perception of the trusting parties with regards to these acts will either 
increase or decrease the likelihood of reciprocity and eventually developing a positive 
and trusting relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Fourth, “[precipitous trusting acts will accelerate the development of mutual 
trust” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 17). Besides the point that the SDE is 
more reliant upon cooperation and a level of mutual trust with the underperforming 
school, the SDE has more experience with implementing new school accountability 
policy. Therefore, the SDE is in the position to set the tone of the relationship with the 
underperforming school. If the SDE representatives conduct themselves in a trusting 
manner from the start, they may accelerate the potential for a positive working 
relationship. 
Fifth, “[Reciprocity will be more likely when it reinforces a positive self¬ 
impression or reduces the likelihood of negative self-impression” (Weber, Malhotra, & 
Mumighan, 2003, p. 18). This is a key point when looking at the early phases of new 
school accountability implementation because studies by Acker-Hocevar and Touchton 
(2001) and Mathers and King (2001) report findings that principals and staff within the 
underperforming school find the SDE intervention to be threatening and to lower morale 
within the school. The “underperforming” designation reinforces a negative self¬ 
impression. Therefore, for the SDE to gain a functioning level of trust and positive 
working relationship, then implementation must include strategies that reduce the initially 
negative self-impression brought about by the policy and the underperforming label. 
Last, “[c]lear communication can accelerate explicit understandings of each 
party’s trusting actions and expectations and increase the likelihood of a mutually 
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beneficial trust development process” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 21). 
Communication is an easy tool that the SDE representatives can use to show their 
dependence upon the expertise within the underperforming school and to show 
“precipitous acts of trust” to form the basis of a positive working relationship. This 
characteristic is supported by the enabling strategy, which entails communication, 
individual relationships, and flexibility (Lin, 200), and requires a combination of 
availability, openness, and direct communication between the SDE and the 
underperforming school. Again, the SDE, having participated in many early 
interventions, is in the position to train staff and consultants to use this style of 
communication. Clear lines of communication between the SDE and the 
underperforming school during the early phases of implementation will facilitate the 
potential for forming a positive working relationship. 
The motivated attributions model of trust is appropriate for analyzing the working 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school for several reasons. While 
both the SDE and the underperforming school are dependent upon one another for 
successful implementation, they are not on a level playing field. Initially, it seems (and 
likely feels this way to school staff) that the underperforming school is in the more 
vulnerable, and therefore, dependent position. New school accountability policy, 
however, places greater control (and responsibility) in the hands of the SDE. The lines of 
authority and responsibility to improve the delivery of education point directly to the 
SDE, and presumably those in the SDE who ultimately will be held accountable to the 
policymakers for achieving the end goal. Without the technical expertise or resources to 
improve education and by employing an enabling strategy relying on the professional 
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expertise of those within the school, in a sense, the SDE is more dependent upon the 
school’s cooperation than the school is upon the SDE. The SDE technically has the most 
power at the top of the hierarchy, but is also most vulnerable as the entity that is 
ultimately accountable for upholding the state constitutional responsibility to ensure the 
delivery of an adequate education to all students. Consequently, the SDE benefits the 
most from “mutual trust,” follows proposition one of the mutual attribution model, and 
initially takes the greater risk to launch a trusting relationship. 
The remaining propositions of the mutual attributions model ring familiar to the 
Weick (1979) definition of organization, which is when two separate parties recognize 
that to get something that is out of their individual organization’s reach they need the 
help of the other and decide to collaborate to accomplish this goal. In a sense, 
cooperation is a less formal type of organization and trust is its foundation. Reciprocity, 
sincerity, positive self-impressions, perceptions of others, clear communication, and 
supporting actions all work together to create a mutually trusting, and cooperative 
relationship. It is these factors that provide the framework for investigating the working 
relationship between the SDE and the school change during the implementation process. 
Levels of trust vary within the underperforming schools. The district’s 
representation of the SDE, and the limited (if any) interactions between SDE staff and the 
school both impact levels of trust. I expect that cooperation between the SDE and the 
underperforming school staff will change over time for three reasons. First, the 
presumptions within the new school accountability policy are so strong that initially the 
locals may believe being identified as underperforming equates to a hostile take over. 
Changing this mindset may be an arduous task for the SDE staff, and the SDE must not 
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only talk about cooperation and support, but also take actions that reflect their talk. The 
SDE is dependent on the cooperation of the school, because the SDE staff do not have the 
skill, expertise, or resources to take over individual schools. Second, as the SDE staff 
start being seen as individual people (and as the school staff are seen as individual 
people) with expertise and skills, this familiarity improves trust levels. In most cases, 
schools and SDE’s are so distant from one another in the organization of the public 
education system that they do not even know each other. Last, the way the SDE staff, as 
the more dependent party, approach the implementation of new school accountability 
dictates the working relationship. The more able the SDE is in triggering Gouldner’s 
(1969) norm of reciprocity, the better the working relationship, which may lead to 
successful policy implementation. 
The limitations of applying the motivated attribution model of trust are its 
applications at the organizational level. Trust is a complex concept. At the 
organizational level trust is based on the ideas of individuals, sub groups, larger groups 
and finally the organization itself. These variables can cause a wide range of outcomes. 
Weber, Malhorta, and Mumighan (2003) suggest that it is possible to apply their model at 
the organizational level, but it may be difficult to obtain a single idea about the trust level 
of an organization. This is where the working relationship typology (Scheberle, 1997) 
comes into play. The model, with its limitations, has been applied to organizations. By 
using the model to take the “temperature” of the working relationship at different points 




Trust in a relationship encompasses some level of risk to the organization. In fact, 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and Luhmann (1988) put forth that cooperation 
does not necessarily require trust, but is rather a “willingness to take risk” (Mayer, Davis, 
and Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). In the terms that trust is defined by Scheberle (1997), risk 
is included in the definition. New school accountability policy implementation represents 
risk especially during interventions (Brady, 2003). In fact, I suggest that this risk is 
evident at the institutional, organizational, and personal/professional levels for staff 
within the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Institutionally, a school being thought of as “underperforming” risks undermining 
the public’s faith and trust in public education as a pillar of democracy (Tyack & Cuban, 
1999). An institution’s credibility largely rests on the public’s perception of its mission, 
and what it offers. If the idea of public education as a public good is destabilized, then 
the institution itself may be in peril. Though those in the SDE and in the 
underperforming school may understand that the public education system has 
imperfections, there is an overarching “logic of confidence” (Meyer & Rowan, 1978) 
within the public education system, which is “the process of maintaining the other’s face 
or identity and thus maintaining the plausibility and legitimacy of the organization itself’ 
(p. 102). 
Organizationally, both the SDE and the underperforming school are at risk under 
new school accountability policy. What Meyer and Rowan (1978) refer to as the 
“technical core” of the school is being challenged and intervened in by virtual outsiders 
(the SDE). New school accountability requires those in the SDE to be experts (Lusi, 
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1997) in what goes on in the school. This is a dramatic shift from the administrative and 
regulating style of the SDE, and puts the reputation of the SDE at risk of not meeting this 
policy demand. 
On a personal/professional level new school accountability threatens the 
professional, self-regulating nature of teachers, principals and SDE public administrators 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Tyack & Cuban, 1999). With all of this risk, in many ways, the 
SDE and the underperforming school are on the same team, but are coming from very 
different perspectives. The level of risk is considerable for the SDE and the 
underperforming school, and therefore trust and cooperation cannot be disentangled. 
Acker-Hocevar and Touchton (2001) and Mathers and King (2001) found that reactions 
of those in the school are likely to be reactionary and defensive. The profession of 
teachers and schooling brings about territorial issues within the local community and 
within the profession of teaching (O’Day, 2002). 
Early phases of new school accountability must incorporate strategies to gain the 
trust of those in the school and community, despite the risk. The reality and explanation 
of the school accountability process may be overlooked for the possible end result of 
strong interventions such as take over or reconstitution looming in the air. It becomes a 
threatening situation for schools and may naturally hinder the collaborative spirit between 
the SDE and the school. 
Policy Incentives v. Contextual Trust 
The idea of incentives is often found in the literature on policy and 
implementation. In much of the policy literature there is an implicit, and sometimes 
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explicit assumption that effective implementation of policy often has more to do with 
getting the incentives right than anything else (Bardach, 1977; Stoker, 1999). Stoker 
(1999) clearly identifies a need for incentives to motivate the target group or those 
responsible for implementing policy to accomplish the end goals of a policy. Logically, 
this makes sense, and to a degree is probably true. 
While incentives may be a catalyst for change, I suggest that the longevity of a 
change may additionally be dependent on the level of trust and involvement between the 
implementers and the targets of policy implementation. The idea of trust between 
organizations builds upon the research of Lin (2000), which suggests that incentives are 
important, but additionally, the organizational context is important. The context is where 
one finds trust and involvement or the working relationship. When a policy requires two 
organizations to cooperate in a new way, a new context is created, and the relationship 
and levels of trust between the two organizations become embedded in this new context. 
Stoker (1991) emphasizes incentives as a tool to maintain policy intent. He notes 
that it is incentives that will bring “reluctant partners” to the bargaining table, because the 
default mode within an organization is to continue to adhere to the organization’s current 
practices and values. The example he provides is the payment of federal taxes. The 
assumption is that no one wants to pay taxes out of their pockets, but the desire to avoid 
punishment by the Internal Revenue Service motivates people to pay their taxes to avoid 
the risk of the consequences if they did not pay them. Bardach (1977) describe a similar 
type of “deterrent” system which functions on disincentives if a policy is not followed. 
This type of policy is like new school accountability policy. The imperative to improve 
educational outcomes within a school is created by the strong desire to maintain local 
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control and avoid the scrutiny of the state (SDE). The challenge that Bardach (1977) 
points to is what happens once a target, in this case the school, does not meet the 
improvement goals. The system of deterrence loses its incentive (or disincentive). 
Stoker (1991) implies that when one is caught the swift and simple punishment of 
a fine may be enough to get the taxpayer back on track. At that point, the metaphor loses 
its currency when considering new school accountability, because the remedy is not 
swift, nor is it simple. Once a school is underperforming the motivation from the threat 
of publicly being declared underperforming is over. Therefore, a new motivation and 
support must be developed for new school accountability policy to be effective. This is 
the point where the legislation is less clear. Although it is true that there are increasing 
levels of intervention (or threats) that lessen local control, if a school does not respond to 
initial supports this may not be enough incentive for those particular schools to change or 
alter their delivery of education. Motivation or incentive to change cannot only come 
from the threat of further intervention, because it does nothing to empower or enable staff 
in the schools. Also it creates a situation where the SDE must become increasingly more 
involved in running the school, something an SDE is organizationally ill-suited to do. 
Also, if a school staff had been really working to improve educational outcomes (test 
scores) to no avail, the SDE intervening within the school may find a low morale, and a 
deficient level of motivation among staff (Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001; Mathers & 
King, 2001), leading to a negative self-perception. Since the SDE needs the cooperation 
and the expertise of those from within the school, the policy, which creates a scenario 
where professional power is taken away and morale within the school is lowered, runs 
64 
counter to the direction and type of working relationship the SDE will need in order to 
accomplish the intended policy outcome. A change in context is needed. 
Lin’s (2000) ideas about the context in which a policy is implemented become 
important during the study of the beginning of intervention because an SDE is in a 
position to build new incentives by translating the federal and state requirements into the 
existing values and context of the underperforming school. The SDE is at once the 
arbitrator, the translator, and the advocate for the underperforming school. As the SDE 
achieves successes in these roles, new incentives to comply with new school 
accountability policy will be created, but underlying all of these roles and incentives is 
the concept of a trusting relationship between the school and the SDE. The relationship 
may not be strong between the two organizations, but will likely be built on the 
interpersonal relationships between the SDE representative and the underperforming 
school leaders and staff. Cooperation in a working relationship between the two requires 
a level of trust, common goals, shared values, and the right people forging the right 
relationships (Galvin & Fauske, 2000). 
In the field of policy analysis the emphasis on incentives is appropriate because 
incentives are (possibly) within the domain that policymakers and implementers may 
actually control. Cooperation is dependent upon levels of trust and involvement, which 
are more elusive and less easy to dictate within written policy or standardized 
implementation procedures. One must, therefore, look at the implementation process to 
gain insight into the role of these characteristics. Incentives and cooperation within 
policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Weber, Malhorta & Mumighan, 2003), 
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without some level of trust between the policymakers and the targets, the implementation 
of policy disintegrates. 
Even those who believe incentives are important for policy implementation 
mention trust as an element of any relationship (e.g., Bardach, 1977; Lin, 2000; 
Scheberle, 1997; Stoker, 1999). Fullan (1991) calls the idea of attempting a complete 
policy solution at the policy maker level a “rational fallacy.” Lin (2000) describes the 
rational fallacy of incentives as moving and changing targets when she notes: 
No magic bullet exists for implementation. No particular set of 
values or incentives is best suited to the successful implementation 
of programs... in general. Instead, the ability of any particular set 
of organizational practices and beliefs to foster the successful 
implementation of a program can only be measured in terms of 
incentives it provides, at any particular time, for staff & clients to 
participate in the program, and in terms of the match between 
existing institutional values and the program activities they will 
justify. 
(Lin, 2000, p. 128) 
While policy is often heralded as successful due to the tangible incentives, it does 
not preclude the need for the intangible trust, especially in a context that is without (at 
least initially) any real financial, professional, or organizational (as it exists before state 
intervention) incentives to cooperate with the SDE. On the other hand, there are 
organizational and possibly even professional incentives for members of the SDE to 
participate. The limited capacity of the SDE to take over a school is incentive enough to 
build on any existing strengths within the school in order to avoid having to take the most 
drastic of actions of strong interventions, which requires resources and capacity the SDE 
is unlikely to possess and implies a failure of the deterrent policy. The more those within 
the SDE recognize the need to avert takeovers, the stronger the incentive or 
organizational value and priority placed upon cooperating with those in the school to 
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improve educational outcomes. As Hanushek and Raymond (2002) note, “[m]uch less 
information is available about the range and scope of reactions to improve 
performance.. .the exact nature of the response.. .is uncertain” (pp. 30-31). The missing 
variable within any context for implementation is the understanding of the individual and 
unique situation. 
Conclusion 
The dynamics of the working relationship between the school and the SDE are 
essential to understanding the process of implementing “new accountability” systems. 
Kelley (2000) asserts that, “... in practice, the student, the classroom, the school, the 
district, and the policy environment are co-equal and interdependent partners in the 
education and policy system” (p. 79). However, Cuban (2004) finds that the history of 
the U.S. public education system reveals a loosely structured organization in which these 
entities (SDE, district, and school) are more prone to act as rivals rather than partners. 
New school accountability requires state control over the school, and compliance and 
commitment from the school educators, both of which the SDE does not have the 
perceived authority or capacity to accomplish alone. 
The gap between the policy assumptions about the structure of the education 
system, and the reality of how it is organized requires the SDE and the underperforming 
school to move from a deterrent strategy to an enabling strategy that uses the assets of the 
individual school. This change to an enabling strategy relies upon the collaboration of 
the underperforming school in order to have a functioning working relationship. 
Limitations of information during the early phases of new school accountability 
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contribute to the complexity of implementation. Further, Giroux (1992) states that 
participants in collaboration... 
[m]ust be encouraged to cross ideological and political borders as a 
way of furthering the limits of their own understanding in a setting 
that is pedagogically safe and socially nurturing rather than 
authoritarian and infused with suffocating smugness of certain 
political correctness. 
(Giroux, 1992, p. 33) 
Creating this environment takes time and resources the SDE and the 
underperforming school may not have under the short timelines for improvement in the 
state and federal (NCLB) guidelines. Lin (2000) identifies the need for what Bardach 
(1977) calls a “fixer,” or what might be better described as an ambassador of the policy, 
as essential to implementing policy. The foundation for this role is a trusting relationship 
between the SDE (ambassador/translator) and the underperforming school (target). Lin 
(2000) notes: 
The challenge this points to is that of creating trust between those 
who ... monitor the policy and ...the target groups who feel its 
effects. Staff and policy targets do not resist policy, or each other, 
simply out of natural orneriness. Instead they do so because, 
directly or indirectly, program mandates or sanctions force them to 
abandon coping strategies that at least have the virtues of 
familiarity and predictability. 
(Lin, 2000, p. 166) 
Every state in the union is developing and implementing new school 
accountability policy. Yet, we know very little about how an SDE and a school function 
under such policy. It is time to shed some light upon the implementation of new school 
accountability policy. If early strategic and diagnostic interventions of a school 
accountability system are built around these known assumptions about collaboration and 
unique characteristics of individual organizations within the public education system, 
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then moving underperforming schools into the strongest interventions may be averted. 
Because of the established limited capacity of the SDE's (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997; 
Madsen, 1994), it is in the state’s best interest to have successful mild and moderate 
interventions requiring fewer of the scarce SDE’s accountability resources. 
Overcoming the threat of the policy and facing the reality of the capacity of the 
state and the structure of the public education system sums up the challenges of 
implementing new school accountability policy. The coercive nature of a “new 
accountability’ system adds to the difficulty (Mintrop, 2002). Becher (1989) states: 
Coercion would seem a prompt and efficient means of putting any 
proposal into effect...[but] those who are required to carry out the 
resulting policies have no sense of ownership of them.... They 
may elect to ignore them or at best to interest them in ways that 
serve their own interests. 
(Becher, 1989, p. 54) 
School ownership of the goals of new school accountability policy is essential because is 
it is more likely to impact the “technical core” of the school that is created and controlled 
by the professional educators with the school and classrooms. 
Efficiency is the cornerstone of the bureaucratic assumptions within the policy, 
but it may not yield intended result of an improved, high quality system of education6. 
O’Day (2002) adds to this idea by specifically addressing the innate challenge of new 
school accountability policy. 
The heart of the issue is the problematic relationship between 
external and internal sources of control and the implications of this 
relationship for the organizational learning and improvement. 
Organizational systems have several mechanisms at their disposal 
to control the behavior of individuals and subunits. 
(O’Day, 2002, p. 3) 
6 Some critics of new school accountability believe that the policy is intended to privatize the public 
education system. This research, however, is focused on the existing public education system and 
improvement of the delivery of education within that system. 
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Efficient and rational policy, like new school accountability, omits the social and 
human dynamic that makes up the public education system. The onus is upon the SDE to 
develop a system of accountability that accommodates this dynamic between the external 
and internal systems. Specific research on new school accountability, and how this 
rational policy is injected within the human/social dynamic is needed. 
By examining the early processes and dynamics between the state and the school, 
the voices of the practitioners experiencing the beginning of intervention are added to the 
discussion of new school accountability policy and intervention into underperforming 
schools. Given the scarce resources of time and money along with the limited capacity of 
the state, collaboration with the underperforming school and respect, without 
“smugness,” are important ingredients for improving the educational outcomes in all 
schools, especially underperforming schools. The working relationship between the SDE 
and the underperforming school is the informal organization or context in which the two 




This research is on the critical beginning of new school accountability 
implementation. The aim of the study is to find out more about the policy 
implementation process during the earliest phases of new school accountability from the 
perspective of those in the SDE and the underperforming school. Falling in line with 
phenomenological methodologies which are used to “...attempt to understand the 
meaning of events and interactions to ordinary people in particular situations” (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 1982, p. 31), the study is designed to understand how the working relationship 
between the SDE staff and the underperforming school staff changes as new school 
accountability policy is implemented. It strives to improve our understanding of the 
meanings participants place on elements of the policy during the implementation process 
and to identity elements that support or hamper new school accountability policy. 
The assumptions at the foundation of this inquiry are that the working relationship 
between the SDE and the underperforming school impact the new school accountability 
policy implementation process, and that rather than a command and control style of 
implementation implied within the policy, implementation requires negotiation and 
bargaining between the SDE and underperforming school at the point of implementation 
or the “street level.” 
To understand this working relationship, it is necessary to explore the perceptions 
the SDE staff and the underperforming school staff have of one another, the history of 
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their relationship, and the levels of involvement and of trust in early intervention and 
implementation. This section provides information on the research design and 
methodology used to obtain these perceptions and how the working relationship changes 
as new school accountability policy is implemented. 
All names and places, with the exception of the state where this research took 
place, have been changed to provide anonymity to interview participants. 
Research Questions 
A few things stand out with regard to this kind of research. First, it is important 
to understand the perceptions of the individuals engaged in implementing new school 
accountability policy, including both SDE officials and the “target group,” which include 
the educators in the underperforming schools, and indirectly administrators in the districts 
in which the underperforming schools reside. The context of policy implementation is 
part of the essence of this study, and it is therefore necessary to examine these 
perceptions within their natural setting. For this reason, I have chosen to conduct an 
interpretive, phenomenological study. Both the experiences of those implementing new 
school accountability policy and the structure of the policy implementation process are 
the focal points of this qualitative study. Within this context I will focus on the following 
questions: 1) how do the SDE and the underperforming school understand their 
respective roles with regards to the implementation of new school accountability policy; 
2) what is new about the relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school; 
3) how do the SDE and underperforming school understand and perceive each other 
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within the new context; 4) how has the relationship changed over time; and 5) what has 
changed the relationship over time? 
Throughout the exploration for answers to these questions, structure and 
experience are central to this research, as within any phenomenological study. As Patton 
(1990) states, 
...[the] essences [of shared meaning] are the core meanings mutually 
understood through phenomenon commonly experienced. The 
experiences of different people are bracketed, and analyzed, and compared 
to identify the essences of the phenomenon... 
(p. 70) 
The perceptions of the staff within the SDE and the underperforming school provide 
information on how new school accountability policy is understood and how this 
understanding changes for each as the policy is implemented. 
Unit of Analysis 
The phenomenon under study is the interaction between the actors within the SDE 
and the underperforming school during the earliest phases of state intervention and the 
perceptions each has of one another. This encompasses the actual interactions, 
communications and perceptions of one another at different points in this process. 
The “earliest phases” of new school accountability intervention means the 
interaction between the SDE and the school after a school has been identified, 
investigated, and gone through a diagnostic phase (see Table 2.1). Specifically, this 
occurs when a school: 1) does not meet established state performance criteria, 2) meets 
the SDE’s “strategic criteria” for state investigation of the school, and 3) is found to be 
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underperforming after the investigation and meets the criteria for state intervention, 
moving the school into the diagnostic intervention phase. 
The study examines the reflections of two underperforming schools in the same 
school district within the state of Massachusetts toward new school accountability policy. 
Interviews were conducted with principals and teachers at these schools: Alfred 
Elementary and Babson Elementary. District administrators, who participate in school 
improvement efforts in the Charlesburg Public School District, were also interviewed as 
part of the local level interviews. At the state level, administrators from the 
Massachusetts Department of Education, whose primary function is early intervention, 
underperforming schools, and school improvement, were interviewed. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with members of ABC Consulting, which is a consulting firm 
that contracts with the Massachusetts Department of Education on many of the early 
intervention activities. 
In Massachusetts early intervention is broken into two stages: the School Panel 
Review and the Fact Finding Review. The School Panel Review is much like the 
strategic criteria described in Table 2.1 and is used “[t]o assist the Commissioner in 
determining whether state intervention is needed to guide improvement efforts in schools 
where students' MCAS [Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System] performance 
is critically low and no trend toward improved student performance is evident from 
MCAS data” (Massachusetts Department of Education, Unknown). The School Review 
Panel, made up of administrators and educators from other Massachusetts school 
districts, submits a report to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education. The 
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Commissioner then makes a determination on the status of the school based on 
information from this report. 
If the Commissioner decides that a school is indeed “underperforming” then it 
must go through the diagnostic intervention called the Fact Finding Review. During this 
longer and more in-depth visit, contractors, who represent the DOE (members of ABC 
Consulting), with support from practitioners (from schools and districts that are outside 
of the district being intervened in), identify strengths and weaknesses that are used to 
inform the school improvement plan process. 
Information from the Fact Finding Review is used during the diagnostic and 
corrective intervention, which includes a school improvement planning process called the 
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM). PIM is a series of intensive technical 
assistance sessions for underperforming school teams that include the principal and are 
convened by the DOE. All underperforming schools are required to attend. District 
representatives also attend the PIM training but are generally not a part of a particular 
team, though they may serve as team facilitators. The outcome of the PIM training is to 
equip school teams with improvement tools based on data driven decision making. 
School teams are then expected to return to their schools and develop a school 
improvement plan using the tenets of PIM. The point when a school is identified as 
being potentially underperforming, diagnosed as underperforming, and provided 
technical assistance or from the School Panel Review, to the Fact Finding Review to the 
PIM encompasses the “earliest phases” of new school accountability policy 
implementation in Massachusetts. 
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The study of early intervention within two Massachusetts elementary schools 
(Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary) was conducted in a single public school 
district (Charlesburg Public School District) from February through November 2004. 
The observations of four School Panel Reviews occurred in three districts including the 
Charlesburg District from February through March 2004. Two of the School Panel 
Reviews were conducted in the Charlesburg district in which the two elementary schools 
selected for study reside. One of the elementary School Panel Reviews observed ended 
up being one of the elementary schools that was selected for interviews (Babson 
Elementary). Each School Panel Review lasted for two days. One Fact Finding Review 
was observed in May 2004 in the Charlesburg District. The Fact Finding Review lasted 
for four consecutive days. Interviews of the participants occurred between September 
and November 2004. Seventeen interviews were conducted ranging from 35 minutes to 
180 minutes in length. The average interview lasted approximately 60 minutes. An 
estimated 17 hours of interviews were conducted in person, and over the phone. 
In pursuit of understanding the relationships among participants during the 
earliest phases of new school accountability, the research project is limited to the 
examination of the relationship between the state and two underperforming elementary 
schools (Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary). Alfred Elementary went under 
review in the 2003 underperforming school review cycle, had been through the early 
intervention and was being “monitored” by the DOE. The second school, Babson 
Elementary, was selected from the 2004 underperforming school review cycle. Babson 
Elementary went through the School Panel Review, the Fact Finding Review in 2004 
(during the year of time of this research), and was awaiting the approval of their PIM 
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(school improvement) plan by the Massachusetts Board of Education at the time of the 
study. 
The decision to focus on two schools was made for several reasons. First, by 
limiting the number of schools studied, I hoped to gain a deeper insight to the relationship 
and perceptions of participants through in-depth interviews and surveys, thus increasing 
my ability to see the intricacies of this interaction. As Seidman (1991) notes, “the 
method of in-depth, phenomenological interviewing applied to a sample of participants 
who all experience similar structural and social conditions gives enormous power to the 
stories of a relatively few participants” (p. 45). Second, there is a limited pool of 
underperforming schools to choose from within Massachusetts. Only 26 schools have 
been declared underperforming since the first reviews/interventions (2000) and of those 
12 are elementary schools. Two elementary schools make up nearly 10% of the 
underperforming schools within the state, and 17 % of the underperforming elementary 
schools within Massachusetts. 
In the 2003 and 2004 review cycles there were more elementary schools selected 
for visits than any other type of school. This may be due in part to the greater numbers of 
elementary schools within the state and may signal that the Massachusetts DOE is 
focusing on this segment of the target population as an overall strategy (see Table 3.1). 
Because there are more elementary schools participating in the process, the likelihood of 
finding two elementary schools that were willing to participate in the study was greater. 
Since the DOE has reviewed a number of elementary schools, with the additional 
experience of working with elementary schools, there may be a better established 
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process, and it may be more indicative of the general characteristics of developing a 
working relationship when implementing new school accountability policy. 
The timeframe is limited to two years of a process that has been officially 
occurring for four years,1 because a significant policy change occurred in the 2002-2003 
academic year (as of the 2003 underperforming school review year). In that academic 
year, districts with high numbers of underperforming schools were provided with state 
funding for a school support specialist (specialist) to be placed in the district and 
considered an employee of the state, who supports schools in need of improvement and 
underperforming schools both in terms of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 
(NCLB) and the state Massachusetts Education Reform, 1993 (MERA) legislation. The 
specialist strategy has more than likely altered the relationship between the state and the 
school. Therefore examination of the relationship before and after the specialist, may be 
inconsistent. The inconsistency has been accounted for by limiting the research to the 
2003 and 2004 underperforming review cycles, which, at the time of this research, 
encompassed all of the cycles that occurred after the specialist strategy was implemented. 
Table 3.1: Massachusetts Schools Visited and Declared Underperforming, 
by Year, by Type 
Total Elementary Middle2 High 
Visited UPS Visited UPS Visited UPS Visited UPS 
TOTAL 61 26 23 12 ; 33 12 5 2 
2000 8 4 1 0 7 4 0 0 
2001 11 0 0 0 10 0 1 0 
2002 12 6 3 1 7 3 2 2 
2003 14 8 9 6 3 2 2 0 
2004 16 8 10 5 6 3 0 0 
UPS is the abbreviation for schools declared underperforming school. 
1 The Underperforming School Review process was first piloted in the 1999-2000 academic year. 
However, the official beginning of these reviews is considered to be in the 2000-2001 academic year. 
2 There are four kindergartens through eighth grade schools that have been visited, and one has been 
declared underperforming. The schools are counted in the “middle” school category. 
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In the past two cycles 15 schools have been declared underperforming and of 
those 11 are elementary schools. In fact, all but one of the elementary schools declared 
underperforming have been designated underperforming in the past two cycles (See 
Figure 3.1). The specialist strategy and the concentration upon elementary schools have 
coincided, and make the elementary school level the best fit for studying the early phases 
of new school accountability policy. 
Figure 3.1: 2000-2004 Massachusetts Schools Declared Underperforming, 
by Type, by Year 
The school interviews were conducted in Alfred Elementary and Babson 
Elementary. Each school was declared underperforming by the Massachusetts 
Commissioner of Education. To get an idea of how perceptions change over time, each 
individual school was chosen on the basis of being declared underperforming in a 
different academic year to capture how the new school accountability policy “settles.” 
Alfred Elementary School participated in the 2003 underperforming review cycle, and 
Babson Elementary School participated in the more recent 2004 underperforming review 
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cycle. By selecting schools from two different review cycles, I mean to examine the 
threat of state intervention that principals (Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001) feel early 
in the process, and to observe how the working relationship with the SDE evolves as time 
and different phases of intervention are understood over time. Moreover, this allows for 
a time dimension to be added to Scheberle’s (1997) working relationship typology. 
Limitations 
The rationale for selecting schools that have been declared underperforming in 
different academic years is to capture the differences in involvement and trust that 
emerge as the relationship evolves between the school and the state. The purpose of the 
method is to capture a point in time, and fit within time constraints of the research. A 
limitation of this approach is that each school setting is unique. As Salomon (1991) finds 
that, 
Classrooms (schools, families, therapies, cultures) are complex, 
often nested conglomerates of interdependent variables, events, 
perceptions, attitudes, expectations, and behaviors and thus cannot 
be approached in the same way that a study of single events and 
single variables can. 
(p. 1) 
Another limitation to selecting schools from different review periods is that it 
requires staff from schools declared underperforming in a previous year to recollect how 
they felt at different points in time. Weick (2001) calls attention to the idea that people 
tend to rationalize past actions or decisions into a sense making framework after the fact 
and may ignore the complexities and unknown that was present when they were taking 
the action or making the decision. This limitation, however, may be lessened because 
schools are being selected two different points in time, so that information on the 
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immediate reaction to SDE intervention is mostly taken from the underperforming school 
declared underperforming in the 2004 underperforming school review cycle. The 
underperforming school selected from the 2003 underperforming school review cycle 
was in the second year of SDE intervention and therefore provides a view point that 
allows participates to reflect upon their perceptions during early intervention and make 
sense of the process in retrospect (Weick, 2001). 
The interviews of teachers in Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary reveal 
different dispositions and attitudes toward the state, which may or may not be attributed 
to the difference in time. For example, Alfred Elementary, having been declared 
underperforming a year prior to Babson Elementary, certainly yielded answers to 
questions with more of a reflective and sense-making disposition. 
Additionally, it is sometimes challenging for teachers to distinguish between the 
different points in time (i.e. the School Panel Review versus the Fact Finding Review). 
Participants saw both as simply a “state visit.” Babson Elementary participants had 
similar challenges, but because it was relatively recent, the principal and teachers had 
more clarity about the different visits and their feelings during the different points in 
time. 
Participants 
The participants for this study are those who participate in the beginning of 
intervention at the state and the local level. They fall into two broad categories: state 
level participants, and local level participants. 
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State Level Participants 
Four members of the Massachusetts Department of Education Accountability and 
Targeted Assistance Cluster (DOE) were interviewed along with three members of the 
consulting firm ABC Consulting who: provide staffing, write reports for the panel, and 
conduct the bulk of the fact-finding reviews of underperforming schools. 
At the DOE the School Accountability and Targeted Assistance (ATA) Cluster is 
the part of the organization responsible for all aspects of the beginning of intervention. 
Interviews were conducted with four DOE staff including: 1) Daphne, the Director of 
School Performance Evaluation, who coordinates all aspects of the underperforming 
school reviews; 2) Debra, the Administrator for School and District Planning Support, 
who provides planning and support to the school support specialists within the district; 3) 
Dianne, a DOE Coordinator, who acts as a DOE liaison and monitor by visiting schools 
during the reviews and monitoring them after they have been declared underperforming; 
and 4) Dan, the DOE liaison, who also plays the role of DOE monitor. It is worthy of 
noting that many of the DOE staff I interviewed played a multitude of roles within ATA 
and their titles were modified accordingly. However, the titles used here are appropriate 
to their roles and participation in the beginning of intervention. 
Interviews with the contractors from ABC Consulting, who work with the DOE 
on early intervention were also conducted. Specifically, interviews were conducted with: 
1) Christie, the Director of Resource Development, who is the main contact for the DOE 
and coordinates the school accountability work with the DOE, and who also acts as a 
Chairperson on School Panel Reviews and Fact Finding Reviews; 2) Chuck, a 
subcontractor of the consulting group, who is a retired principal and who has served as a 
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chairperson on many school panel and fact finding reviews over the past three years; and 
3) Caitlin, a subcontractor, who serves as a staff person on School Panel and Fact Finding 
Reviews and who is the primary report writer for these reviews. The ABC consulting 
group, like many consulting groups, uses a wide array of subcontractors with specialized 
skills and experiences who are contracted with on an “as needed” basis. When hired on 
projects, however, they are representing ABC Consulting. 
Interviews with participants at the DOE and ABC Consulting were conducted 
with members who are most active in the beginning of intervention. The DOE uses ABC 
Consulting to contract out services that enhance the skills and capacity of the DOE. ABC 
Consulting offers the DOE expertise in dealing with evaluations and issues of school 
accountability, the ability to expand the number of people visiting schools during the time 
and labor intensive periods of early intervention, and contract with former principals, 
superintendents and highly skilled educators who have a more in-depth understanding of 
schools and how they function than the DOE staff. These people are the “face” of the 
state and therefore, their actions during the beginning of intervention become the 
foundation of the working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school. 
Local Level Participants 
The local level participants consist of both those from the district and the 
underperforming school. Participants interviewed at the local level include: school 
support specialists, district administrators, school principals, and teachers. 
Participants from within the district provide a slightly different perspective on the 
SDE than those in the school. District employees presumably work with the DOE in 
relation to all schools that are underperforming within their district. Therefore at a 
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minimum the district/SDE relationship has been on going since 2000 when new school 
accountability policy was first implemented. The relationship between the district and 
the DOE has had a longer period to develop and the implementation of the specialist 
strategy may have strengthened the connection between the DOE and the district. As 
with many of the larger urban districts within Massachusetts, there are several 
underperforming schools within the selected Charlesburg District. Consequently, over 
the years the Charlesburg District staff and DOE staff have more familiarity with one 
another because they have been interacting since the first underperforming school review 
cycle. 
School support specialists are paid for by the DOE and are technically employees 
of the DOE who work in their designated district. To those in the district the specialist 
appears to be a district employee because one of the requirements of the specialist is to 
understand the district and therefore the specialists have worked in the district for many 
years. An example of how ingrained the specialist position is within the district is: when 
the superintendent of the Charlesburg District was contacted for an interview for this 
research, his response that the district person and his representative in charge of 
underperforming schools was one of the Charlesburg school support specialists. 
Interviews were conducted with the two school support specialists (Stan and 
Sandy). Both specialists were long time veterans of the district. They have each served 
in many capacities from teacher, to counselor, to curriculum director, to principal, to 
assistant superintendent. Originally, the plan was to interview the Superintendent as 
well, but as mentioned, after contacting him, he recommended I speak with Stan, who 
represents the district on the topic of school accountability. 
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Traditionally, those in the district are guides for those in the school, especially 
with regard to state compliance. Consequently, the perspective of participants at the 
district level sets the tone, and informs some of the perceptions that participants in the 
underperforming schools may have about the SDE. Because the Massachusetts DOE 
funded specialist positions in the ten districts that have the majority of the 
underperforming schools within the state, the specialist strategy proves to be an important 
link in developing a working relationship between the state and local levels. The 
specialist strategy enhances the ability of the state to build a “bridge” to align the external 
and internal accountability systems. 
Underperforming school administrators and teachers working with the DOE staff 
were interviewed to provide the school level perspective. Each of the underperforming 
elementary school principals in Charlesburg were contacted via email and post mail. 
Two principals expressed interest in participating in the research project. Coincidentally 
V ^ 
the two schools were from the 2003 (Alfred Elementary) and 2004 (Babson Elementary) 
underperforming review cycles. From there the principals within each of the schools 
gave permission to contact other teachers within the school. 
In both Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary the principals provided the 
names of many staff who were involved in some capacity of the school improvement 
planning. Though one might assume that these would be the staff working with the DOE, 
this was not always the case. The degree to which the teachers interacted with the state 
had some variation. 
Still, the teachers who were working the most with the DOE (e.g., in the PIM 
process) set the tone for intervention and the attitudes in the school towards DOE. The 
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variation in the levels of involvement with the DOE among the teachers proved to be a 
good way to check information and opinions to guard “against drawing easy conclusions” 
(Seidman, 1991, p. 44) and to support the reliability of the information that is gathered. 
Participant Selection 
The study focuses on two elementary schools (Alfred Elementary and Babson 
Elementary) from the same district (Charlesburg District) in the state of Massachusetts. 
Massachusetts was selected because it has had a statutory mandate for new school 
accountability policy since 1993 and because the DOE has been a front runner in 
complying with the accountability requirements of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 
2001(NCLB) (Olson, 2003). The state began implementing a system of new school 
accountability prior to the passage of the NCLB, and it has a school accountability 
infrastructure that other states may still be developing. The state’s policy is similar to the 
requirements in the NCLB, and, in areas where it is deficient, the Massachusetts DOE has 
worked to comply with the federal requirements. 
I selected a state with this type of pre-existing infrastructure in the hope that it 
may have a more developed system that those from which states that are not as far along 
in implementation might be able to learn. The statutory mandate shows the evidence of 
commitment from politicians and policymakers within the state. The commitment is 
reflected in the thoughtful and evolving new school accountability policy being 
implemented by the DOE. Another reason for selecting a state with more implementation 
experience is that there are more underperforming schools to select from. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Participants 
Level Name Title Organization 
| State Level (n=7) - 




Debra Administrator for school and 
district planning support 
Department of 
Education 
Dianne DOE Coordinator Department of 
Education 
Dan Underperforming School Liaison Department of 
Education 
Christie Director of Resource 
Development/Panel Chair 
ABC Consulting 
Chuck Panel Chair ABC Consulting 
Caitlin Panelist/Report Writer ABC Consulting 
Local Level (n=10) 
Stan school support specialist 
(specialist) 
Charlesburg District 
Sandy school support specialist 
(specialist) 
Charlesburg District 
Mr. Arnold Principal Alfred Elementary 
Anita Teacher Alfred Elementary 
Amelia Teacher Alfred Elementary 
Adeline Teacher Alfred Elementary 
Ms. Beth Principal Babson Elementary 
Brenda Teacher Babson Elementary 
Bridget Teacher Babson Elementary 
Barbara Teacher Babson Elementary 
State Department of Education 
The SDE selected is the Massachusetts Department of Education (DOE). The 
DOE implemented the first round of site visits in the 1999-2000 academic year (2000 
piloted underperforming school review cycle). In the first year the process was piloted 
(2000) two schools were found to be underperforming, and since being implemented 
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(2001- 2004) an additional 24 schools have been found to be underperforming for a total 
of 26 underperforming schools. Table 3.3 shows the schools visited between 2000 and 
2004. 
Table 3.3: Massachusetts Schools Selected for Review and 
Declared Underperforming, 2000-2004 
_ Total Elementary Middle3 High 
Selected for a School Panel Review 61 23 33 5 
Declared Underperforming 26 12 12 2 
At both the School Panel Reviews and the longer Fact Finding Reviews, I gained 
permission to observe the process from the Associate Commissioner of the 
Accountability and Targeted Assistance Cluster in the DOE. In total I observed four of 
the two-day School Panel Reviews in three different school districts, and one of the four- 
day Fact Finding Reviews. At each of the reviews I observed, I was presented as a 
neutral observer of the state team visits to the school during the 2004 reviews. 
Permission to observe all of the reviews was sought from the DOE, the Panel Chairs from 
ABC Consulting, the district superintendent, and the underperforming school principals. 
Interviews conducted with representatives of the Massachusetts DOE were self- 
designated into one of the following categories: 1) DOE Staff or Contractor, who is 
directly involved with the underperforming school (visits the school); 2) DOE employee 
or Contractor, who primarily coordinates or manages the school accountability process; 
or 3) DOE or contractor employees, who do both coordination, management and visit the 
schools. 
3 Schools that were designated kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8) have been counted with the 
“middle” school category. Three of these (K-8) schools are from the Lawrence School District and one is 
from the Springfield School District. 
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Table 3.4: State Interview Participants, by Category of Involvement 
in Early Intervention 





(V isit/Coordinate) Total 
DOE 1 2 1 4 
Contractor 
(ABC Consulting) 2 0 1 3 
Total 3 2 2 7 
District 
The Charlesburg District was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it is a mid¬ 
size urban district with more than two underperforming schools. Second, it was the 
district in which I conducted two School Panel Review observations and one Fact 
Finding Review observation, so I was more familiar with the district. Third, the district 
had recently undergone the state’s district accountability review, which made data on the 
district and background information readily available. Fourth, while the district suffers 
from many of the plights of an urban district, its public education system is not in 
immediate danger of being taken over by the DOE for academic reasons. Of those 26 
schools that have declared underperforming, 5 are in districts that are in danger of, or in 
the recent past already have been, intervened in by the state4. Last, it was one of only 
two districts have more than two underperforming elementary schools. 
The combination of potential takeover and a large enough sample of 
underperforming elementary schools proved to be somewhat rare, and narrowed down the 
potential districts. Access to district personnel that have a familiarity with all levels of 
4 Some of the school districts that have faced state intervention, were not intervened in because of new 
school accountability policy, however, this prior relationship with the state may alter the findings. For this 
reason schools will not be selected from these districts. 
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those in the public schools was an invaluable characteristic of the mid-size urban district 
and the district specialists agreed to participate in the study. 
Underperforming Schools 
Once permission for the research at the district level was obtained, all of the 
underperforming elementary schools were contacted to see if there was interest in 
participating in the study. Three of the elementary school principals expressed interest, 
and two of those expressed a more serious interest by scheduling appointments for 
interviews. The two elementary schools in some ways were self-selected based on their 
interest to participate. They each came from the appropriate underperforming school 
review cycle (Alfred Elementary from the 2003 cycle and Babson Elementary from the 
2004 cycle). 
At the end of each of the principal interviews, permission to interview teachers 
was obtained. In both instances the principals provided a list of names of teachers that 
may be able to provide insight to the intervention process. These teachers came from a 
variety of involvement levels in the underperforming school status. Permission to 
observe and interview participants was obtained on an individual teacher basis. 
Participants from the school were placed into categories. Those in the school 
were self-designated into one of the following categories: 1) those who are directly 
involved with the underperforming school process; 2) those who are indirectly involved, 
meaning there is no personal relationship with the SDE, but some of work is directly 
related to the underperforming school status; or 3) those who are aware of the 
underperforming school status, but are not directly impacted by this. The school 
interviews break down is shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: School and District Interview Participants, by Category of Involvement 







District 2 0 0 2 
Alfred Elementary 1 1 2 4 
Babson Elementary 2 2 0 4 
Total 5 3 2 | 10 
Data Collection 
In a phenomenological study, the researcher is attempting to interpret human 
interaction (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982, p. 31). In this type of study it is therefore important 
to begin by listening and observing (Psathas, 1973). The data collection process was 
designed to accommodate this need and to use multiple methods of collection. Data was 
collected in three ways: 1) analysis and review of documentation pertaining to the new 
school accountability process, 2) observation of the DOE visits to potentially 
underperforming schools, and 3) loosely structured interviews conducted with DOE and 
school staff. The variety of data collection methods has provided information about and 
insight on the actions taken by the DOE and the underperforming school. 
Document Analysis 
Documents developed by the school for the state and by the state for the school 
during the process of reviewing and intervening in the underperforming school were 
reviewed. These documents fall into three categories: Process documentation, 
underperforming school documentation, and underperforming school reports. 
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Process Documentation 
Process documents are those generic documents developed by the DOE for the 
School Panel Reviews and the Fact Finding Reviews. These are specifically developed 
for the training of the state representatives (panelists and consultants) that participate in 
the early phases of new school accountability to ensure consistency during 
implementation by a multitude of panelists. The documentation is not necessarily given 
directly to the underperforming school, though much of this information is made 
available to the general public on the DOE website. Summaries of the process 
documentation are provided to the school principal, who is encouraged (not required) to 
share the information with school faculty and staff. 
Underperforming School Documentation 
These are the internal5 documents from and about the underperforming school 
used by the state to assess the ability of the school to improve without DOE intervention. 
These documents include an anonymous teacher survey conducted by the DOE, the 
school’s improvement plan, student body demographic information, the staffing 
information, MCAS results for the school and district, a leadership report from the 
principal developed specifically for the DOE review, and any other pertinent information 
the principal and/or DOE feels should be included. Documents pertaining to the two 
elementary schools selected for study will be reviewed for this research. 
Underperforming School Reports 
The underperforming school reports are different from the “documentation” in 
that they are the result of reviews of an underperforming school. These are the public 
5 Technically the “internal” documentation is made available to the general public, however, all reviewers 
must return this documentation to the DOE and those that request access to the information are only 
allowed to review the information on the premises of the DOE headquarters. 
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documents that synthesize information gathered from the review of the underperforming 
school documentation and the site visits to the school. Officially two reports are 
developed by the state. The first is the report from the School Panel Review, which is 
used by the Commissioner to make a determination about a school’s status. The second 
is the Fact Finding Review report, which is used to inform the future technical assistance 
and support for the underperforming school. 
In each case, the school and/or district are allowed to respond to these reports in 
writing to the Commissioner. This is a route for the school principal to pursue any 
inaccuracies or omissions within the report and these are considered part of the “reports” 
because they are public and become part of the report process. 
Observations 
The observation portion of the study is intended to provide insight into the early 
phases and processes surrounding new school accountability in Massachusetts. Through 
over 110 hours of observations, I have observed how the process works and how the 
DOE staff, consulting staff working on behalf of the state, and practitioners who 
participate in the state reviews connect with the underperforming school leaders and staff. 
Specifically, I was interested in learning how the school staff reacts to questions made by 
the state team and how the state teams delivered information about the method of the 
DOE’s method of implementing new school accountability policy. 
Also of interest was how the state team brought about a transition in the 
underperforming school staffs’ understanding of the policy from one that is top down and 
controlling, to a policy that relies on mutual involvement and cooperation to be 
effectively implemented. The team, as the first state entity to come face-to-face with the 
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school, is in a position to commence the relationship between the SDE and the 
underperforming school off to a good (or bad) start. Therefore, the manner and attitudes 
of the team toward the school are important to the implementation process and to the type 
of working relationship that develops between the DOE and the school. 
Observations of the state and (potentially) underperforming school were allowed 
by permission of the Massachusetts Department of Education, district superintendent, and 
underperforming school principals and teachers. In each instance observation 
participants were given a description of the project and researcher contact information. 
At each meeting with school staff, I was introduced and provided an oral explanation of 
my role as a neutral observer (separate from the state team). Each participant was then 
provided with written documentation about the project in the form of an Informed 
Consent for Observations (appendix B). 
Observations were specifically targeted at two official parts of the Massachusetts 
School Accountability Process. The first was the School Panel Review, which is when a 
team consisting of a DOE liaison, ABC Consulting staff and a group of school 
practitioners from throughout the state interview district and underperforming school 
staff and visit the underperforming school over a period of two days. In the four School 
Panel Reviews that I observed, the DOE liaison, ABC Consulting staff, and school 
practitioners on the team were made aware of my presence as an observer during the 
process. In most instances the DOE liaison notified the school principals of my role as an 
observer and researcher in advance of the visit. Because a number of the initial School 
Panel Review visits are conducted simultaneously in different parts of the state, I was 
only be able to observe a sample of the total number of DOE visits for a total of about 72 
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hours of observation during the 2004 underperforming review cycle. One of the 
observations of the School Panel Review was at Babson Elementary. No observations of 
the cycle were conducted at Alfred Elementary because the study was conducted in the 
year after the school was declared underperforming. 
The second part of the school accountability process is the Fact Finding Review. 
This review is for the schools that are determined to be underperforming based on 
information gathered during the School Panel Review and a determination by the 
Commissioner. The Fact Finding Review is designed to take an in-depth look at the 
processes and practices within a school and to make suggestions about areas in need of 
improvement. I participated as an observer during this four day process, which consisted 
of a strategy meeting of the ABC Consulting Chair and Panelist and visiting the school 
with the ABC Consulting Chair and Panelist as well as a team of practitioners, who 
conducted interviews, focus groups and classroom observations. The results of these 
activities are summarized into a brief report, which identifies some of the key strengths 
and weaknesses in the school so that the principal and staff attending the PIM (school 
improvement planning technical assistance provided by the state) training have a 
diagnosis of areas to concentrate on during the school improvement planning sessions. 
Loosely Structured Interviews 
The loosely structured interview as a method is used to allow interview 
participants to convey their feelings about the implementation processes of new school 
accountability policy. In this study, I expected and found that the participants’ 
perceptions emerged during the loosely structured interview. The perspectives of those 
in the DOE and the underperforming school provided insight into their attitudes toward 
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the policy, their understanding of the policy as they went through its implementation and 
their understanding of the organizational context. Specifically, I was interested in finding 
out about the feelings of trust, involvement and cooperation between the DOE and 
underperforming school staff. 
Another component of interest was time. How a school employee or a DOE 
employee feel about one another is likely to change over time. The two schools, having 
been declared underperforming in different years, have different perceptions and attitudes 
towards new school accountability policy. For example, Alfred Elementary has been 
underperforming longer and has a more established relationship with the DOE, while 
Babson Elementary has more recently been declared underperforming and may not have 
as clear of a picture as to how they felt toward the DOE. 
The interviews were conducted with DOE staff and underperforming school staff 
who participated in the early phases of new school accountability policy implementation. 
Participants were asked to review the questions (appendix A) and provide feedback on 
ways to improve the questions, or additional questions that might be asked. Each 
interview participant was asked to sign an informed consent (appendix B), which 
provided information about the project and contact information for future follow-up. 
Interviews were taped with the permission of the participant. Additionally, notes were 
taken during the interviews. In all but one of the 17 interviews participants agreed to 
allow the interview to be taped. At the one interview that was not taped, I took notes and 
applied them to the interview questions. 
The interviews lasted approximately one hour and follow-up questions were 
sought in person, over the phone or through electronic correspondence, as they were 
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needed. All interviews were transcribed. Transcriptions were provided to the interview 
participant for his/her review. In the case of the one interview that was not taped, the 
notes were typed and submitted to the participant for approval. This “member-checking” 
method (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was used to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of 
the information gathered during the interview (Seidman, 1991, p. 75). In some instances 
comments and additional information were provided by the interview participants and 
included in the transcript. 
Data Collection Limitations 
..[Institutional relationships and implementation process on any but the 
smallest scale are simply too numerous and diverse to admit of our asserting law like 
propositions about them” (Bardach, 1977, p. 57). To account for this challenge that many 
researchers, who attempt to study policy implementation in its natural environment, face, 
Salamon (1991) suggests that a “systemic” approach captures “...the richness of events 
and actions in complex social environments.. .recognizing the inter-dependence, 
inseparability and transactional elements among elements” (Chatteiji, 2004, p. 7). This 
is a limitation found in many studies. Cronbach and Associates suggests thinking of it as 
a “before-and-after study” (Cronbach, et. al., 1980, p. 271) in which you begin the study 
with a small sample and use this small sample to develop the most pointed issues and 
questions that arise and increasing the sample size to broaden this research after these 
“pointed, significant questions” (p. 271) have been developed. The research as 
conducted is therefore a “before” study to develop and strengthen questions about the 
working relationship between the state and local during the beginning of intervention in 
the underperforming school. 
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Consequently, the endeavor is still worthwhile because it serves as information 
for those in this particular circumstance of implementing new school accountability 
policy. It uncovers a dynamic of relationship between the state and the school that may 
point to a new era in the history of public education within the United States. It is a 
starting point for future research on the early stages of state intervention in the local 
underperforming schools. 
Within any phenomenological research the subjective meaning from the 
perspective of the participants is essential to understanding. In fact, Bogdan and Biklen 
(1982) identify the participant’s “point of view” as the foundation of the research 
construct. By researching a specific event, the researcher may impose more thought than 
the participant may have put upon a situation without the researcher’s prodding. This 
forces the participant to think more deeply about the subject and develop a “point of 
view.” It is semi-manufactured (motivated by the researcher’s questions), however, it is 
important to seek the perceptions of stakeholders in the new school accountability policy, 
and thus questions were selected, so as not to be leading, and they were open-ended to 
improve the chances for the participants’ perceptions to emerge. 
Data Analysis 
In any phenomenological study, it is essential to allow the themes to emerge from 
the data. Data from the document analysis, observations, and interviews have 
intermingled to unfold a larger story about how new school accountability policy is 
implemented and how the SDE and underperforming school relationship develops during 
the process. Rather than impose a structure upon the data, Scheberle’s (1997) “Working 
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Relationship Typology” (with an added time dimension) functions as “data analysis 
scaffolding” that guides the direction of the research questions. As opposed to fitting the 
data into the boxes within the working relationship typology, information from this 
research was guided by Scheberle’s (1997) research experience, and the typology itself 
was honed, or altered depending on the emerging data. It is the basis for examining the 
status of the working relationship at different points in the new school accountability 
policy implementation process. Information gathered through interviews, observations, 
and document review have been analyzed to determine the levels of involvement and 
trust existing at different phases of implementation. 
Scheberle’s Working Relationship Typology Adapted 
Figure 3.2 represents a typology of working relationships adapted from Scheberle 
(1997) for the state and local relationship between the SDE and the underperforming 
school. In this typology, two essential elements of working relationships are identified as 
important to the interaction between the SDE and the school staff: mutual trust and 
involvement. 
High 










Low INVOLVEMENT High 
Figure 3.2 A Typology of State and Local Working Relationships6 
6 This is derived from Scheberle (1997) “Typology of Federal and State Working Relationships” (p. 18). 
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Within this typology the variables of involvement and trust are examined during 
the early phases of new school accountability policy implementation. In particular the 
perceptions of those in the SDE and the underperforming school have been sought. 
Involvement is defined as the interaction between the SDE and the school during the 
early phases, and also includes the history of the relationship, the expected duration of the 
relationship, and the expectations about the future of the relationship as perceived by both 
the SDE and the school. 
Trust is defined by Scheberle as the degree to which the other is dedicated to the 
“intent of the policy.” By adding a time dimension, reciprocity between the two 
organizations has been captured. To examine particular elements of trust, aspects of the 
motivated attributions model of trust developed by Mumighan, Malhotra and Weber 
(2003) are used. Specifically the characteristics of: feelings of dependence, sincerity of 
trusting acts, evaluation of ambiguous information (positively or negatively), perceived 
likelihood of reciprocity of the other party, risk reducing behaviors to encourage trust, 
and consistent and clear communication. 
By combining the levels of involvement with trust found at different points in 
time, one is able to see the differences in the working relationship between the SDE and 
the school over time. In congruence with the negotiation model of implementation, and 
the evolving nature of policy implementation, the time element reveals how the working 
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school and the district evolves 
and changes by moving into different quadrants as new school accountability policy is 
implemented. The implementation strategies employed by the SDE affects the working 
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relationship and changes as the enabling strategy becomes clearer to those in the 
underperforming school and district. The following details the expectations of how the 
working relationship is characterized in each of the four quadrants: 1) pulling together 
and synergistic, 2) cooperative but autonomous, 3) coming apart with avoidance, and 4) 
coming apart and contentious. 
“Pulling together and synergistic” is high in trust and involvement between the 
two entities. According to Scheberle this is the ideal working relationship. It is 
characterized as a general willingness of both parties to contribute, support, and play an 
active role in the implementation of policy. Characterized by high levels of trust, the 
level of threat on an institutional, organizational or personal level is minimal. A high 
level of involvement between the two entities means that there are resources and/or 
commitment for both to work together to a common goal. This type of working 
relationship is reminiscent of Weick’s (1979) definition of organization as the point when 
two separate entities recognize that to achieve a desired goal they must work together. A 
“pulling together and synergistic” working relationship is the point when Weick’s 
definition is realized. 
In this type of working relationship there is an understanding by both the SDE and 
the underperforming school staff that they need one another to accomplish the goals of 
new school accountability. I expected to find a common recognition among both parties 
about the issues of being an underperforming school with an equal part of empathy and 
motivation to improve the educational outcomes within the school. Communication 
between the SDE and the school is clear and the expectations of all involved are explicit 
and understood at the state and local levels. Also, though being declared 
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‘"underperforming” may be seen as a negative experience, the process of implementing 
new school accountability policy brings about a positive experience for those in the SDE 
and the school. Because the level of involvement is high in this type of relationship, 
beyond a strong commitment to the policy, I would expect the state to have allocated 
enough resources to provide for high levels of staff involvement, and to provide technical 
assistance and training as needed. 
A “cooperative but autonomous” relationship is marked by high levels of trust, 
but low levels of involvement. This type of working relationship is “cooperative, but 
lonely” (Scheberle, 1997, p. 20). The loosely coupled nature of public education systems 
within the United States makes it likely that involvement between the SDE and the school 
is low. This type of working relationship is dependent upon the technology and expertise 
within the underperforming school. Though the SDE is trusting of the school, its limited 
capacity and expertise (Lusi, 1997) make it difficult to fully engage and support the 
underperforming school. This relationship is marked by limitations of resources, 
expertise and capacity. Because of the high levels of trust between the two parties, 
communication is open and explicit; however the distance between the two restricts the 
implementation to the capacity of the school. Trust is the glue in this type of working 
relationship. 
“Coming apart with avoidance” is a relationship with low levels of trust and 
involvement. Scheberle (1997) describe this type of relationship as “token” or “skin 
deep” (p 21). The type of working relationship may also exist in a loosely coupled 
system, like the public education system. In this type of relationship I would expect to 
find poor communication that is plagued by misunderstanding and misperceptions of 
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actions. Energy by both or either party is spent putting up a positive image, and the real 
challenges and issues are often hidden from one another. The school staff might show 
deference or what Gofftnan (1967) refers to as “avoidance rituals,” toward the SDE staff, 
because they work at the state level, but this is only part of the show. By providing an 
image that everything is all right, intervention may be avoided, and because there is low 
involvement, this may actually work. The sincerity of actions made to implement the 
policy are questioned and doubted. The SDE’s and the underperforming school’s 
understanding of one another is limited. In this type of working relationship there is no 
commitment to the nature of or solution to the policy problem. Though both parties are 
obliged to implement the policy, they practice the art of going through the motions 
without and real policy impact. 
“Coming apart and contentious” working relationships have low levels of trust 
and high levels of involvement. This type of relationship is a type of micromanagement 
(Scheberle, 1997). The perception of one another is negative. Therefore, any actions and 
communications are perceived negatively. In this type of working relationship distrust is 
prevalent, and I would expect to find the school staff feeling threatened by new school 
accountability policy, and the SDE staff second-guessing information put forth by the 
school staff. Both parties may feel they need things to change the school’s 
underperforming status, but neither recognizes their dependence upon one another, or 
neither trusts the other enough to be willing to take the risk of trusting the other party. 
The SDE and the school staff’s self-perceptions are positive, and the perceptions of the 
other are negative. Intervention from the SDE is seen as a nuisance and interference with 
the hard work that needs to be accomplished. This is indicative of the fact that both 
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parties likely agree on the end-goals of new school accountability policy. However, they 
disagree on the means to this end (Scheberle, 1997). Commitment to the implementation 
of new school accountability policy is high within the SDE, and this leads to 
micromanaging of the underperforming school. Commitment to the end-goal may also 
be high within the underperforming school, but there is disagreement between the two 
parties how to reach these goals. The resources of time, money and commitment exist, 
but the recognition of areas of expertise and strengths of both parties would not exist and 
therefore, undermines the policy implementation efforts. The SDE relationship would be 
paternalistic in nature and resentment from the school staff grows because the expertise 
they have to offer is not acknowledged by the SDE. 
According to Scheberle (1997) “end-running” may be an “outgrowth of this kind 
of relationship” (p. 22). End-running is when the SDE staff responsible for implementing 
new school accountability is “stepped over,” and complaints are lodged by the school to 
their superiors (i.e. Commissioner of SDE, State Board of Education, Legislators, 
Governor, etc...). This begins a vicious cycle. Having been overstepped, the SDE staff 
may increase their scrutiny of the underperforming school and identify areas of non- 
compliance. This in turn, increases the frustration of those at the school and the cycle 
starts all over again. To alter this cycle Scheberle (1997) states, “[w]ithout dramatic 
intervention, this kind of relationship has its own force of gravity, destined to generate 
continued erosion of trust, resentment by all participants, and hypervigilance on the part 
of the overseer” (p. 22). Without the willingness to risk trusting the other party, this 
relationship is doomed, much like a nuclear arms race. Someone must take the first, big 
step toward altering the relationship to break this cycle. 
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For the purpose of this research the Working Relationship Typology is used to 
observe movement in the working relationship between the SDE and the 
underperforming school. The selection of two schools, each from different 
underperforming review cycles, is important when applying the typology because they 
contribute to an understanding of how the working relationship changes over time. In the 
case of Alfred Elementary there is more distance from intervention, and thus the 
perspectives of educators at Alfred Elementary shed light onto the attitudes over a longer 
period of time. Babson Elementary educators, on the other hand, provide insight into the 
fine grain of the early intervention process and allow for a closer examination of changes 
in the working relationship between the school and the SDE. On the whole, the 
involvement between the SDE and any single school is low, meaning the working 
relationship is either cooperative but autonomous or coming apart with avoidance. 
SDE’s and schools do not have a history of direct involvement. As potentially 
underperforming schools are identified and visited by the SDE, involvement increases 
and the relationship has the possibility of changing. 
Limitations of the Working Relationship Typology 
There is a limitation to the application of this typology to the implementation of 
new school accountability. In Scheberle’s research, the typology was used to examine 
the working relationship between federal and state agencies. Within the United States 
there is a clear delineation between state and federal government and in this delineation 
federalism is an ongoing tension between states and the federal government. There is 
often an accepted dynamic that the state is equal to or above the federal government in 
this hierarchy and the federal government is simply an organizational tool to accomplish 
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things that provide a collective good or “economies of scale,” that a single state may not 
as readily accomplish. 
These ideas herald back to the birth of this nation and continue to provide balance 
and tension between the two levels of government (Ellis, 2001). It is for these reasons 
that laws and policies between states and the federal government can and do conflict with 
one another. This adds a dimension to a state and federal relationship that is not as 
prominent in the state and local relationship. In the case of new school accountability the 
state and local governments are interacting through their public education conduits, the 
SDE and the school. The states are constitutionally responsible for the delivery of an 
adequate public education and the schools are seen as agents of the states. Within the 
public education context the bond between the two is legally more direct and obvious 
between the state and local entities. Because of the grassroots evolution of the public 
education system within states (Tyack & Cuban, 1999), and the overarching theme of 
local control of public schools, however, the tension of control among state and local 
entities is similar to the tension of control in federal and state relationships. 
Trust and Involvement Over Time 
Within the loosely structured interviews, and document analysis I looked for 
evidence of trust and involvement to examine where the working relationship between 
the SDE and the underperforming school lies within the typology. I expected that the 
relationship would change over time. Therefore, I selected four points during the early 
intervention phases that will be examined (see Figure 3.3). These are: 1) after a school 
has failed to meet the performance criteria and has met the state’s strategic criteria for 
potential underperformance; 2) during the School Panel Review and the release of the 
subsequent School Panel Review Report and decision by the Commissioner that the 
school is indeed underperforming; 3) during the second DOE diagnostic intervention 
which is called the Fact Finding Review and after the subsequent Fact Finding Review 
Report is released; and 4) after the first state strategic intervention in the form of 
technical assistance provided to the school (after the first Performance Improvement 
Mapping - PIM training). 
1. Past Relationship 2. School Panel 
Review 
3. Fact Finding 
Review 
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• Receives a copy of the School Panel 
Review Report. 
• Is determined to be underperforming by 
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Figure 3.3: Timeline Reflecting Points of Interest during the Study of New School 
Accountability Policy Implementation 
Within the collection methods these four points in time are delineated and used to 
structure interviews, documents, and observations. Ideally, as a researcher, I would have 
been part of the process and simultaneously interviewing participants as they were 
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experiencing these points in time. However, due to the demands placed upon an 
underperforming school during the early phases, it was not feasible for those in the 
schools to participate in the study as they were experiencing early intervention. 
Additionally, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for me as the sole researcher 
to conduct the functions of observing and interviewing simultaneously. Therefore, 
interviews occurred after the state teams and school staffs have been through the early 
phases of new school accountability and participants were asked to reflect upon their 
experiences. Relying on state and local reflection upon the past experiences was another 
limitation of the study because of what Weick (2001) calls “sense making” in which 
participants impose the present point in time upon reflections to put together a cohesive 
and consistent path that brings them to where they currently are in the process. 
Regardless, it provides insight into the process, and allows for participants to reflect upon 
their experiences and participate in the interview during a less demanding and stressful 
time period. 
T rustworthiness 
Throughout the data gathering process, there are methods embedded to increase 
the trustworthiness of the data gathered. On a grand level, the reason for looking at two 
schools is to be able to support some of the more generic procedural findings and identify 
any similarities in response. Still, the generalizability of phenomena across the two 
school sites is difficult. Selecting two schools and the teachers and principals from those 
schools may improve the ability to generalize. However, it is better suited as a first step 
to hone questions for a future larger study. Additionally, the document analysis specific 
to the school also provides a place to crosscheck information. 
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It is important not to place the “state” and the “school” on opposite sides of the 
same coin for many reasons pointed out in the literature review. They are, in a sense, 
implementation partners. However, though the perspectives of those representing the 
state and the school are likely different, there are also similarities in experience. After all 
they are going through the same process together. These points of similarity and 
departure are the fine details of this research, and are used to validate the trustworthiness 
of the data gathered. 
The last effort to improve trustworthiness is at the participant level. Each 
interview participant was asked to member-check his or her transcribed interview. This 
allowed for the possibility to clarify points, change inaccuracies, and further reflect upon 
their experiences. As a researcher, I used follow-up interviews and correspondence as 




In the following chapters I use the data from documents, observations and 
participant interviews to improve understanding of the beginning of intervention. 
Chapter 5 discusses the state level, chapter 6 the local level, and chapter 7 the working 
relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school. Finally, chapter 8 
analyzes the district and its role as the “fixer” of new school accountability during early 
intervention. 
The state level and local level chapters (6 and 7) have a similar format. First, 
there is a discussion of the role each particular entity (Massachusetts Department of 
Education, ABC Consulting, Charlesburg District, Alfred Elementary and Babson 
Elementary) plays during the beginning of state intervention and how individuals within 
these organizations understand their role in the larger picture (e.g., state level, local 
level). Then the discussion focuses on the state and local context of early intervention. 
At each level there are factors that emerged from the data which influence how those at 
the state and local levels perceive early intervention and how new school accountability 
policy is implemented. 
After gaining familiarity with the state and local levels, I delve into the working 
relationship between the SDE (DOE) and the underperforming schools (Alfred and 
Babson Elementary Schools) over the designated time periods (past experience, School 
Panel Review, Fact Finding Review, PIM) structured within Scheberle’s working 
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relationship typology. The variables of trust and involvement are key to building a 
concept of the working relationship. By summarizing the working relationship between 
the state and local level from participants’ perspectives, I attempt to track the evolution of 
the working relationship in terms of Scheberle’s typology. Out of the working 
relationship analysis a discussion about the context, the impact, and the perspectives of 
the different stakeholders ensues. I conclude by discussing some of the findings that 
arose from the data and attempt to estimate the point where, from the various 
perspectives, the incremental or dramatic shift from a deterrent to an enabling process of 
implementation is perceived and understood at the local level, the assumption being that 




THE STATE LEVEL 
In this chapter, the state level organizations (DOE and ABC Consulting) findings 
and perspectives as they relate to and influence new school accountability policy 
implementation during early intervention are investigated. First, the state level 
participants, the SDE’s (DOE) and the contractor’s (ABC Consulting) roles during early 
intervention are discussed. Then, the context in which the DOE implements new school 
accountability policy is considered. 
Table 5.1 details the state level interview participants and their respective 
positions. All names have been changed and titles have been simplified (in some 
instances) to the title under which the person most connects with new school 
accountability policy implementation. 




Massachusetts Department of (n=4) 
Education (DOE) 
Daphne Director of School Performance Evaluation Department of Education 
Debra Administrator for school and district 
planning support 
Department of Education 
Dianne DOE Coordinator Department of Education 
Dan Underperforming School Liaison Department of Education 
ABC Consulting (n=3) 
Christie Director of Resource Development/Panel 
Chair 
ABC Consulting 
Chuck Panel Chair ABC Consulting 
Caitlin Panelist/Report Writer ABC Consulting 
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The state level is represented by the SDE and the contractor. In Massachusetts, 
the SDE is the Department of Education (DOE) and the contractor is ABC Consulting. 
The DOE is involved in all aspects of school accountability policy and thus brings a 
broader understanding of the implementation process. ABC Consulting works mainly on 
the review visits to the schools. Each brings a rich and detailed understanding of the 
visits, and how the schools receive the state teams. 
The SDE: The Massachusetts Department of Education 
The part of the Massachusetts Department of Education that manages the 
beginning of intervention is the School Performance and Evaluation Department within 
the Accountability and Targeted Assistance Cluster. It is a relatively new entity that has 
come about because of the added responsibility of holding schools accountable and has 
been in existence since the late 1990’s. The staff members that work within the cluster 
for the most part have not worked in other parts of the Department of Education (DOE). 
Many of the employees interviewed have worked at the DOE for less than ten years and 
began working at the DOE for the specific purpose of working on school accountability 
and targeted assistance in particular. 
Daphne oversees the underperforming school intervention and monitoring within 
the DOE. She is a veteran of the public education system in a neighboring state and has 
over 25 years of experience in the classroom, as a district administrator, and as a 
principal. She has been working on school accountability ever since and describes her 
work as “.. .learning how to build the plane as we fly it.” She oversees the DOE liaisons 
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and the relationship with ABC Consulting. Daphne is the leader of underperforming 
school intervention and is responsible for overseeing the DOE staff and contractors, who 
work on school accountability, as well as managing the relationship with districts, where 
the underperforming schools reside. 
Dianne is considered an Education Specialist in School Performance Evaluation. 
She participates in many aspects of accountability and targeted assistance that reach 
beyond the scope of underperforming school interventions. However, she does 
participate in the role of a DOE liaison. A DOE liaison is the representative from the 
DOE who participates on School Panel Reviews and during the Fact Finding Review 
attends the exit interviews. She is not considered a “monitor,” which is the role the DOE 
liaison takes on for the two years after an underperforming school has developed a state 
Board of Education approved improvement plan. She has been with the DOE for 
approximately seven years and clearly has experience in a wide range of initiatives that 
fall in the realm of school accountability. Her perspective is broader than that of a DOE 
liaison because she deals with the entire process of early intervention and is a contributor 
to the design of the system. 
A typical DOE liaison would only be responsible for connecting with the 
underperforming school, managing the logistics of the early intervention process, and 
maintaining contact with the school principal and team during the school improvement 
planning process (PIM). After the principal of the underperforming school has presented 
the school improvement plan before the state’s board of education, and the board of 
education approves the plan, the DOE liaison’s role then switches to a monitoring role. 
An underperforming school is monitored by the DOE liaison for two years. At the end of 
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the two years a determination about the school’s ability to improve based on the 
achievement over the two years of monitoring is made. At the end of the two years the 
school can take one of three paths: 1) move out of the underperforming status, 2) be 
declared chronically underperforming and face strong intervention, or 3) maintain the 
“monitored” status for a designated amount of time. During the two years of monitoring 
the DOE liaison visits the school to make sure the principal is accomplishing the goals set 
forth in the board approved school improvement plan. The visits are an opportunity to 
identify areas of need within the school and to negotiate the implementation of the 
improvement plan. The DOE liaison is largely responsible for bringing the voice of the 
underperforming school to the DOE. They often see themselves as supportive advocates 
for the underperforming school, who also must be a critical friend to the school as they 
monitor the implementation of the underperforming school’s improvement plan. 
Dan is a DOE liaison who has worked with the Department for a little under two 
years. He was a DOE liaison on two of the School Panel Reviews and the one Fact 
Finding Review I observed in the Charlesburg School District. The Charlesburg District 
was his region. However, he left the DOE in the summer of 2004 to become a vice 
principal at a middle school. Dan’s background is in public education, though he did take 
on some other jobs that were loosely related to education and accountability for a few 
years. His short tenure as a DOE liaison limited his depth of knowledge, but in many 
ways Dan is a typical example of a DOE liaison who only stays in the position for a short 
time. 
Debra is less involved with the beginning of intervention, but plays a critical role 
in the district strategy as the coordinator of the school support specialists (specialist), 
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which means that she is in charge of all of the specialists in the state. When discussing 
early intervention, the district’s role through the school support specialists came up over 
and over again as one of the critical components of early intervention. Debra, unlike the 
others interviewed, has been at the DOE for many years and only in the past four years 
began to work in the accountability unit of the DOE. 
The Massachusetts Department of Education’s Role 
There is an old adage out there that the greatest joke in the world 
is, ‘Hi, I’m here from the DOE, and I’m here to help you.’ 
(Daphne, DOE) 
The quote above is often heard when talking about the DOE. It typifies the distance 
between the DOE and the local district and school, and denotes the old role of the DOE, 
which required less of the educational/practitioner knowledge and expertise and more 
administration, data collection, and compliance expertise. It captures the challenges DOE 
faces when implementing new school accountability policy. The DOE must build 
relationships where there were none, and simultaneously change the perception locals 
have of the state as a non-influential and less than helpful part of the education system. 
Despite the general feeling among those in the lower echelons of a state’s loosely 
coupled public education system, the Massachusetts Department of Education has 
attempted to implement new school accountability policy that conveys a message of 
support to the underperforming school by saying, 
.. .[W]e know this is hard. We understand the challenges you face, 
but you can do it a little better, we think. And, we’re going to 
show you how. We think, we don’t have all these answers, but we 
do think there is room there for us to work together on behalf of 
kids. And, the message is this isn’t about you, it’s about these 
kids. (Daphne, DOE) 
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By removing the onus of blame those within the school feel, Daphne has created an 
implementation process that does not place personal blame upon educators in the school. 
Rather, it is intended to redirect and refocus efforts within the school so that the educators 
within the school move toward improvement rather than having early intervention 
paralyze them. From the start the state representatives send the message that they do not 
have the answers by showing respect for the expertise of the educators in the school, and 
by conveying sincerity and honesty when communicating with them. All efforts 
concentrate on changing the idea of new school accountability policy from a deterrent to 
an enabling system. 
According to Dan, at every turn the educators in the school are told that school 
improvement is reliant upon their efforts. He emphasizes the point by stating, 
That’s crystal clear. There’s just no two ways about it that your 
school has to pull itself up. You’re the one that’s going to do this 
work. You’re the one that’s going to carry this forward. And, it’s 
not done in such a way that it’s threatening or anything like that. 
(Dan, DOE) 
Throughout the DOE, those in contact with the school emphasize that the educators 
within the school are going to improve the school. The enabling message sent to 
principals and teachers symbolizes the respect the DOE has for the work they do within 
the schools, and it shows that the DOE staff recognize that the classroom expertise exists 
within the school. Dan mentions that the message is sent without threat to those in the 
school. Rather, the approach is designed to reinvigorate and refocus the internal 
accountability mechanisms within the school so that they meet the end goal of improving 
educational outcomes. 
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Consistently, interview participants from the DOE reiterated that building a 
relationship with the district and the school is a central focus of early intervention. 
Dianne discusses the type of relationship the DOE wants with the underperforming 
school, and how the DOE negotiates cooperation with those in the underperforming 
school. 
We try to establish a really professional, pragmatic approach. That 
there’s a job that we have to do, and this is how we have to get it 
done. And, we try to be as sensitive to the school as we can - the 
people in the school as we can - because we understand it can be a 
difficult situation for them, and it can be disruptive for them. So, 
we try to be as sensitive as we can and as professional as we can. 
(Dianne, DOE) 
Once again, sincerity and respect for those within the school is ingrained in the DOE’s 
language and process. Accommodation of the school principal and staff are made at 
every turn in the early intervention process. The respect and professionalism with which 
they approach the school staff is proof in actions that the DOE is interested in partnering 
with the school to achieve a commonly desired end goal. The culture within the DOE 
unit responsible for underperforming schools is that of support and enabling. The 
Director, Daphne puts it best, 
.. .1 think as [early intervention’s] premise it has always been really 
focused on support. Despite the fact that school performance 
evaluation is really an accountability measure, where for the first 
time the state is making judgments about the quality of what is 
happening in the schools...but I think that our perspective has 
always been to do so as a way to help schools. (Daphne, DOE) 
The bottom line within the DOE is support for the underperforming schools and 
designing a system of early intervention that gives the principal and teachers in the school 
the tools to analyze how they will improve educational outcomes. Throughout the 
process, the DOE staff recognize their need to partner with the school, and that after the 
118 
underperforming school principal and teachers are given the tools, true improvement 
relies on the internal expertise and ability to gain the expertise of the teachers in the 
classroom. Knowing that every piece of the public education system is needed to focus 
upon school improvement means the DOE does not automatically take a command and 
control style implied by the legislation. Rather, the DOE’s process works within and 
alters the public education system by injecting support, placing importance on outcomes, 
and respecting the professional educators within the schools and classrooms. 
The Contractor: ABC Consulting 
ABC Consulting is the contractor that supports the state’s underperforming school 
accountability efforts. At the higher levels of ABC Consulting, the staff have worked in 
partnership to develop an early intervention system for Massachusetts that is supportive 
of school improvement efforts by diagnosing school challenges with a team of experts 
(panelists) and developing a system of data analysis that directs school improvement 
efforts (PIM). Beyond working on the development of the early intervention process, the 
role of ABC Consulting is narrowly focused on a portion of the beginning of 
intervention: the School Panel Reviews and the Fact Finding Reviews. The purpose of 
using an outside consultant is to bring the skills and experience of an organization that 
works primarily on school accountability evaluations and school improvement initiatives 
within schools and districts across the nation. ABC Consulting has clients ranging from 
other state departments of education to city districts. Using ABC Consulting’s services 
on an as needed basis expands the capacity and skills of the DOE. 
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ABC Consulting’s specialization and expertise have helped to design the 
“beginning of intervention” implementation for the Massachusetts DOE. The contractor 
and the DOE alike describe the relationship as a partnership. The contractor develops 
plans and the DOE has the final approval on them. Additionally, the contractor has the 
flexibility to bring in experts to chair the panels and to write the reports. These experts 
generally have a public school leadership background as retired principals and 
superintendents. This type of background and experience is generally not found among 
state level DOE staff (McDermott, Berger, Bowles, Brooks, Churchill, & Effrat, 2001). 
Three members of ABC Consulting were interviewed for this study. Each of the 
interview participants represents a different aspect of the consulting group, but covers all 
of the roles that ABC Consulting plays with regard to the school accountability process in 
Massachusetts. Christie manages the role of the contractor with the DOE and partners 
with the DOE by participating and contributing to the development and evolution of the 
beginning of intervention. She has a background as a teacher in middle schools and is a 
veteran teacher of the public education system in a neighboring state. Not only does she 
help to develop the process, but she also provides logistical support and serves as a chair 
on both School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews. Her insights, therefore, are much more 
connected to the DOE perspective than to that of the schools because she has regular 
contact with the leaders within the DOE and the director (Daphne) in particular. 
Chuck is a retired principal, who subcontracts with ABC Consulting. He works 
on more than just the Massachusetts school accountability project for ABC Consulting. 
When he is working on Massachusetts school accountability, he serves as a Chair for 
both School Panel Reviews and Fact Finding Reviews. He has been working on school 
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accountability issues for over three years and participates in the annual training that ABC 
Consulting provides to its employees and subcontractors. His perspective on school 
accountability is that of an outsider to the school accountability policy, but he has 
experience in the public education system under the education reform initiatives of which 
school accountability is part. He has a particular focus upon the school. His contact with 
the DOE is limited. He reports directly to Christie, and the information about the state 
process he possesses comes from her as well as from his experiences visiting 
underperforming schools. 
Caitlin is a former special education teacher, who is currently working outside of 
the classroom. She is also a subcontractor with ABC Consulting. She has participated as 
a panel member on School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews for two years and in the most 
recent year began subcontracting with ABC Consulting to work closely with the Chairs 
and to write the reports that are submitted to DOE. The reports she writes for ABC 
Consulting are handed off to DOE. The DOE liaison and Daphne edit them as they see 
fit. The reports are used to make determinations about a school’s status of 
underperformance and particular areas that need to be addressed for improvement. Like 
Chuck, Caitlin reports to Christie and gets most of her information about school 
accountability from ABC Consulting trainings and from her experiences as a panelist on 
underperforming school reviews. 
ABC Consulting’s Role 
ABC Consulting’s role is to chair and conduct the School Panel and Fact Finding 
Reviews, write the first draft of the reports from these visits, and at the higher levels of 
the organization partner with the DOE to develop the early intervention process. The 
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DOE has partnered with ABC Consulting to take advantage of the organizations 
experience in managing school accountability and school improvement initiatives in other 
parts of the country and to access the expertise of school practitioners (e.g., principals, 
superintendents) on an as needed basis. Because of their experience working with 
districts and states around the nation, ABC Consulting has played an important role in the 
design of early intervention. Christie describes the relationship. 
Originally, back in the early days we were developers of the 
protocol. So that we were, you know, we were invited to provide 
support over the summer to develop a process for not just visiting 
schools, but for guiding the improvement planning process which 
is what schools undergo once they’re declared underperforming. 
So, we have been developers of the process, as well as, you know, 
conductors of the visits. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
... So,... it’s been a very collaborative relationship with respect to 
the DOE. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
By collaborative relationship, Christie is referring to the how ABC Consulting has 
worked with the DOE to develop the process, and how they work in partnership to 
improve and change the implementation process of early intervention. 
ABC Consulting’s most important role is to build the capacity of the DOE by 
visiting the schools, gathering the practitioners, screening panelist candidates, writing the 
reports, and handling the finances of paying the subcontractors. ABC Consulting pulls in 
expertise from a variety of school settings and ultimately leads and enhances the breadth 
and depth of the panels during the School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews. 
In observations and discussions about the role of ABC Consulting, it is clear that 
the role of the contractor is important for more than just expanding the state’s capacity. 
They bring in experienced educators, who are veterans of the public education system. 
The members of ABC Consulting are some of the first people that those in the school see. 
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Essentially they are the “face” of the state because they are working on the frontline 
during the beginning of intervention. Their role lends credibility to the DOE from the 
perspective of those in the school and potentially the district. ABC Consulting requires 
the Chair of a panel to be someone who has been in the trenches of the public education 
system (e.g., retired superintendent, principal), and at the very least it is someone who 
has worked in the classroom. In most cases educators in the schools believed the ABC 
Consultants were employees of the DOE. At the district level, administrators were more 
familiar with the process and understood that ABC Consultants were contractors of the 
state. The consultants never denied being external contractors, but the message was not 
forthcoming, so educators in the underperforming schools tended to assume they were 
DOE employees because they did not know otherwise. 
Because they are the “face” of the state during early school intervention, it is 
valuable to understand how those that work for ABC Consulting view the state’s role 
during early intervention. Rather than being an independent and separate evaluator, ABC 
Consulting is presented as the state and acts as a partner of the state. 
We... make sure it’s clear that we are an agent of the state and that 
we are doing the state’s business here. That the state’s business 
allows us to offer you from another perspective... what issues you 
might want to address and how you might want to deploy your 
energies and time. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
The role of the ABC Consultants, as they see it, is to represent the state and 
provide a fair assessment of what is occurring in the underperforming school so that the 
DOE is able to make a determination about the school. Still, as representatives of the 
state they work within their unique situations, and they are melding their own 
organizational goals with their client’s goals. 
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With respect to the schools, we have a personal goal that even 
though the client may be an agency or organization or foundation, 
we have a strong belief that if our work is to be, our work has to be 
useful to the school. In some way or fashion it has to be... useful 
and hopefully meaningful to the school... [Y]ou know we have the 
extra responsibility that we hold ourselves to - an extra standard 
that we hold ourselves to. So, with respect to the schools our 
target, [or] the reason we do so much training on interpersonal 
relationships is that, you know, we want them to know that we’re 
there. We’re there for the state. We’re conducting the state’s 
business, you know, business on behalf of the state, but... we want 
to do it in a way that [people in the school] can... nod their heads 
when we leave and say, “Yeah, you’re right. You know you got it. 
You have described us correctly.” (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
In congruence with the DOE’s expressed desire for a cooperative working relationship 
with those in the school, ABC Consulting as an organization places a priority on 
developing a supportive relationship with the principal and teachers within the 
underperforming school. The “extra responsibility” Christie talks about is concentrated 
on forming a positive working relationship with the underperforming school on behalf of 
the state. 
In fact, ABC Consulting’s role of representing the DOE in the reviews of 
underperforming schools is taken quite seriously. For each consultant, on a personal 
level, there is a clearly expressed empathy for the school and the difficult situation it 
faces. In many instances when they are Chairs of the reviews, they find themselves 
making those in the school comfortable with the process and letting them know that no 
matter what happens the process can only improve the current situation. Much of their 
effort is concentrated upon the school and the reaction of those within the school, which 
requires them to pay close attention during visits and interviews and to model the 
counseling/empathetic behavior to the practitioners on the panels. As Chuck states, “The 
thing that ABC Consulting does well is that it emphasizes that this is a human process, 
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you know? That the relationships that you create or fail to create.. .are really pivotal to 
everything that goes on.” 
The DOE and ABC Consulting have teamed up to implement new school 
accountability policy during the beginning of intervention. Their priorities of developing 
a working relationship between the state, the underperforming school, and the district, 
and balancing support and accountability during implementation, reveal a symbiotic 
partnership between the two. The evolution of new school accountability policy is 
indication of a continuous improvement effort that includes information gathered from 
state and local feedback. The state’s willingness to empower the local district and 
underperforming school during early intervention shows a sincere desire to work within 
the existing public education system. 
The State Context 
The staff from the Massachusetts Department of Education Accountability and 
Targeted Assistance Cluster (DOE) developed an early school intervention process that 
puts the idea of building relationships between the state and local levels at the center of 
new school accountability in Massachusetts. For the DOE the goal of building a working 
relationship is to change the perception of new school accountability from a deterrent to 
an enabling system as perceived by those at the local level. Ultimately the DOE wants to 
empower the underperforming school principal and teachers to take responsibility for 
school improvement. The goals of building a working relationship with those in the 
school and changing the perception of school accountability policy is to improve 
educational outcomes and to avoid further state interventions. 
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Relationship building takes time, energy, and resources that are in short supply at 
the state level. Therefore, the DOE has implemented several strategies to expand and 
balance the state s capacity, all of which put relationships between the state, the district 
and the school as a top priority. Using contractors to expand their expertise during 
reviews, and partnering with district superintendents have broadened the expertise levels 
and human resources working with the underperforming schools. Relationship building 
with the underperforming school further engages and empowers the principal and 
teachers within the underperforming school. Additionally, DOE has also involved the 
districts that oversee the underperforming schools. District superintendent involvement 
and the DOE’s district based school support specialist (specialists) strategy improves and 
expands DOE’s capacity to work with underperforming schools. Simultaneously, it helps 
the district, which is the entity responsible for school improvement, by providing 
additional, focused resources for school improvement. 
Though the DOE is best suited to implement “one best system,” the relationship 
centered early intervention process allows for accommodations and negotiations within 
the unique local contexts. Partnerships with the urban school principals and urban 
districts leaders keep the DOE administrators apprised of local needs, provide feedback 
to reform systematic problems with implementation over time, and maintain a common 
understanding among state and local partners about the end goal of policy 
implementation. The strategy led to the development of a common framework for 
implementation that gives locals control and discretion over how the policy is 
implemented and negotiated at the district and school levels. In a sense, rather than 
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taking the expected “one best system” approach, the DOE has taken a “one best 
framework” approach. 
The purpose of a “framework” type of approach is that it respects and leaves room 
for local expertise and authority aimed at accomplishing the intent of new school 
accountability policy, to improve educational outcomes in all schools. It allows for 
negotiation of new school accountability policy implementation, and perhaps more 
importantly, it is evidence of the DOE’s recognition of their dependence upon the local 
staff of underperforming schools and district to mobilize themselves around improvement 
efforts that are designed and therefore owned by the local educators. In the face of 
limited capacity and expertise to implement a deterrent system, the DOE (and ABC 
Consulting) must rely upon the partnership with the underperforming schools and the 
existing educational expertise at the local level. 
For those at the state level, the idea that real change needs to occur at the local 
school level pervades all explanations of new school accountability policy 
implementation. Implicitly, it reveals an understanding among DOE administrators that 
they are dependent upon the local underperforming school and district for improvement 
in the educational outcomes. State level interviewees did see the importance of 
cooperation during the beginning of intervention. However, state level participants did 
not express a dependence upon the local level. Rather, they couched the need for 
cooperation as an essential ingredient to supporting the underperforming school and 
ensuring those at the local level are appropriately taking on their responsibility to provide 
an adequate education to students within their schools and district. 
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State and District Relationship 
Throughout early intervention the underperforming school and the DOE are 
forging a new working relationship, but not without the facilitation of the district. In 
Massachusetts the district is a central component of early intervention. In earlier waves 
of new school accountability policy implementation in other states, the relationship 
between the state and schools was forged separately from the district. Consequently, it 
leaps over the traditional SDE-district-school hierarchy of the public educations system. 
In Massachusetts, however, the district is the key partner during early intervention. The 
DOE Coordinator for the school support specialists explains the decision to make the 
district such an integral part of early intervention. 
[Other state educational leaders] said they sent people in and the 
school would get better while they were there, but ... they had no 
confidence that the school could stay better without their presence. 
So, that was one of the reasons why we decided that if we built 
capacity at the district level, there was a closer-in relationship 
between the district and the school. And...the school would have 
somebody at the district level who would be there for much longer 
than we would if we sent somebody from [the DOE]. And besides, 
somebody at the district level would also help the school, would be 
somebody who understood the culture of the district and would be 
able to try and work within that and make changes within the 
district that would not only effect the particular low performing 
school, but would have impact on other schools in the district. 
(Debra, DOE) 
The DOE implements a district focused strategy for school improvement based on the 
challenges faced by those SDE’s that went before Massachusetts, and in an effort to 
sustain improvements within the school and share the improvement strategies across the 
district. Additionally, they see the district based strategy as a way of getting at the 
problem of having to balance the number of schools that are underperforming and the 
number of schools the state can intervene in during a single year. By placing a person in 
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the district (school support specialist), whose sole responsibility is school improvement, 
the district can integrate the improvement methods learned through the state’s early 
intervention, in the schools that are not selected for state review, but still designated as in 
need based on student test results. 
Professional courtesy and respect from the DOE toward the district abounds in all 
the conversations with the state level participants. Rather than jumping over the district 
to work with the underperforming school, the DOE has integrated the district or enlisted 
the district to be a partner in the school improvement endeavor. In fact, the bulk of the 
negotiations of early intervention occur between the DOE and the district. DOE staff 
members’ regular contact with district superintendents and specialists creates a forum for 
negotiation of the implementation process on a regular and informal basis. The evolution 
of the policy implementation process is a good indication that the DOE staff listens to the 
local level and has embarked on developing a positive working relationship with the 
school. Consequently, because the district is in the middle of negotiations between the 
DOE and the underperforming school, the district has become an integral part of the 
working relationship between the DOE and the local underperforming school. 
Building and Balancing State Capacity 
Capacity limitations are cited frequently by state level participants, especially 
when discussing the beginning of intervention, and have at least partially shaped the way 
new school accountability is implemented and negotiated between the state and local 
levels. 
With regard to the early intervention visits, the DOE has innovatively expanded 
its capacity by using a contractor (ABC Consulting) to provide expertise during the early 
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intervention school visits. As the face of the state in the eyes of the school, ABC 
Consulting serves a special role in developing the working relationship between the 
school and the state. ABC Consulting has national expertise in school accountability and 
school improvement initiatives. The staff are experienced and regularly trained with 
priority placed on the human aspect of school accountability. They see building a 
“critical friend” type of relationship as essential to the school accountability process. A 
combination of honest feedback and understanding helps to push and empower school 
leadership to move forward. With a wide variety of K-12 educational backgrounds, the 
consultants from ABC Consulting are selected for their intuitive sense of how to work 
with school leaders respectfully and sincerely. ABC Consulting is an integral participant 
in the design of the early intervention process and offers the DOE an expanded capacity 
to visit and provide in-depth diagnoses of underperforming schools. 
As another capacity expansion measure, the DOE uses the working relationship 
with the local district and underperforming school as the vehicle to encourage and 
empower local change. Apart from creating more harmony during implementation, a 
cooperative working relationship helps the DOE expand its capacity and resource 
limitations by partnering with the underperforming schools, hence relying on and 
empowering the professional educators within the schools. To expand capacity and 
support the schools the DOE has enlisted the district’s help and thus tapped into district 
level expertise and capacity. Through regular contact with the urban superintendents, 
who have the bulk of the underperforming schools within their districts, and by a strategy 
of embedding district-based school support specialists to provide targeted assistance to 
underperforming schools, the state has increased its interaction with the schools. 
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Engaging the district as a partner in supporting underperforming schools additionally gets 
the district invested in a school’s improvement. This investment is critical, as the district, 
according to all state level interview participants, is the entity that is ultimately 
responsible for an underperforming school’s improvement. 
Even with the capacity building measures the DOE takes during early 
intervention, it still must engage in capacity balancing efforts. The most superficial 
glance at the number of schools in need compared with the number of schools the state 
intervenes in places the question of capacity front and center. Simply by comparing the 
number of federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 (NCLB) designated schools “in need 
of impro vement, in “corrective action,” and in “restructuring” within Massachusetts to 
the number of state intervention or underperforming schools within the state presents the 
question. Between 2000 and 2004, the state officially visited 61 schools and declared 26 
underperforming. In Massachusetts, according to NCLB designations as of the 2003- 
2004 “Cycle III” 324 schools were “in need of improvement,” 27 school were in 
“corrective action,” and 25 more schools were in “restructuring” (Perlman, 2004). There 
are 376 schools, according to federal guidelines, that are at the very least in need of 
support and very worst in restructuring. Still, during the same 2004 underperforming 
school review cycle, the DOE was only able to visit 16 schools (the most it has ever 
visited in a single year) and found eight to be underperforming. Thus, in 2004 the state 
had the capacity to visit approximately 4.26% of the schools designated as needing 
improvement or worse, and only intervened in 2.13% of them. In all of the years the 
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DOE has been implementing new school accountability policy only 61 or 6.38% of the 
schools designated as in need have been the target of state intervention.1 
Strategic criteria are not only a way of looking beyond poor test scores in a school 
and at other influential dimensions of schooling. They are also how the DOE manages its 
capacity to intervene in schools. Mintrop (2003) found that states use a variety of 
methods to match the SDE’s capacity with the numbers of schools in need. Maryland 
typifies the type of strategic criteria methodology used in Massachusetts. In these cases, 
the SDE selects the worst of the worse schools as targets of intervention by prioritizing 
schools that have the declines in improvement and poor overall ratings. Additionally, in 
Massachusetts, the DOE relies upon the district superintendent’s professional judgment 
or belief that a state visit would be good for an underperforming school. By matching 
school performance and professional judgments of the district superintendent to the 
DOE’s capacity to support schools the number of schools intervened in by the state is 
determined. 
There is some pride in the fact that the DOE does not only use test scores to 
determine whether a school should be visited or declared underperforming. According to 
the Director of School Performance and Evaluation at the DOE (Daphne), the state looks 
at more than just test scores to intervene in a school, which puts a heavy demand upon the 
DOE’s constrained resources. Consequently, no more than 16 schools have been visited 
in a cycle. The DOE is forced to look initially at all of the schools in need. In due course 
the DOE depends upon strategic criteria to determine a school’s needs in an effort to 
1 Because the Massachusetts school accountability policy precedes the NCLB legislation, it is difficult to 
provide an exact estimate of the number of schools that fall into the NCLB designated categories. The 
designations are a moving target from year to year and changes within a given school can alter these 
determinations. It should be noted that since NCLB, the DOE has aligned their school performance criteria 
to suit the requirements of the federal legislation. 
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balance the state’s resources and capacity with the needs of the most severely 
underperforming schools across the state. 
The general feeling among DOE administrators and ABC Consultants is that the 
DOE does the best it can in balancing capacity with limited resources. One way the DOE 
balances capacity with need is to carefully select the “right people,” who represent the 
appropriate attitude and approach to the implementation of new school accountability 
policy. The “right people” are essential to accomplishing the difficult job of 
implementing new school accountability. 
Daphne has been very skillful in getting DOE personnel, people on 
her staff, although, you know turnover rate is incredibly high just 
because of other conditions that are beyond Daphne’s control. But 
she’s been very clear in making that the focus of their work. 
(Christie, ABC Consulting) 
By looking for the “right people” the DOE assures quality and consistency when 
implementing new school accountability policy. The right people for DOE must be able 
to balance the punitive and supportive roles the DOE plays when negotiating new school 
accountability implementation within a particular underperforming school. Christie 
believes the DOE has been successful at getting the right people to ensure that the DOE’s 
message of support and desire for a positive working relationship with the school is 
clearly articulated. As Christie notes, for that to happen support has to be the overriding 
message. 
That [the DOE staff are] there to support the schools, and if what 
they’re doing isn’t supportive, if the schools aren’t responding, 
then ok, they can be a little stricter and more demanding, but... the 
first step is to do the supportive. So, I think they’ve been very 
good given the limitations. They’ve been less effective than they’d 
like to be just because they don’t have the personnel and time. 
(Christie, ABC Consulting) 
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Balancing the role of support and enforcement is a challenge for the DOE 
according to ABC Consultants. In many ways they see the state’s enforcement role grow 
as one moves higher up the DOE’s hierarchy of administrators. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy are the DOE people who have the closest relationship with the underperforming 
school, the DOE liaisons. The DOE liaison is the school’s contact at the DOE and 
eventually the person who monitors the school’s improvement after early intervention. 
Because of their direct relationship with the school, the DOE liaison tends to be an 
advocate for the school. As Christie describes, 
[The DOE liaisons] do tend to align themselves with the school. 
So...when we’ve had some DOE liaisons engaged in conversations 
afterwards, they tend to present an overly rosy picture. They 
defend the school’s actions in many ways, despite, you know, 
other evidence that suggests that...such is not formerly the case. 
(Christie, ABC Consulting) 
Christie states that the DOE liaisons are “going native” because they are so close with the 
school they start to defend the school, and she suggests they become overly supportive. 
As advocates for the underperforming schools, DOE liaisons serve the school and 
the DOE by connecting the two. The DOE liaisons become advocates at the state level 
by providing the school perspective for decisions the DOE makes about the school. By 
connecting the DOE and the underperforming school directly, the unique circumstances 
and challenges of a particular underperforming school are taken into account. The DOE 
liaisons’ supportive advocacy of the underperforming schools ensures that the 
implementation process is checked and makes sense within the context of an 
underperforming school. 
On the other hand, the supportive nature can sometimes cause DOE liaisons to 
paint a rosy picture of the activities within an underperforming school, and thus may give 
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the diagnostic intervention less power to cause change in the school. DOE liaisons are 
charged with connecting to the schools and supporting improvements. While they 
recognize that they must also hold schools accountable for improvement, their dual role 
contributes to the DOE’s ability to change the implementation of new school 
accountability from one which is deterrent to one which is enabling for the 
underperforming school. 
In some senses “going native” (Christie, ABC Consulting) can help the DOE 
liaison to collaborate with underperforming school principals and teachers as well as 
district administrators. As one moves further up the chain of command in the DOE, 
however, it seems that the administrators tend to be stronger advocates for accountability 
rather than support. Comments from Daphne indicate that the DOE is organized to play 
both roles intentionally, so it is not surprising to find that the DOE staff at the bottom of 
the organization (DOE liaisons) tend to be more supportive toward the school than they 
are at holding the school accountable. As you move up the hierarchy within the DOE, the 
degree to which the staff holds a school accountable increases as the support decreases. 
Throughout the organization, support and accountability exist. They even have a 
symbiotic relationship, with one looming larger than the other depending upon the 
situation and the level in the hierarchy which the DOE administrator works. 
Evolution or Negotiation of Policy Implementation 
Under the constraints of limited capacity the state, the district, and the 
underperforming schools must work to fit the policy into their organizations so that it 
makes sense for their organizations. The evolution of the early intervention (policy 
implementation) is evidence of Lipsky’s (1977) and Elmore’s (1979) suggestion that 
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policy implementation is negotiated as it is implemented to better fit the organization. 
Changes in the process and understanding at the state and local level have contributed to 
significant changes in the perceptions the DOE, the district, and the underperforming 
school have about one another and thus have altered the way the organizations function 
together within the public education system. 
From the beginning the DOE has established a “culture” of support that pervades 
new school accountability policy implementation. During early intervention, each of the 
partners (contractors and the districts) are encouraged by administrators at the highest 
levels of the DOE to adhere to a common tone of support and sincerity when 
implementing new school accountability policy. Christie discusses the DOE’s earnest 
desire to work with underperforming schools to improve the existing public education 
system. 
You know, [the DOE staff] are always working a gazillion hours to 
do everything possible to support the schools. And, you know, 
that’s a culture. My personal belief is that Daphne is responsible 
for that culture. ... [S]he surrounds her people with the notion that, 
you know, that their job is to be the strongest support for the 
schools. ...That’s what they see themselves as, but they also see 
the constraints of not having enough people to do exactly, to do it 
right and to do it well by their standards. So, there’s a level of 
frustration that I sense because they know that there are more 
things that could be done. There are more things that should be 
done, but they just don’t have the number of hours or the number 
of people to do it. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
Even within the capacity limitations, the supportive culture and the right people to 
carry out the support to the schools has led to changes in the state and school relationship. 
A sign of the change in state and local relationship is in the difference between the 
reaction toward the state when school accountability policy was first implemented (2000) 
and the more recent years. The DOE and ABC Consulting staff members recount the 
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reaction of schools toward early state intervention teams as “defensive” during the early 
years. Daphne discusses the change. 
... the more practitioners we involved in our School [Panel] 
Review process who got to participate, understand what it was we 
were looking for, come to a training where I was able to explain to 
them what we were really trying to do here. So, as the word got 
out, people although it still makes them very uptight, have become 
much more accepting. (Daphne, DOE) 
The state teams still encounter nervousness and milder levels of defensiveness during 
school visits, but note a remarkable difference and lessening of the defensiveness. The 
relationship and expectations between the state and the underperforming school have 
changed since the first years of implementation. More than likely it is because the 
frequency of early intervention has increased, information about the process has spread 
among the lower ranks of the public education system, and because the district, especially 
the specialists, provides additional support and information to those within the 
underperforming schools. 
Over the many cycles of underperforming school reviews, the behavior and policy 
implementation methods of the DOE have bestowed a new, and more cooperative starting 
point for early intervention. Beyond the local level changes, those in the DOE believe 
these changes have come about because of the clear and sincere message the DOE sends 
to the school about needing them as partners during implementation combined with the 
strategy of expanding their capacity to support schools with the help of the district 
superintendents and specialists. As Daphne states when referring to the district school 
support specialists, “They’re a bridge.” The school support specialists provide an 
important and consistent connection between the DOE, the district, and the 
underperforming school. 
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Specific changes in the early intervention process framework since new school 
accountability policy has been implemented are another outcome of negotiations. One 
important change has been the timing of state visits to underperforming schools. 
Originally the underperforming schools went through school panel reviews in the 
springtime, attended a Performance Improvement Measurement (PIM) training session 
over the summer, and were visited for a Fact Finding Review in the fall. In these cases, 
the state teams often found that dramatic changes were made in between the Panel 
Review and the Fact Finding Review because of a summer of planning and staff changes. 
Additionally, the original timing of early intervention meant that the school teams at PIM 
were heading into a planning session without the diagnostic information from the Fact 
Finding Review. The timeline has been changed in the last two years because the DOE 
listened to the districts and schools and felt it would be better to have the Fact Finding 
Review report information for the underperforming school team during the PIM training. 
Therefore, last year the Fact Finding Reviews were held in the later spring (May/June). 
In the 2005 underperforming review cycle, the DOE is altering the timeline even further. 
The School Panel Reviews will be conducted in the fall of the school year, and the Fact 
Finding Reviews will be held in the early spring to allow more time for the school to plan 
for improvement. 
Another alteration to the school accountability framework is the decision to have 
DOE liaisons have territories (much like sales people), which enhances their ability to 
develop relationships with a district and a school. Because the liaison is often visiting 
more than one school within a district, there is a greater familiarity with the district 
players. On occasions the ABC Consulting panelists mentioned, and I observed, the 
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DOE liaison justify or translate information provided by a superintendent or district 
representative for a School Panel or Fact Finding Panel Review based on “knowing” him 
or her. It suggests that early intervention policy strengthens the relationship between the 
DOE and the underperforming school, and perhaps even more so contributes to a stronger 
working relationship between the DOE and the district. The DOE liaisons become an 
advocate of the district, and by the time of the Fact Finding Review, a relationship with 
the principal makes them an advocate for the school. 
In the most recent year there has been an attempt by the DOE to have ABC 
Consulting use the same (ABC Consulting) Chair for an individual school’s School Panel 
and Fact Finding Reviews, provided there was no conflict between the principal/school 
staff and the chair during the School Panel Review. State level participants report that 
using the same Chair (ABC Consultant) on both the School Panel and Fact Finding 
Reviews allows for a more in-depth Fact Finding visit (diagnosis), because there is 
already some familiarity with the school, beyond simply having read the School Panel 
Review report. Additionally the ABC Consultants, who go on both School Panel and 
Fact Finding Reviews, indicated that when the principal and staff within a school see a 
familiar face it puts the staff at ease and is helpful in allaying any fear and/or anxiety 
within the school. 
Another reason for using the same Chair (ABC Consulting) on the School Panel 
and Fact Finding Reviews may be because the length of time of the Fact Finding Review 
has been shortened from the original 10 days, to 4 days and now to three which has been 
attributed to limited financial resources. Having the same Chair at both reviews shortens 
the time it takes those in the school to warm up to the state panel. In fact Christie and 
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Chuck from ABC Consulting stated that with the change there is not as much of a 
learning curve with the process and that the reports are likely comparable to the reports 
developed during the longer visits of the past. 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of the state DOE and ABC Consulting, cooperation and a 
working relationship are at the heart of the early intervention. Initially, the positive and 
cooperative approach was surprising based on the deterrent nature of the new school 
accountability policy language. However, it quickly became apparent that after the 
deterrent threats of new school accountability were realized, that to continue down a path 
where threat was the motivation would quickly undermine any real efforts to improve 
educational outcomes within the underperforming schools. Deterrent systems of 
implementation imply that expertise exists primarily at the top of the organization. 
Rather, a state public education system is loosely coupled with professional 
educators (and expertise) at the bottom levels of the organization. The real challenge 
seems to be bridging the state’s external accountability system and the school’s internal 
accountability system, which is controlled by the professional educators within the 
underperforming school. Consequently, the DOE’s switch from the deterrent nature of 
the policy language to an enabling system of implementation that incorporates the 
professional judgment, persuasion, and negotiation of the policy to fit the context of the 
organization is a better implementation choice. 
An enabling system of implementation is the type of implementation traditionally 
found in the public education system, but more than tradition, the capacity limitations at 
140 
the state level force the DOE to alter its approach to the beginning of intervention. 
Deterrent systems of intervention require centralized resources for effective 
implementation (Bardach, 1977). Enabling systems require a strong sense of professional 
duty as incentive and motivation to implement policy (Bardach, 1977). Because the DOE 
has been able to intervene in less that 10% of the schools that are underperforming in 
Massachusetts, efforts to expand capacity are the driving force behind the state’s 
implementation of new school accountability policy. 
Capacity limitations at the state level create a dependence upon the educators 
within the underperforming school to take on their own improvement efforts within the 
one best framework of implementation the DOE had developed. Enabling the 
professional educators within the underperforming school is a primary goal for the DOE. 
By developing educator capacity to address the issues causing underperformance 
(through the PIM process), the DOE is imbuing educators by providing them with 
capacity and tools to develop their own improvement strategies. 
Early intervention strategies improve the DOE’s credibility in the eyes of the 
educators within the underperforming schools, and they encourage a mutually respectful 
type of relationship with the school. ABC Consulting plays a critical role in enhancing 
the credibility of the DOE by providing experienced (and often retired) administrators 
and staff mixed with practitioner panelists who are trained to put relationship building 
and respect at the center of their process. Also, the DOE liaisons are encouraged to be 
supportive toward the principal and educators, rather than critical of the educators within 
the school. These efforts help to build a positive working relationship between the DOE 
and the underperforming school from the start. 
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Throughout the state level, support and accountability have a symbiotic 
relationship during the beginning of intervention. Though much of early intervention is 
based on supporting the school and equipping educators with the tools they need to 
develop improvement strategies, there is still an element of accountability which the 
DOE staff use as they see fit. DOE staff at the lower levels of the organization tend to be 
more supportive and are encouraged to be supportive by their superiors. At the higher 
levels of the organization, however, the DOE administrators realize they must be strong 
with educators in the underperforming schools and hold them accountable. The dual role 
and relationship can be difficult to juggle, but throughout the process is clearly 
sympathetic to the hard working educator in the underperforming school. 
The DOE has partnered with the districts to expand the state and local capacity to 
intervene in underperforming schools. By providing the districts with school support 
specialists, the DOE has expanded the district’s ability and vicariously the DOE’s ability 
to intervene in schools (through the work of the specialists). By providing specialists 
with regular training and developing an informal and formal communication network at 
the district level, the DOE receives feedback and is able to negotiation the 
implementation of policy so that it fits the local context. Partnering between the two has 
been made easier because the district accountability office is outside of the DOE. So the 
DOE support efforts toward the district are seen as genuine without strings of 
accountability (at least by DOE) attached to them. 
The DOE is dependent upon a positive working relationship, or at least not a 
negative working relationship, with the underperforming school during the beginning of 
intervention to impact improvement and avoid the strong interventions that the DOE has 
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even less capacity to implement. DOE and ABC Consulting seem to implicitly recognize 
the dependency. Credibility offered by the experts from ABC Consulting, and support 
offered by the DOE liaisons, are the olive branches offered to the local district 
administrators and the underperforming school educators in an effort to initiate a positive 
relationship. The beginning of intervention brings with it many shifts in perception of 
new school accountability policy. Clearly, from the state perspective intervention brings 
a switch from a deterrent system of implementation to one which enables educators to 
make real changes after receiving state led capacity building professional development. 
The most important change for those in the school is to understand that the DOE is 
implementing “one best framework” rather than one best system. As an organization it is 
more than willing to negotiate the implementation of new school accountability policy, in 
fact, the DOE staff expect the educators in the underperforming school to take on the 
responsibility for school improvement. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The original definition of the “local level” in this study was the underperforming 
schools, meaning the perceptions of the principals and teachers from within the two 
schools selected for study. A surprise, however, was the influential role the district plays. 
Specifically, the engagement of the district by the DOE administrators, and to a lesser 
degree the principals and faculty members in the underperforming schools, pushes the 
district to spend additional resources of time and attention on the underperforming 
school. In the end, the district is at the center of new school accountability 
implementation, plays a critical role during early intervention. Thus, the district had to 
be included as part of the definition of the local level. 
In many ways the district is encouraged by the DOE to provide the bridge or play 
a “fixer” role (Bardach, 1977) in the implementation of the Massachusetts Education 
Reform Act, 1993 and NCLB during the beginning of intervention between the state and 
local levels. The local level is where new school accountability policy implementation is 
negotiated, and the district administrators become the diplomatic ambassadors working 
on behalf of the state and the schools. The district staff (specifically the school support 
specialists) are the negotiators and translators for the implementation of state policy into 
a district an underperforming school’s unique local context. 
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Table 6.1 is a list of the local level interview participants and their organizational 
affiliations. All names of individuals and the organizations have been changed to protect 
their privacy. 
Table 6.1: Charlesburg Public School District Local Level Participants 
District Administrators (n=2) 
Stan School Support Specialist 
(specialist) 
Sandy School Support Specialist 
(specialist) 
Alfred Elementary (n=4) 
School 




Babson Elementary (n=4) 
School 




The Charlesburg Public School District1 
The Charlesburg Public School District, of which the Alfred and Babson 
Elementary Schools are a part, is a typical mid to large size urban district with roots in 
the manufacturing and mill technology of New England. The city has a diverse 
1 For more detailed information about the Charlesburg School District see appendix C. 
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population that is 56% White, 21% Black or African American, 2% Asian and 16.4% 
other race (Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development, 2004). 
Nearly 30% of the Hispanic population is of Puerto Rican descent. The median 
household income is $30,417 in the 2000 Census Community Profile as compared to the 
state’s $50,502 as reported on the 2000 Census Massachusetts Profile (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2000). 
Within the past year the Charlesburg district has faced many fiscal problems 
attributed to the stagnation of state aid. The Charlesburg Public School District has been 
impacted by the state of affairs, but its funding has remained somewhat level. 
There are a total of 47 schools in the Charlesburg Public School District, 32 of 
which are elementary schools. Per pupil expenditures have been increasing since 1993 
because of changes made to the state aid formula when the state’s comprehensive 
education legislation, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 (MERA) was 
passed. The state funding formula that came out of MERA has increased state aid to 
urban districts like Charlesburg. Most importantly, MERA has leveled the fluctuations in 
funding levels from year to year by establishing a required level of school spending. 
Within the district more than three quarters of the students are considered low income 
and over 30% of the students, who attend the Charlesburg Schools, do not speak English 
as their first language or are considered “limited English proficient.” 
Because of budget issues, there has been a slight decline in the number of teachers 
working in Charlesburg schools. At the same time, there has been a slight increase in 
student enrollment. Salaries of teachers are slightly below the state average (Table 6.2). 
Teacher salaries are a big issue in the district because there have been no raises for more 
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than three years due to the city not funding union contracts. As a result, district and 
school level staff report low morale and frustration. 
Table 6.2: Charlesburg Public School District Teacher Salaries and Counts as 
Compared with the State, 1999 and 2003 
District State 
1999 2003 1999 2003 
Salary Totals $92,892,766 $102,506,941 $3,081,654,861 $3,603,600,648 
Average Salary $43,622 $50,801 $45,149 $51,803 
FTE Count 2,129.50 2,017.80 68,255.80 69,562.90 
(Massachusetts Department of Education) 
In many of the interviews with district and school staff, there was mention that 
there have been no pay raises for over three years. The average teacher salary continues 
to be lower than the state average and has contributed to some of the losses in teaching 
staff. A few of the interviewees mentioned that the practice of teachers taking jobs in 
surrounding school districts that are seen as less challenging places to work than 
Charlesburg, for more pay than Charlesburg was able to offer, has been increasing in 
frequency. Adding to the challenge of experienced teachers leaving the district, the 
student population has grown slightly since 1999, while the number of teachers has 
decreased. 
Role of the District: The Negotiator 
Two of the school support specialists were interviewed because of their dual roles 
as members of the district and as specialists. DOE requires all school support specialists 
to be veterans of both the Massachusetts public education system and the district in which 
they are working. Stan has been working in the Charlesburg District for 32 years. 
Fourteen of those years were spent as a teacher. After being a teacher, he became a 
147 
counselor, an assistant principal, and eventually he worked in a variety of capacities at 
the district level. He is well liked by all who I spoke with in the district and schools and 
is designated by the superintendent as the person in charge of underperforming schools. 
Sandy has been in public education for over 32 years and in the Charlesburg district for 
27 years. She has been a teacher, grant administrator, and central office administrator. 
She is a detail oriented and focused administrator. Both Stan and Sandy as school 
support specialists felt the importance of their work and in many examples were able to 
enlist the help and support of others in the district office (e.g., curriculum coordinators 
and content specialists) to work with the underperforming schools. 
The school support specialists are the connection to the underperforming schools, 
the district, and the DOE. They are in the middle of it all. As advocates for the 
underperforming schools within the district, the specialists provide a strong and direct 
connection between the underperforming school and the district, as well as the district 
and the state. Both describe efforts they have made to make people in the district 
comfortable with the idea of working with the schools and the state. Prior to new school 
accountability policy, the schools, district, and DOE had essentially been working 
independently of one another, and the specialists create a bridge of communication to the 
DOE and support and communication to the schools. Having the connection is important 
to the DOE because it lessens miscommunication between the DOE and the 
underperforming school, it increases feedback from the targets of new school 
accountability policy, and it creates a place for all parties to develop a theory of action 
around the policy. For the schools, it is critical because they are not in the habit of 
contacting the state when troubles arise. Rather, they turn to the district. Now that there 
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is someone at the district level to work with them, they are more likely to get an 
appropriate and timely response and support. 
The specialists must juggle the counseling and supportive role with the 
accountability role at the district level. The “human piece” (Sandy, Charlesburg District) 
is an important element to the process. Principals feel threatened by the process. In fact, 
Sandy said, “I really worry sometimes if they’ll have a heart attack over this thing.” And 
Stan refers to the “art” of balancing support and accountability when relating to those in 
the schools. Embedded in their understanding of their role is the idea of building a 
relationship with the school. Having the “right people,” who understand when they need 
to support or to hold a school principal accountable is identified as a critical part of their 
jobs. Juggling of these roles is an obvious place where the specialists are able to 
negotiate the implementation of new school accountability policy within the school. 
The school support specialists believe there are two major components of public 
education that contribute to the switch from a deterrent to an enabling understanding of 
new school accountability policy. First, the beginning of intervention by the DOE 
captures the attention of the school principal and teachers in a way the district could not. 
The DOE is considered an outsider removed from the politics of the district and the 
school. Consequently, those in the school feel more obliged to listen to the state about 
the issues within the school. Second, the professional integrity of educators means that 
“people really want to be seen as good educators” (Stan, Charlesburg District). The 
inherent desire for educators as professionals concerned with and “very much invested in 
how they are seen academically” (Stan, Charlesburg District) makes an outsider’s critique 
of the school more valid than if a district level person did it. The specialists concede that 
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the principal and teachers in the underperforming school are upset and angry initially, but 
eventually, their professionalism as educators pushes them into mobilizing and taking on 
the challenges within an underperforming school. 
The specialists find that principals and teachers have one of two responses toward 
new school accountability and early intervention. Either they move forward and start 
making changes, or they are paralyzed. The specialists feel it is their job to encourage the 
principals and teachers to view the state’s outside assessment as an opportunity to make 
changes, which professionally they already knew needed to happen. The district 
specialists generally believe that the power to improve exists within the underperforming 
school (after some staffing changes). It is simply a matter of providing focus and tapping 
into the educators’ professional work ethic. 
More than any other participants, the school support specialists repeatedly spoke 
of the change occurring in how the different levels of the public education system relate 
with one another because of new school accountability policy. They see change in their 
relationship with the DOE and in their relationship with the school because of school 
accountability policy. They know they are acting differently. Before they felt that the 
DOE was “underutilized,” and now they realize the DOE staff are “not ogres” (Sandy, 
Charlesburg District) but simply people who are trying to help them. They also have an 
idea that the schools may have felt the same way about the district level administrators. 
The DOE and the school participants view the district as the entity responsible for 
improving the delivery of education; however, the district school support specialists were 
not as explicit about taking on the responsibility. Sandy explains, “.. .it’s not always 
entirely clear what the DOE does, what the district does, and what the school does [under 
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new school accountability policy.” According to them the DOE “works” with the district 
and the school support specialists to “define what each... is supposed to be doing” 
(Sandy, Charlesburg District). Neither specialist explicitly stated that the district is 
responsible for school improvement. What they do know is that they are individually 
responsible for the improvement of the state determined underperforming schools and 
maybe that is enough of an understanding. 
District specialists tend to see accountability in terms of everyone (including the 
DOE) being held accountable. Their perception is a testimony to the degree to which 
DOE has developed a cooperative working relationship with the district. Stan talked 
about the DOE administrators realizing that they would be held accountable for how well 
they interacted with the districts in need or with schools in need. The state’s district 
accountability system compounds the urgency of improving schools because it holds 
districts accountable for how well the schools are doing. Consequently, the school 
support specialists believe that building a stronger relationship with the schools and 
improving educational outcomes will keep the district out of trouble with the state. The 
threat of district accountability is at least part of the incentive for the district to engage 
with and develop a new kind of working relationship with the schools. 
As a school support specialist, Sandy describes the feeling of being in the middle 
of trying to improve schools, work in the district, and work with the DOE as, “[feeling] 
like you’re trying to keep all the balls in the air, and.. .am I getting the work done that I 
need to do?” Bearing the responsibility for improving schools and keeping the district 
out of trouble with the state is a lot of pressure for the school support specialists. 
Fortunately, as veterans of the district they have a wide network of contacts and support 
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within the district and a new connection to members of the DOE who work with them for 
the common goal of improving public education in the Charlesburg District. 
The district’s school support specialists are purposely placed in the middle of new 
school accountability policy implementation. They have the ability to negotiate change 
at the state level as well as at the local level. Trained by the DOE and largely hired for 
their professional judgment, the school support specialists are the negotiators during early 
intervention. They are constantly making sense of the policy as it relates to the 
Charlesburg District and making it accessible to the underperforming school principals 
and teachers. In instances when they cannot make sense of the policy, the specialists turn 
to the DOE to discuss their challenges and negotiate a workable solution. It is a give and 
take. 
Rather than allowing district administrators to make decisions about how well or 
not so well the policy fits in their district, the DOE has built an ally and “fixer” into the 
implementation process. The school support specialists must consistently follow the 
implementation of new school accountability policy strategies within each 
underperforming schools and make adjustments to implementation (Stan calls this an 
“art”) so that it makes sense for the school and for the intent of the policy. Negotiation of 
implementation is a natural part of the specialists’ role and is evident in their district’s 
working relationships with the DOE and the underperforming schools. The district’s role 
in new school accountability policy implementation and early intervention is explored 
further in chapter 8. Now the targets of the policy, the underperforming schools are 
examined. 
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The Underperforming Schools 
The two elementary schools in the study are elementary schools from the 
Charlesburg School District. Alfred Elementary School was declared underperforming in 
the 2002-2003 academic year (2003 underperforming school review cycle) and Babson 
Elementary School was declared underperforming in the following 2003-2004 academic 
year (2004 underperforming school review cycle). In both instances the principal, who 
was in charge of the school when it was declared underperforming, was subsequently 
removed from the school. 
The DOE does not track the exact number of principals removed in the midst of 
early intervention, but there is general agreement that designation of a school as 
underperforming is usually followed by a change in leadership, especially in the 
Charlesburg District. The removal of the principal is typically the action a superintendent 
takes once a school is declared underperforming. In the Charlesburg District, in all but 
one of the schools declared underperforming by the state, a new principal was placed at 
the helm of the school by the summer following the school year in which a school was 
declared underperforming. Generally, principals are replaced before the school goes into 
the state mandated school improvement planning process (PIM training), which is 
conducted over the summer. 
With the exception of the number of English Language Learners (ELL), the two 
elementary schools have fairly similar student bodies. The Babson School has a larger 
student population (n=321) than the Alfred School (n=280). Also, the student 
populations are similar in terms of percentages of student who are from low-income 
153 
backgrounds and who require special education. Babson Elementary, however, serves a 
much higher number of “First Language Not English” and “Limited English Proficient” 
students. The racial composition of the student body between the two schools is similar 
(Table 6.3). The student to teacher ratio is lower in Babson Elementary, and may be 
attributed to the larger population of ELL students (Table 6.4). The Charlesburg District 
has a policy regarding student teacher ratios and by most reports they have met the 
demands of the policy. 













First Language not 
English 2.3 31.3 17 13.7 
Limited English Proficient 0.4 26.4 11.6 5 
Low-income 84.3 84.9 77.1 27.2 
Special Education 13.0 12.9 20.0 15.6 
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004) 






American % Hispanic % White 
Charlesburg District 0.2% 2.5% 27.9% 49.9% 19.5% 
Alfred Elementary 0.0% 2.1% 21.8% 58.2% 17.9% 
Babson Elementary 0.3% 3.4% 19.3% 62.0% 15.0% 
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004) 
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Total # of Teachers 20 34 2,302 72,062 
% of Teachers Licensed in 
Teaching Assignment 100 91.2 88.9 93.9 
% of Core Academic 
Teachers Identified as 
Highly Qualified 100 90.3 86.8 93.9 
Student/Teacher Ratio 13.1 to 1 10.9 to 1 11.4 to 1 13.6 to 1 
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004) 
Alfred Elementary School2 
Like many of the school buildings in the district, Alfred Elementary was built 
during the early 1900’s. It is embedded in a neighborhood, surrounded by homes on all 
sides. There are 280 students attending the school in grades K-5. There are a total of 20 
teachers working in the building. Alfred Elementary School is an older building that is 
well-maintained in the inside, but looks in need of repair from the outside. It is a small 
school on a single floor with an open courtyard in the center. There is practically no 
technology in the school, and teachers describe the supplies of educational materials as 
limited at best. 
The principal of the Alfred Elementary is Mr. Arnold. He came to Alfred 
Elementary in the summer after the school was declared underperforming by the DOE 
(during the 2003 underperforming school review cycle). Mr. Arnold has been in the 
district for over ten years as a teacher and a counselor. He was an assistant principal for 
2 Early intervention had a different timeline during the year Alfred Elementary was declared 
underperforming. Alfred Elementary was declared underperforming during the 2003 review cycle. The 
PIM was held in the summer following the School Panel Review (as it still is), and the Fact Finding 
Review was conducted the following fall (rather than in the spring prior to the PIM training as it is now). 
Therefore, Mr. Arnold participated in the PIM and the Fact Finding Review. In fact, he was hired a few 
days prior to attending the state PIM training. 
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one year and then became a principal, for the first time, at Alfred Elementary School. He 
is in his early thirties and extremely energetic, focused, and clearly involved with all of 
the teachers. During visits to the school, it became clear that there is a strong, respectful, 
working relationship with many of the teachers in the building. Interviews with teachers 
in the school support this assertion. Even though the school has recently made its annual 
yearly progress (AYP) goals, it is required to be monitored for two years after being 
declared underperforming by the state. Because the school has achieved AYP, those in 
the school have a sense of success, though Mr. Arnold and some of the teachers feel that 
there is still much to do and plenty of improvement to be made. The attitude that 
prevailed in the school is one of focus, determination, and collegiality. 
The three teachers interviewed from the school were indirectly and directly 
connected to the underperforming school early intervention by the state. Anita is a 
teacher in her mid forties and has taught in the school for three years. She has worked as 
a drug counselor in the city of Charlesburg and been involved in education for ten years. 
She is an active member of the faculty and advocate within the school, though because of 
family issues did not participate in the school improvement planning process that took 
place after school hours and over the summer. Amelia is a teacher in her early thirties 
and has worked as a teacher in the school and Charlesburg district for five years. Though 
more reserved, she did participate on the school improvement planning team when the 
district ran the process the year prior to her school being declared underperforming. 
After the state came in, she handed over the duties to other teachers in the building, but 
communicated with them regularly. Adeline is in her early fifties and has taught in the 
school and district for seven years, after switching to teaching in mid career. She 
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conveys a positive attitude and is an active participant in the school having participated 
on the PIM team during the year of their intervention (last year). Collectively the 
teachers provide insight to many aspects of new school accountability policy during early 
intervention. 
When speaking to the new principal and the teachers, they each point to the same 
problems in the school prior to state intervention: the old principal was ineffective and 
caused many problems amongst the teaching faculty. The teachers feel the district 
administrators were aware of the issues and did nothing to help the situation. Mr. Arnold 
believes, “[The teachers] deliberately were fighting against the past administrator, and I 
think they stopped teaching.” The teachers describe the former principal as someone who 
played favorites, who was mercurial in nature, and who really just wanted to shut her 
door and not be bothered with the running of the school. One teacher described the 
dissension between the faculty and the principal and how the teachers together 
contemplated getting the superintendent’s attention. 
...I remember there being times where... the teachers said, ‘Well 
what if we just all sit out in front of the building today and just 
refuse to come in?’ You know? What kind of message would that 
send to the superintendent... that we have a very ineffective leader 
in our building? And, of course we’re all professionals here, and 
we wouldn’t do that. But... what does it need to take? There were 
numerous complaints and so forth. So, I don’t know how [the 
district administrators] were unaware. (Amelia, teacher, Alfred 
Elementary) 
Another spoke of the challenge of engaging the district 
We were very glad to see [the DOE] come in because nothing was 
getting done district wide. No matter, how many grievances were 
filed, how many reports were filed, nothing was getting done at the 
district level. We kept on being promised but nothing was getting 
done. (Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
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Like Adeline, each of the teachers mentioned that many complaints had been filed at the 
district office, but they were met with no district response until the state decided to visit 
the school. The new principal, Mr. Arnold, was a part of the district response. 
After being declared underperforming in the spring of 2003, the school lost nine 
teachers or 45% of the teachers in the building, and the principal was removed and placed 
into a central office position. It is not clear what this says about district staff. The 
impression given from the specialists is that sometimes a principal is placed into a school 
that he or she may be ill-equipped to manage. The problem is characterized as a bad fit 
between the needs of the school and the skills of the principal, rather than as a bad 
principal. The district staff seem to be aware that there are mismatches between schools 
and principals, but because there are so few qualified principals, they do not have a 
choice in the matter. Candidates for principal are often weak or inexperienced because 
there is a shortage of qualified elementary school principals (National Association of 
Elementary School Principals, 2005), and district staff identified this is a challenge. 
Additionally, they agreed that there is an unwillingness at the district superintendent level 
to fire principals who do not fit into difficult leadership positions. 
With a new administrator and nearly half the staff new to the school, things at 
Alfred Elementary dramatically changed between the time of the School Panel and Fact 
Finding Reviews. Teachers in the school felt the change immediately. On the whole the 
teaching faculty understood that prior to intervention the school was an underperforming 
school. Adeline explains, 
... before we were identified as underperforming, in my opinion, 
and talking to other staff members that were here at the time, we 
all felt that we were an underperforming school. We were a school 
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that lacked direction... and... congeniality, there just wasn’t any. 
We worked. We left. (Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
The professional judgment of the teachers in the school is that it was underperforming 
long before the state visit. In fact, many of the teachers discussed a downward spiral for 
over five years in which the district provided no help. Because of the situation at the 
school the teachers felt that any kind of help, even the severity of a state visit had to make 
things better. 
The district staff reported that they were aware the test scores at Alfred 
Elementary were not good. However, the district’s own capacity limitations made it 
difficult for them to address the issues at the school. Sandy describes a possible scenario: 
[It] could be that the current principal or the past principal cut off 
all communications with the people at central office that could help 
him or her for whatever reason; it could be that [the principals are] 
managers - in other words, they keep the building quiet, there’s no 
parents coming down here [to the district office] and complaining 
but they don’t let anybody in. Nobody really has a sense of what’s 
going on [in the school]... (Sandy, Charlesburg District) 
There is an expectation that the school principal will reach out to the district, and that the 
district, with its own limitations of capacity, can easily ignore a school that is not 
engaged with the district because there are so many other things that must be done. The 
onus of responsibility for school improvement at the local level, therefore, is upon the 
principal. The district tended not to interfere as long as there were no parents 
complaining. 
After the school was identified as underperforming, Mr. Arnold felt there were 
tremendous supports from the district. It is clear the district involvement in and 
connection with the school has made a huge difference in the school. Since being 
declared underperforming, Alfred Elementary has been a success story as it has had 
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modest gains in student test scores in the first year of being monitored, and the teachers 
and principal alike are pleased with the improvement, though each admits there is a long 
road ahead. A positive attitude permeated the building and the interviews. 
Babson Elementary School 
Babson Elementary is an older school built in the early 1900’s. Though it is old, 
the inside has interesting architecture with two grand staircases that come down and spill 
out into the front foyer. There are classrooms on three floors, the basement, first and 
second floors. The woodwork in the building is well maintained, and the classrooms I 
visited looked like elementary school classrooms in any school. The kindergarten 
through fifth grade school serves 320 students and has 34 teachers. In the school, the 
new principal and three teachers were interviewed about their perceptions of new school 
accountability policy and the working relationship between the state and their school. 
The principal of the Babson Elementary is Ms. Beth. Ms Beth is in her mid fifties 
and was transferred to the Babson Elementary from another school at which she was the 
principal for ten years. She was bom and raised in the city and in her own words, 
“bought a plot in the cemetery” so she’ll “likely die here.” She has worked for the 
district for over thirty years and is very much engaged in the politics of the district. She 
said she was not surprised when she heard Babson Elementary was going to be declared 
underperforming, because the “administrators meet regularly, and they know what’s 
going on in the district.” She describes feeling “ashamed” of being in charge of an 
underperforming school and feels she had no choice but to move to this school if she 
wanted to still be a principal in Charlesburg. In our conversation it was clear that she still 
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had a foot in her old school. In fact, she noted that she “will be very disappointed if my 
name is not on the [old school’s] report card.” 
The three teachers interviewed are members of the school’s PIM team and are 
therefore more intimately familiar with early intervention and new school accountability 
policy. Brenda is in her early thirties, has been working at Babson Elementary for six 
years and has been working in the Charlesburg school district for 7 years. She has taught 
in the classroom for over a decade and has an allegiance to the school, despite the fact 
that most of her former colleagues have left the school. Brenda is highly involved in the 
school and the school improvement planning process and has been since the year prior to 
its being declared underperforming when the district implemented a school improvement 
planning process. Bridget is in her late forties and has also been involved in the school 
improvement planning process with Brenda. She has taught at Babson Elementary and in 
the district for a total of 6 years. Prior to coming to Charlesburg, she taught for over ten 
years in private schools in the United States and internationally. Bridget is engaged in 
the planning process and has seen a positive change in morale amongst the staff since Ms. 
Beth has arrived as the principal of the school. Barbara is in her mid fifties and is a 
professional development teacher at Babson Elementary. She came to the school with 
Ms. Beth. She is a member of the PEM team and has long been Ms. Beth’s colleague. 
She has been working in the Charlesburg Public Schools for 33 years in a number of 
capacities. Barbara has served as a classroom teacher and a Title I teacher in reading and 
math. She works closely with Ms. Beth and brings a friendly sense of humor to the 
planning process. 
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When the school was declared underperforming approximately 80% of the staff 
transferred out of Babson Elementary. Over the summer Ms. Beth had to hire nearly an 
entire school of new teachers, adding to the challenges of being put in charge of 
overseeing an underperforming school. While high staff turnover does occur once a 
school is declared underperforming, school and district people interviewed indicated that 
by all accounts the turnover at Babson Elementary was extraordinarily high. 
Being a veteran and replacement principal at Babson Elementary brings about 
many challenges for a new principal in the underperforming elementary school. First, 
there is a degree of personal reconciliation about why you, as a principal, are put in the 
school. As a professional, the principal wants to do the best she can, however personally 
she feels some shame in being associated with an underperforming school. For Ms. Beth 
it is especially true. She felt as though she had no choice but to move from the high 
performing school she was principal of to Babson, because the superintendent required 
her to change. There is a sense that Ms. Beth knows she is a good principal, but facing 
the hard work to improve an underperforming school, on a personal level, is 
overwhelming. 
Ms Beth’s feelings about not being supported by the state or by the district may 
be attributed to the disruption in the working relationship over early intervention that 
occurs when a principal is replaced. In fact, Ms. Beth was uncertain about who the DOE 
liaison assigned to Babson Elementary even was. She was generally aware of a DOE 
person that would check in on the PIM team, but was not sure what role that person 
would or would not play in the future. At first she indicated that the district staff were 
just as absent from the school. Because she was moved to the school under less than 
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ideal circumstances, she felt the district staff and superintendent owed her support. Her 
expectations of the level of support are high, and the district staff simply were not living 
up to them. Eventually, she did mention that the two school support specialists were 
involved in their improvement planning process and that they had been helpful to the 
school. 
Early intervention is designed to be supportive to the school prior to and during 
the two review visits. Ms. Beth came to the school after these visits and thus did not feel 
supported or connected to anyone at the DOE. Being new to the school and to the 
process, she was forced to learn about the school and what it means to be 
underperforming in a very short period of time. The demanding learning curve and 
anxiety about taking charge of a new school contribute to the feelings of not being 
supported, and indeed much of the DOE’s relationship building strategies are missed by a 
new principal. It can be very isolating for the new principal. 
Ms Beth was interviewed a few weeks prior to presenting Babson Elementary’s 
school improvement plan to the state Board of Education (BOE). Upon approval by the 
BOE, a new level of support is laid out for the school with the specialist and the DOE 
liaison meeting regularly with the underperforming school principal. The shift from 
being declared underperforming to being monitored by the state brings about a new round 
of support and a new opportunity for a positive working relationship between the school 
and the DOE and district. Indeed, in correspondence with Ms. Beth after the school’s 
plan was approved by the BOE, she wrote, 
My DOE [liaison] is great and very accommodating of her time to 
me and the school. I have received a great deal of help from the 
district level support specialists to date, and all school personnel 
have called me in the last few months to offer any assistance. I 
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have not asked for a great deal of help, only because of who and 
what I’m all about. But, it is nice to know they really do care 
about my students and staff. (Ms. Beth, principal, Babson 
Elementary) 
The comment is much more similar to the perspective of Mr. Arnold, who felt extremely 
supported by the district. His school is further along on the early intervention process, 
and therefore he was receiving more support. At the time of Ms. Beth’s interview she 
had not yet presented her improvement plan before the Board of Education. 
At Babson Elementary the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports 
along with principal and staff interviews point to a history of inadequate principal 
leadership and district neglect. The last principal being ill-equipped for the school, and 
the inconsistent quality of the teaching staff led to Babson Elementary being declared 
underperforming. As each of the teachers said, 
The administration wasn’t helping. The district wasn’t helping. 
The kids were doing poor. The parents weren’t here. The teachers 
were working hard. Some teachers weren’t. It was just a mess. It 
was a mess. It really was...I’ve been here six years and [the 
school] just kind of spiraled downward. (Brenda, teacher, Babson 
Elementary) 
I haven’t seen much of anything. I thought.. .the past few years 
things had gotten worse than better within the school. And what 
was going on in the school? And, I don’t’ mean to put anybody 
down, but what I saw and what was going on in the classrooms. I 
thought things had deteriorated. (Bridget, teacher, Babson 
Elementary) 
There were kids running around doing nothing. There were 
classrooms we went into where there was no learning going 
on...[T]here was nothing going on that looked like learning. 
(Barbara, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Throughout the discussions with the principal and the teachers about Babson’s 
underperforming status, there was a wavering between professional opinion and personal 
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shame. Interestingly, each participant could identify the reasons that Babson Elementary 
was declared underperforming, and none of the teachers felt that the declaration of 
underperformance was a surprise. The school’s test scores were low, and the teachers 
knew they would be reviewed by the state. Teachers said they knew about the problems 
that were cited in the reports long before the state came into the school. Teachers 
described a ripple effect within the school. Teaching was inconsistent in classrooms 
because the principals over the years were not holding teachers accountable, and 
principals were not being held accountable by the superintendent and district staff. 
According to one teacher, “...[the district] was like, ‘Let’s forget you exist’” (Bridget, 
teacher, Babson Elementary). 
There had been problems in the school over a period of over six years, but 
teachers felt helpless to change things within the school. Bridget said, 
It’s not anybody’s fault, but my general feeling is that everybody 
looks at us, the teachers, but they don’t look at all of the things. 
And, they don’t want to hear these things. You do, you know, I 
think people do the best they can with what they’ve got...” 
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Teachers did the best they could, but remained isolated. Still, there is a palpable 
sentiment of shame or maybe embarrassment in being associated with a state designated 
underperforming school. Over the period of an interview the principal and the teachers 
would oscillate between giving their professional opinion about the problems in the 
school, which were in accord with the findings in the state reports, and the frustration and 
embarrassment about what was written in the school’s Panel Review and Fact Finding 
Review reports. Feelings amongst the staff about the DOE intervention can be described 
best as complicated. 
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When one teacher was asked about her feeling about new school accountability 
policy, she stated, “Are you talking about the teachers being accountable for everything” 
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)? Clearly, there is a degree of ownership 
embedded within the professional tenets of the teachers, which pre-dates new school 
accountability policy, but the understanding of the policy even as a school staff is 
experiencing early intervention continues to be tainted by a less than desirable and less 
than empowering perception of the policy. 
The school staffs expectations of support from the district were very high and, 
according to those in the school, they were unmet. In the year prior to being declared 
underperforming, Babson Elementary along with all of the other district schools was 
required by the district to participate in a school improvement planning process. 
However, the district staff were unable to provide the level of support that many of the 
schools needed. As Brenda explained, 
We didn’t have any help. We made phone calls. District people 
didn’t show up. .. .[T]hey had no idea. Supposedly they looked at 
the [school improvement plan], and they sent it back and said we 
had to make some changes. We did, but we didn’t have help. 
Nobody really knew what they were doing including ourselves. It 
was a work in process, but the district people really didn’t know, 
...so we kind of got the run around. (Brenda, teacher, Babson 
Elementary) 
Before Ms. Beth came, [the district administrators] were not seen, 
not heard. They didn’t show up. If we called for help, they didn’t 
come. I mean, I’ve got to tell you. There are two stories. One 
story was, ‘Yes, I called them to come, and they never showed up.’ 
Another [district’s side of the] story was, ‘Well, they were rude to 
me when I got to the door, so I turned away, turned and walked 
away.’ (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Bridget also reported frustration with the lack of district support. 
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You know, I just think the district; they come in and throw things 
at us. And, you know, we’re supposed to do these things, but 
nobody backs us up. Nobody comes in to retrain or model or do 
anything. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
The working relationship between the state and the underperforming school had less 
“baggage” because there are fewer expectations for the relationship. The district, 
however, must confront and overcome a prevalent feeling of neglect and anger about the 
neglect amongst the staff within the underperforming school. 
The Local Context 
There are differences between the two schools in the way each of the principals 
and teachers perceive the beginning of intervention. Not surprisingly, the unique 
characteristics within any given school may account for differences in how a school 
responds to early intervention. O’Day (2004) found that “.. .this unevenness may be 
directly tied to the internal conditions in the schools that make them more or less able to 
use information generated by the accountability system” (p. 25). The cohesiveness 
among the staff, the internal trust among teachers, and the trust they have in the principal 
each contribute to the differences (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). 
Overall the teachers and principal at Alfred Elementary tended to be more 
positive than the teachers and principal at Babson Elementary. The most obvious reason 
for the difference is that Alfred Elementary had been declared underperforming in the 
2003 underperforming school review cycle and had since had a round of testing in which 
the school had shown enough improvement to move off the federal NCLB list, but still 
monitored by the DOE. Having felt a small success and improvement, teachers and the 
principal may see the beginning of intervention in a much different light than those 
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teachers and the principal at Alfred Elementary who were still in the “thick of it” having 
yet to complete their school improvement planning. The Alfred Elementary principal and 
teachers still had to work long hours to conduct the data driven analysis required by PIM, 
as well as doing their jobs at the school. Because PIM is the point where the school team 
is expected to take responsibility for school improvement, it can be a difficult transition 
for team members. 
Another possible cause in the difference is the teaching staff in each of the 
schools. At Babson Elementary nearly all of the staff left after the school was declared 
underperforming, while at Alfred Elementary a little less than half of the staff left (still 
quite a few, but not as dramatic). It may be evidence of difference in the levels of trust 
and sense of collaboration and cohesion among the teachers in the school, with both 
having a high teacher turnover, but Babson Elementary certainly having a much higher 
loss. At Babson Elementary, the norms of the school environment were lost as the 
veteran teachers became a minority group, while at Alfred Elementary, veteran teachers 
were still the majority group. 
Further, the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports were different 
and perceived differently by the staff between the two schools. At Alfred Elementary the 
report was more focused on the inadequacy of the principal and instructional leadership 
and less focused on problems in the classroom, though there were a few. Teachers at 
Alfred truly felt that there was not a problem with them, but that it was the administrator, 
and they strongly felt that state reports backed them up. Alfred teachers described a 
cohesive group of educators who knew they were good teachers. 
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In contrast, Babson Elementary state reports were equally damning toward the 
principal and the teachers in the classroom. Babson teachers described an environment in 
the school where everyone just did their own thing. They expressed awareness that there 
were teachers in the school who were not doing their job, but they felt helpless to make 
any changes. The new principal and the teachers clearly stated that the principal was not 
holding teachers accountable and the environment in the school was chaotic on a daily 
basis. Teachers stated that they knew they were good teachers, but still felt like the 
reports singled them out as bad teachers and took things out of context. The anger and 
devastation after reading the reports and especially the Fact Finding Review report was 
palpable at Babson Elementary. 
New principals placed at each school changed the context in the school. Having 
been placed in the school after it was declared underperforming and just prior to the PIM 
training, principals were forced to enter into a state mandated school improvement 
planning process at the helm of an underperforming school of which they knew very 
little. In both cases the new principals started at the school less than a week prior to 
having to go to PIM. Not knowing the teaching staff can make the PIM extremely 
difficult for the new principal for the purposes of planning. In both instances they had to 
hire many new teachers and were unable to do that until the end of the summer. So, they 
were forced to lead a team to plan for the future of a school without knowing the existing 
teaching staff and not knowing the qualifications of the staff he or she would be hiring. 
Both principals stated that there were not many people interested in being the 
principal of their schools, nor were many people interested in teaching at their schools. 
Once a school is declared underperforming and the principal is removed, there are very 
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few candidates from within the district who want to transfer to a school in which the state 
is intervening. As a matter of fact, Mr. Arnold felt fortunate that he was able to get a 
principal job so quickly because none of the current principals in the district were 
interested in the job. He was able to apply and get the job without any prior experience 
as a principal. In the case of Babson Elementary, Ms. Beth was the principal of a high 
achieving school and was asked by the superintendent to take over as principal of Babson 
Elementary. Ms. Beth did not want to leave her old school and especially did not want to 
have to do the work of building a school from the “ground up.” However, she felt that 
her choices were limited and that professionally she had to do her duty. 
As much as an underperforming school is not the most desirable place for a 
principal, it is even less desirable for teachers. Both principals discussed the difficulty in 
finding teachers to fill the vacant positions. Mr. Arnold received help finding teachers 
for the vacancies from the school support specialist. Ms. Beth, after having no one apply 
for the vacancies and having over 80% of the teaching positions to fill, appealed for help 
from the superintendent. She said that she was finally able to hire outside the district and 
found teachers in the final weeks of summer. 
Keeping up with the demands of being declared underperforming, providing 
instructional leadership in the classrooms, training a new teaching staff, and securing the 
resources needed in the school proved to be extremely demanding for each principal. 
Being new to the school only made things more challenging, though each principal did 
feel that entering the school buildings on the heels of an inadequate leader set the bar 
low. Just talking with the teachers and getting district resources were improvements in 
the school. 
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Principals and teachers universally agreed that the schools were indeed 
underperforming before the state intervention. They also agreed that being declared 
underperforming by the state created many changes in their schools that would not have 
occurred without state intervention. At least in the short term, the principals and teachers 
believed these changes would lead to school improvement. 
Conclusion 
O’Day (2004) asserts that schools respond unevenly to school accountability 
intervention strategies because they are starting from very different places. The evidence 
from the local level participant surveys and observations supports O’Day’s (2004) 
assertion in the cases of Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools. However, O’Day’s 
point also implies that a state externally imposed accountability system will not impact 
the underperforming school because it does not mobilize the professionally driven 
internal accountability system within the school. The findings from Alfred Elementary 
and Babson Elementary do not sufficiently support this argument. 
Rather, the teachers from the underperforming schools claimed that the changes 
that occurred in the schools after they were intervened in by the state would not have 
happened if the schools had not been declared underperforming. The attention of the 
DOE upon the schools caused rapid changes in the leadership and staffs of each school. 
Prior to the beginning of intervention teachers identified problems within the school but 
felt helpless to change them. In fact, some teachers went over the head of their principal 
and complained to the district. They found the district to be unresponsive until the state 
declared their school underperforming. 
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In Alfred Elementary and in Babson Elementary, teachers in the schools clearly 
articulated the feeling that the district had been neglecting their schools for five years or 
longer. The beginning of state intervention changed the pattern of chronic neglect 
between the district and the underperforming schools, when nothing else, even their 
complaints, seemed to alter the relationship. As one specialist indicated, if no parents 
were complaining, then the district did not take the time to look into a school. Even 
teacher complaints did not alter the pattern. 
The district’s role in neglecting the underperforming schools prior to state 
intervention is an interesting one. The district staff experience their own limitations of 
capacity. If, as Ms. Beth continually pointed out, everyone in the district knows where 
the bad schools are and the ineffective administrators are, why did the district not 
intervene in the schools? The reason lies in a traditional manifestation of bureaucracy in 
the context of constrained resources. The district administrators worked with the school 
principals and educators who were contacting the district staff and may have had smaller 
problems to fix. The district administrators probably intended to help fix the small 
problems and eventually get to the big problems. Another possible explanation is 
Maynard Moody and Musheno’s (2004) assertion that clients must be deemed worthy of 
services and respect the expertise of those delivering the services. The environment in 
both schools described communication as cut-off from the district and isolated. The 
district as deliverers of expertise were not always appropriately received by those in the 
school, and therefore moved on to more “worthy” clients or schools. 
In both schools, teachers reported that prior to intervention there was no contact 
or help coming from the district and relations were characterized as hostile or negative 
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between the schools and the district. As Maynard Moody and Musheno (2004) state, 
“When [clients] do not comply.. .workers disengage and move on to other cases and other 
situations” (p. 138). Limitations in capacity in such instances are used to the advantage 
of the district, because there are always other schools to help in an urban district. In such 
a structure, ignoring big problems is possible because there are always other issues to 
address. When there is more work than any single district administrator is capable of 
accomplishing, it is easier to work with school principals and educators who are receptive 
to working with the district. The beginning of intervention during new school 
accountability policy implementation upsets the traditional approach, by prioritizing the 
worst of the worse as targets of intervention. Early state intervention therefore, shines 
light and attention of the district upon the previously neglected underperforming schools. 
It serves to focus and prioritize resources at the district level by clearly articulating the 
areas of need. 
The partnership between the DOE and the district serves several purposes. First, 
it creates a working relationship between the two that encourages mutual respect and 
reciprocity. These feelings are then conveyed by the district to the school and help build 
a positive relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school at the beginning 
of intervention. Second, by giving resources in the form of specialists to the district, 
DOE has enlisted a partner and developed capacity at the district level to help the state 
identified underperforming schools as well as the schools that are underperforming 
according to federal NCLB designation, but in which the state has not intervened. Last, 
the DOE is able to communicate the expectations of the districts roles and responsibilities 
in multiple ways. By modeling a process that looks at the worst schools, the DOE 
173 
encourages the district to do the same. Through regular training and meetings, the DOE 
and the district have formed a true partnership in which they are able to negotiate the 
implementation of new school accountability policy. 
Evidence of the impact of the partnership between the district and the DOE can be 
found in the changes in staffing patterns after a school is declared underperforming 
during the beginning of intervention. In the Charlesburg District all but one of the 
principals was removed shortly before or after their school was declared 
underperforming. Additionally, high percentages of staff leave the school building. The 
district imposes much more severe interventions than the state, which look more like 
strong interventions such as reconstitution. The self imposed reconstitution of the 
district’s underperforming schools means the district is taking on the responsibility of 
strong accountability interventions, and that the DOE may have delegated this 
responsibility to the district. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION AND THE UNDERPERFORMING SCHOOL 
The state and local level perspectives are combined to determine the type of 
working relationship that exists between the DOE and the underperforming schools. 
There are several points during the early intervention process that capture the evolution 
of the working relationship between the two. Those segments include the past 
relationship, the performance and strategic criteria captured in the School Panel Review, 
the diagnostic intervention or Fact Finding Review, and the corrective intervention or 
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM). 
When examining the state and local perspectives on their working relationship 
during early intervention, there is a noteworthy difference in their viewpoints. The state 
level perspective takes a longer-term view upon the working relationship and early 
intervention than the local level. This is likely because the DOE staff and contractors 
have been implementing new school accountability policy for a number of years, but the 
educators in the underperforming schools most likely experience the beginning of 
intervention once. Throughout the state level participants’ perspectives of the working 
relationship is a strong sense that the process is being continually refined or negotiated, 
and rather than having one shot at the process like an underperforming school, they have 
many opportunities to change the process of intervention. 
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On the other hand, the local level experiences of principals and teachers during an 
underperforming school review cycle are much more specific because unlike those at the 
state level, they only experience early intervention once (unless they change schools). 
Consequently, their experiences and insights are not as reflective or as general as one 
finds among the state level administrators and contractors who participate in early 
intervention on an annual basis. The perspective of those in the schools is therefore much 
more of a once in a lifetime experience and less concentrated upon continuous 
improvement of the early intervention process. This makes the experience of principals 
and teachers in underperforming schools a testing ground to examine whether the DOE 
goals of support and messages of enabling the school to improve are effective and 
understood by the principals and teachers in the underperforming schools, who are 
expected to accomplish these goals. 
At the state level the DOE and ABC Consulting aim to develop a positive 
working relationship with the underperforming school in order to support improvement. 
Daphne explains the nurturing approach the DOE takes when implementing new school 
accountability policy. 
[W]e have...this medical analogy where we say, ‘if we look at 
your student performance results over time, you are a patient being 
brought to the emergency room because you are bleeding profusely 
[underperforming]. When you are in the emergency room, the 
emergency room physician is first going to stop the bleeding.’ 
That’s what the Panel Review is. ‘We’re coming in.’ We’re going 
to say, ‘We’ve got to stop this bleeding. This school is 
underperforming.’ They need help. So, we’re going to apply that 
tourniquet, if you will, that label of underperforming. ‘And, then 
once we’ve stopped the bleeding, we’re going to take you to the 
specialist who is going to really look you over and figure what in 
the world caused this.’ That’s the Fact Finding Review. ‘Where 
we are going to spend time in your classrooms, we’re going to look 
at teaching and learning close up and we’re going to tell you what 
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we think is working and what isn’t working, and we’re going to 
tell you what we think is working and what isn’t working, and 
we’re going to help you figure out why that is. And, [Performance 
Improvement Mapping training, a.k.a.] PIM is going to help you 
do that.’ That’s our medicine we have. (Daphne, DOE) 
Daphne describes a process that takes the school through several steps of identification of 
underperformance, diagnosis of the problems within the school and providing the tools or 
“medicine” to the school through the PIM training process. Differences in the reaction of 
those in the school are dependent upon how well they understand how to use the 
“medicine” and how well they respond to the “medicine.” 
Developing a working relationship between the school and the DOE is evident 
and is reinforced throughout the state level discussion about the early intervention 
process. An example of this can be found with the contractor, ABC Consulting. As an 
organizational method, ABC Consultants are trained to place top priority on relationship 
building because the DOE’s strategy requires this, and because of their experience 
working with schools in Massachusetts and in other parts of the country. The ABC 
Consultants discussed the importance of their relationship with the school often in the 
interviews. 
...[W]e’ve learned from... having been in so, so, many schools 
and having to provide feedback that’s not always positive, and it is 
sometimes critical that the way for that feedback to be heard and 
...to be useful is to have developed... a trusting relationship 
between the schools and us. ...I know certainly it is for us. It is 
something we’ve learned over time. I think it’s true in the work 
the DOE does. I think... they would say, ‘Yes, we understand that 
you’ve got to persuade these principals, these superintendents 
whomever you’re speaking with that we’re really there to help 
their work.’ (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
.. .1 think that when you... talk about the obstacles to acceptance of 
this process that could be raised by a district or by a school, in a 
sense that it could become a hostile process and has been very 
adversarial. A lot of the people that have the training pay attention 
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to how do you go into a school and neutralize the process as much 
as you can and personalize it in a positive way. They try to help 
people understand that this is not a finger pointing exercise. 
(Chuck, ABC Consulting) 
Christie talks about having to sell or persuade the local district superintendents and 
principals that it is a supportive intervention and not, as Chuck calls it, a “finger pointing 
exercise” or a deterrent system. As partners of the DOE the ABC Consultants advocate 
for a positive working relationship between the state and local levels, and thus as the face 
of early intervention help the DOE to develop that kind of relationship. In many ways 
the ABC Consultants carry the burden of commencing a positive working relationship 
between the state and the underperforming school. 
The initial desire for a positive working relationship is not necessarily prevalent 
or a priority for those at the local level. Building on that commonality between the two 
schools, there are also some distinct difference between the experiences of participants in 
Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary. First, one of the principals is new to being a 
principal and the other is an experienced principal, which means many things and 
fundamentally contributed to a difference in the expectations each principal had for the 
district and the state. Ms. Beth, the experienced principal, believes there should be a 
tremendous amount of resources and support from the district and possibly the DOE. Mr. 
Arnold, on the other hand, did not have such high expectations, though it is clear that he 
understands maintaining frequent communication between the school and the district is 
essential to getting the school the resources it needs. Second, the predominant attitude 
among the teachers was notably different between the two schools. Generally, Babson 
Elementary teachers’ responses were either neutral or slightly negative toward the entire 
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process while the Alfred Elementary teachers were much more positive and accepting of 
early intervention. 
Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools are different schools with different issues, 
and the unique context of the schools more than likely contributes to these differences. 
Another potential reason for the differences may be that they are in different points of the 
early intervention process. Alfred Elementary staff members were past the state’s Board 
of Education (BOE) approval of their school improvement plan and have had positive 
feedback in terms of higher student test results. Babson Elementary was still in the thick 
of the early intervention process. They were putting the finishing touches on their school 
improvement plan, which by all accounts is an arduous process, and preparing to present 
the plan to the BOE. Additionally, much of the support that comes from the state and 
district really commences after the BOE has approved the school’s improvement plan. 
For that reason, staff members from Babson Elementary may have been feeling alone in 
their efforts. So, while some of the difference may be due to differences between the 
schools, at least some of the differences may be attributed to where they are in the early 
intervention process. Still throughout the local level participant responses there are 
common threads and attitudes toward the DOE during the beginning of intervention. 
The working relationship analysis includes the long term point of view of the state 
participants and the short (or one) time view of the local participants with regard to the 
beginning of intervention. Each of the points in time, past. School Panel Review, Fact 
Finding Review, and PIM are examined to look at the state and local level perceptions of 
one another during early intervention. 
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Past Relationship 
The past working relationship between the DOE and any given underperforming 
school is virtually non-existent. Prior to identifying a school as underperforming, the 
DOE worked with the district, which in turn worked with the school. The work is 
characterized as compliance driven, which was typically found in state departments of 
education prior to new school accountability policy. When asked if they had a past 
relationship with the school, DOE staff said “no.” Those in the schools, with a few 
exceptions discussed previously, agreed that the relationship between the school and the 
DOE, and for that matter any individual within the school and any individual within the 
DOE did not exist. 
State Level 
An interesting facet of the state level perspectives was the DOE staff’s and ABC 
Consultants’ understanding or attempted understanding of how principals and teachers in 
an underperforming school feel about and react to the beginning of intervention. One 
example of this state level understanding is described by Chuck, an ABC Consultant and 
Chair of the state teams, who is a retired principal. His experience lent him a special 
insight into the local level and the past relationship between the state and the local levels 
of the education system, 
I think that in the beginning when reform began there was such a 
crazy distrust of what was going on because people were so 
unaccustomed to being held accountable. Other than standard tests 
that were administered at a district level the belief that [privatizing 
education] ...was supposed to happen or that that was the 
underlying goal of the conservative movement, I mean it was there. 
(Chuck, ABC Consulting) 
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I think [the working relationship between the DOE and the school] 
is very small. The relationship, ... you know...there was really 
very little interface. (Chuck, ABC Consulting) 
Chuck’s explanation reveals “distrust” towards the state because of the legislated 
education reform that brought about new school accountability policy. Among educators, 
he explains, there is a belief that the policy makers want to eliminate public education 
and opt for a privatized education system, which drives the distrust among those working 
in public education. The deterrent nature of new school accountability policy to the 
perceived undercurrent of privatizing public education only furthers the distrust. Without 
any kind of working relationship with schools, the “distrust” was not immediately 
addressed, and has gone unmanaged since the onset of new school accountability policy. 
Now, early intervention is the moment where the distrust is lessened, and it can only be 
changed by actions of the state and how the local level stakeholders perceive those 
actions. 
Truly, since the passage of the comprehensive reform legislation (Massachusetts 
Education Reform Act, 1993) created its own waves of upheaval among schools in 
Massachusetts, new school accountability policy and, particularly, early intervention is 
the first time the state and the underperforming school have had to confront one another. 
DOE visits to underperforming schools bring the school staff face to face with the state 
and more than likely the past distrust Chuck discusses, at least initially, contributes to the 
“defensiveness” and fighting back by the schools that DOE and contractors encountered 
during the earlier years of implementation. 
The ability for state level actors like Chuck to place themselves in the shoes of the 
educators at the local level has helped to get the working relationship between the DOE 
and the underperforming school off to a good start. Overall, the DOE and ABC 
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Consulting staff were aware of the feelings of distrust toward the legislative reforms and 
noted that there was much more acceptance among those in the schools since the 
legislation was first passed and a few years of early intervention have been put into 
practice. State level participants believed that local level educators were beginning to 
understand the reforms and accountability are not going away. In particular, as new 
school accountability policy implementation has been experienced by those at the local 
level, there is a pragmatic understanding of the beginning of intervention among 
educators, which has lessened the defensiveness they meet at the underperforming 
school’s door. 
Underperforming Schools 
Generally speaking, the school principals and staff have no relationship or 
experience with staff members from the DOE prior to early intervention. Discussions 
about the “central office” always referred to the district. Feelings toward the district 
tended to be negative and toward the DOE tended to be full of low expectations. 
As an example of the low expectations those in the school have for the DOE, two 
of the teachers, one from each of the schools described a brief encounter with the DOE 
prior to their interaction during early intervention. One described finding an error on the 
scoring of student tests from her school. She spoke with a contact person at the DOE, 
whose name she could not remember, and the DOE person found her to be correct. The 
DOE staff person changed the results immediately, and the teacher was rather impressed 
and surprised at how fast the change was made. Another teacher contacted the DOE to 
report there had been cheating on the MCAS student tests. She expected the state to 
come in and conduct an investigation, but she never heard a word from the DOE. She 
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was not certain what would happen when she reported the case and had low expectations 
for DOE. When her low expectations were met, she did not feel surprised. In both cases, 
however, the expectations the teachers had for the DOE were low. One teacher expected 
there would be no response, and when that happened, it was not that big of a surprise. 
The other teacher got a response, and was surprised because her expectations of the DOE 
were exceeded. In other words, any response that is more than no response from the state 
is seen as a positive experience by those in the school. No response from the state is 
actually expected, and consequently not seen as negative. 
There is an unspoken professional code in the schools that was implicit in my 
interviews of principals and teachers. For the most part, principals and teachers in the 
schools interact with one another or with the district staff. The traditional hierarchy of 
the public education system is followed with the DOE at the top, the district in the 
middle, and the school at the bottom. Even in the instances when teachers felt a 
complaint should be lodged about the conditions within the school, or the lack of 
principal leadership in their school prior to being declared underperforming, the 
complaints were lodged to the district by teachers, who took a considered risk in doing 
so. 
For a teacher to go above the head of his or her principal is seen as a symbolic and 
perilous move. Even in the difficult environments they worked in, in their stories, 
teachers hesitated to contact the district staff directly and rarely did more than talk about 
such acts amongst themselves. Likewise, a principal would be considered insubordinate 
if he or she were to go over the superintendent’s head and contact the DOE directly to 
complain about a lack of resources or neglect by the district. Early intervention opens the 
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door for the DOE to go directly to the school and ask the principal and staff about what is 
going on in their school. 
School Panel Review 
The School Panel Review is a visit designed to use performance and strategic 
criteria gained from information gathered through interviews with staff and observations 
at the underperforming school. Considered to be narrowly focused, clear, and concise by 
those at the state level, the visit is aimed at getting a sense of the school beyond MCAS 
scores, which trigger a potential visit in the first place. The most cited strength of the 
School Panel Review by state participants is that it is concise and clear. Focused on the 
school improvement plan, the state panelists are required to answer two key questions: 1) 
does the school have a sound improvement plan, and 2) does the school have the ability 
to implement the plan? The simplicity of these two questions makes it possible for 
panelists to hone in on two items within the complexities of any school and turn to 
documentation and evidence from observations and interviews within the school to 
answer them. Dianne explains, “Well, I think it is a very clear and focused system. And, 
in the sense that it cuts right to the chase, it does not try to figure out everything that is 
going on in every school” (Dianne, DOE). The simple approach of asking two key 
questions allows room for the state to examine the school within the unique context of a 
particular school. 
State Level 
Making room for the local context is an important element in early intervention, 
but still there are challenges to the School Panel Review. While the conciseness and 
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clarity are strengths, they are also part of its weaknesses. It is so narrowly focused and 
omits many other dimensions of a school. For example, often there are good activities 
and improvement initiatives that exist within a school that are not captured by or 
connected to the improvement plan. The School Panel Review overlooks the whole 
school for the school improvement plan. 
Another challenge of the School Panel Review is its brevity. The panelists 
convene over a two day period, but only spend one day in the school. The first day is for 
reviewing the improvement plan and interviewing the district superintendent and 
underperforming school principal. The second day is spent observing classrooms, 
interviewing staff and conducting focus groups. At the end of the second day the panel 
must arrive at answers to the two questions. Overall it is a huge “intellectual 
commitment” (Christie, ABC Consulting) on the part of panelist practitioners, the DOE 
liaison and the ABC Consultants. 
From the state perspective, there is certainly a varied response from school 
principals and teachers during the School Panel Review. State level participants 
identified a number of factors that they felt affected the way in which the state team is 
received by a school. Factors that affect the response include: 1) the degree to which the 
principal understands the process; 2) the degree to which the staff understand the process; 
3) the degree to which the district is involved in preparing the school for the process; 4) 
the degree to which the DOE liaison is involved in helping the principal prepare for the 
process; 5) the selection of the “right people” to participate on the panel; and 6) the 
ability of the panelists to take an “inquirer” approach rather than an “evaluator” approach. 
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From the state perspective each of these can make the difference between a cooperative 
and a conflict ridden experience. 
Within the School Panel Review process there are several important points in time 
and the reaction of those in the school changes in stages. The important points include: 
the identification and notification of the school for a School Panel Review, the beginning 
of the visit, the end of the visit, and the release of the report with the results of the 
visit/diagnosis of a school as underperforming. 
When a school is identified as potentially underperforming, Daphne first calls the 
superintendent and asks him or her to contact the school principal to notify him or her 
that he or she will be receiving a letter identifying the school as potentially 
underperforming from the DOE. During the phone call with the superintendent. Daphne 
discusses the school or schools on the list for review and whether they will benefit from 
such a visit. It is the first opportunity for the superintendent to discuss the actual context 
of the school beyond the numbers (student test results). The professional courtesy of a 
phone call to the superintendent respects the traditional hierarchy of the public education 
system. It communicates to the superintendent that early intervention in an 
underperforming school is really a partnership between the district and the DOE. 
Additionally, it serves as an opportunity for the superintendent to interact directly with 
the school principal and potentially open up the lines of communication between the two. 
After the letter is sent out, the DOE liaison contacts the school principal to set up 
a pre-visit meeting. At the meeting the principal is given a binder of information 
detailing the School Panel Review process. The principal is given assignments to be 
completed. The principal must submit a “leadership report” discussing his or her role 
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implementing the school improvement plan and a schedule of classroom observations, 
interviews and focus groups during the panel visit. Additionally, the DOE liaison 
administers an anonymous teacher survey that is sent directly to the DOE, which 
compiles the results that are included in the materials for the panelists to review prior to 
the visit. 
From the point of the pre-visit meeting on, the DOE liaison handles the logistical 
matters related to the School Panel Review visit. More importantly the DOE liaison is 
responsible for demystifying the process and managing the anxiety of the principal. The 
DOE liaison is the first state contact the school has. Dan explains that the initial pre-visit 
meeting is, “Just to introduce myself...[and] trying to get them [principals] to be 
relaxed...” (Dan, DOE) about the visit. Recognizing the level of anxiety those in the 
school feel, he really tries to emphasize that the DOE consists of individual people trying 
to help schools. He discusses how that helps to shape the first visit between the DOE and 
the underperforming school principal. 
[It’s] definitely humanizing it... [Y]ou know the DOE is just 
people too, and I know it doesn’t sound like we’re there to help. 
You’re out there looking to see if something’s underperforming or 
not, but like I said, it can be good. I can be a really, really good 
process to go through. (Dan, DOE) 
As a DOE liaison, Dan emphasizes the need for cooperation with the school and really 
tries to make a personal connection with the school principal. Recognizing the anxiety 
among the staff in a school that is being visited, Daphne tries to assure principals that it is 
a supporti ve process and “the beginning of a partnership” between the DOE and the 
school. Dan tried to reiterate the same idea by letting them know that even if it feels bad, 
it is a “really good process to go through.” 
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The message that the School Panel Review is a supportive partnership with the 
state and a “really good process” evidently has been heard and understood at some level 
among those at the local level. State participants report that after several 
underperforming review cycles, the response of the school principals and teachers 
towards the School Panel Review have changed to be less combative and more accepting. 
DOE staff attribute the change to the process itself and to a wider understanding of the 
process among principals and teachers in the schools. 
The devastation of being identified by the state for a visit has lessened among 
underperforming school educators, but still the DOE administrators find that there is a 
complexity to the response of school principals and teachers. Dianne finds that though 
there seems to be an understanding that it is not the end of the world, there is still a range 
in the responses from those in the school. She explains, 
It can be demoralizing. I think especially in schools where people 
feel they’ve been working really hard...I think others are not 
surprised. You know? I think that sometimes there’s 
embarrassment. I think there’s a range of response, but I think 
there’s a sort of first response and that changes over time. (Dianne, 
DOE) 
The complexity may be attributed to the difference between the educators’ organizational 
identity and professional identity. Organizationally, educators in the school are more 
than likely “not surprised” because they have seen the student test scores and know the 
challenges the face in the school. Professionally, however, the label of potentially 
underperforming and the state coming to visit the school for these reasons my feel 
shameful. Chuck refers to this as the “emotional level” when he discusses the reaction of 
the school educators to the panel visit. 
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I think there’s a lot of caution. I think that unless the principal has 
done a marvelous job with the staff. ...[A]t a personal and an 
emotional level so that they’re able to believe that this is really a 
group that’s here to look at what we’re doing to help us make some 
change. Unless that exists, there’s a certain amount of suspicion 
and fear and ‘what does this mean to us?’ (Chuck, ABC 
Consulting) 
In general the state level participants noted that even when the response was negative 
from the school at first, the manner of the visit and the pre-visit connections between the 
school and the state have lessened the levels of embarrassment. The message of support 
and the professional and humane nature of the panelists help to inject the principal and 
educators with a message of hope and support for improving the school. 
The pre-visit meetings between the principal and the DOE liaison are to prepare 
the School Panel Review visit; however, the state participants find that the level of 
preparation by the school and district remains varied and is dependent upon the 
superintendent and principal. Daphne discusses the range in response of school 
principals. 
Principals who take this seriously meet with their staff, give 
everyone a copy of our protocol. We give interview questions so 
they can be very well prepared. Some principals do nothing. And, 
when we actually visit the school, and we have conversations with 
the teachers, we have teachers saying, ‘What is this all about 
anyway?’ (Daphne, DOE) 
ABC Consultants finds the same variation in preparedness. Chuck explains his dismay at 
the lack of preparation in some schools, 
... [T]his is something that... regularly amazes me: the difference 
in how a district and a school will prepare for [a School Panel 
Review] visit. I mean there are places where principals do totally 
nothing. Absolutely nothing until the last week or so, and then 
they’ll throw together a schedule and that will generally inform 
people [in the school] that there’s group coming to explore some of 
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the things that are going on in the school. (Chuck, ABC 
Consulting) 
Over and over again state level participant refer to early intervention as a “transparent 
process” meaning the information about what the DOE is looking for at any given point 
in time, including the School Panel Review visit is made available. Beyond providing 
schools with documentation about the process, the information is made available to the 
public on the DOE’s website. Finding an underperforming school at which the principal 
and the teachers are not prepared for the panelists’ questions indicates to the state that 
there are serious problems within the school. 
Regardless of the degree of preparation, generally the state panel is met with a 
school principal and staff who are “apprehensive - that is the first feeling and most 
predominant feeling,” according to Christie. Other comments about the first impression 
the school has of the state team reveal a similar tone. 
...they’re apprehensive about the whole process. You know, 
‘You’re going to take over our school. You’re going to close our 
school... You’re going to shut us down. You’ve mislabeled us. 
You’re all wrong.’ ...So, ...they’re very apprehensive, defensive, 
.. .they’re worried. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
The punishing and deterrent perceptions the educators in the schools have about the state 
and new school accountability policy are exposed in Christie’s comment. The deterrent 
system that is perceived by the local stakeholders comes out during the first face to face 
interaction between the school educators and the state panelists. The “distrust” refers to 
the lack of faith the educators have in the state’s ability to identify a school as 
underperforming, and the defensiveness toward the state must be countered in order to 
progress or begin to change the working relationship so that the school staff are able to 
take on the improvement initiatives on their own. Though the response is varied, the 
190 
team is seen as “the state” and is an intervention into the school. There is an implicit 
perception by the school that “the state is out to get us” (Christie, ABC Consulting). And 
Christie goes on to say, “I don’t think I’ve ever been in a situation [when] the state was 
referenced in that positive light from the outset.” 
The beginning of a School Panel Review reflects a less than positive perception of 
the DOE by those in the school, and those in the DOE clearly understand the challenge 
they face in overcoming it. Daphne acknowledges the feelings of the principals and 
teacher in a school that is visited. 
They.. .really feel awful. They don’t like it. The.. .first response is 
very defensive. It is sort of a grief cycle. You know? At first you 
don’t believe it, and you can think of every reason why it’s not 
happening. And then, you sort of get angry. You know? That is 
kind of the next thing. You are really upset about this. It’s not 
right. How could this have happened? And then you finally have 
to accept it. (Daphne, DOE) 
The state’s recognition of the difficulty educators have with the process, and letting 
individuals within the school go through the “grief cycle” without reacting negatively, 
allows the school principal and teachers to process the idea of state intervention and 
eventually move into acceptance and cooperation with the state. 
Though state participants feel the individuals in the school are much more 
accepting than in the past, nervousness and tension among the educators in the school 
exists during the visit. Being at the front line of the School Panel Review, Dan explains 
the first encounters, 
They [school staff] are nervous. There is no two ways about it. 
Sometimes you’d walk out of classes, and someone would kind of 
give...a look behind you. Or, they’ll stop you in the hallway, and 
they’ll start showing you volumes of paper and things. Projects 
they’ve worked on. Just to show you, ‘We’re doing this. We’re 
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doing this. We’re doing this.’ It’s all good. It’s nice that they are, 
but it’s not exactly what we’re there to see. (Dan, DOE) 
First impressions are lasting, and the professional manner and regular assurance the DOE 
liaisons, ABC Consultants, and the panelist practitioners take during their first encounter 
quickly changes the reaction of those in the school. Panelists’ actions serve as indicators 
for the school principal and staff that the process is professional. This begins to change 
the reaction of those in the school toward the state visit. Dan describes the phenomenon, 
After a very short while, after you conduct interviews, they’ll, 
many times, though I have no specific data for it...someone would 
say, ‘Well, that’s it?’ 
I’d say, ‘Yeah, that’s it.’ 
They’d say, ‘Wow, I really expected this to be really hard.’ 
[I’d say], ‘You just have to tell us how your plan evolved. That’s 
all. And, what’s your role in that, and if you can tell us that, then 
we’re pretty happy and you should be too.’ So they would be much 
more relaxed.. .by the time we left. (Dan, DOE) 
Dianne supports Dan’s comment when she explains that at first the state (panel) is seen as 
the “interloper,” but once the first few interactions occur between the panel and members 
of the school staff, the word gets around fast. 
Indeed, state stakeholders find that there are certainly at least some “people in the 
school [who] actually seem happy that someone is recognizing that they’re in trouble” 
(Dianne, DOE). At first the process may be frightening in and of itself, but in the 
comments from DOE and ABC Consulting staff, there is an undercurrent that arises after 
the initial defensiveness and nervous reactions the staff in the school are welcoming of 
the help and support. State participants believe educators in the school are really afraid 
of being “blamed” for the underperformance and when they realize it is not a “finger 
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pointing exercise” the attitude changes and the perception of the state visitors becomes 
more positive. 
The change in attitude is largely influenced by the panelists themselves, who 
always include a DOE liaison, ABC Consultants, and several practitioners. Their actions 
and styles of inquiry dominate the opinions the local level stakeholders are forming about 
the state. Consequently, selecting the “right people” for the role is imperative to being 
able to build a cooperative working relationship with the school. Caitlin hits upon the 
idea that the practitioners bring an, “I’m in your position,” perspective, which lends 
credibility to the visit for those within the school. 
Having the “right people” on the panel is important and the management of the 
panel by the Chair sets the tone of the visit. Chuck talks about the challenge of 
overseeing practitioner panelists. 
I think the biggest challenge is to yank the predispositions out of 
practitioners. You know right away if somebody is going to go in 
there with a predisposition, and the difference between that type of 
person and somebody who is going to go in with an open-mind and 
say, ‘You know, we see this in writing, but we have to see how it’s 
operationalized, and what it feels like.’ So if you’ve got a good 
group of people, it makes a big difference. (Chuck, ABC 
Consulting) 
Even more than managing the panel and having a good group of people, Christie talks 
about the importance of selecting practitioner panelists who work in similar situations 
and types of school as the educators in the school that is being visited. Christie explains, 
Well, practitioners are the big strength. If you can have a team in 
which the practitioners’ experience mirrors the school context 
that’s a very powerful team because those people really can know 
quickly, you know, sort of what the lay of the land is. (Christie, 
ABC Consulting) 
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If things have gone well in terms of the being able to allay the fear of the principal 
and gaining a degree of trust among the staff after they realize the state is just a team of 
people who are professional and courteous, a positive relationship begins to develop 
between the panel and the school. Caitlin discussed how “people [in the school] are 
nervous,” but “a lot of people are frustrated with what’s going on [in the school], so 
they’re ready to talk.” Over the short period of time most have found that the school 
principal and staff are nervous, but they are willing to get to the point in the “grief cycle” 
where they are able to discuss the challenges the school is facing. 
By all state stakeholders’ accounts the majority of the School Panel Reviews do 
go well. This is different from the earlier years of new school accountability 
implementation. 
In the early years, of the very first few years, it was an extremely 
antagonistic reception of the idea of potentially underperforming. 
Schools denied...that there was any underperformance, that...it 
wasn’t their responsibility... So, there was very little constructive 
conversation emanating from the school regarding - it was all 
defensive. ...[T]hat was in the early years. It has migrated 
somewhat over the years to be more.. .constructive. (Christie, ABC 
Consulting) 
The change shows a wider understanding of early intervention among the public 
education stakeholders. With the change comes a change in understanding of the policy 
from a deterrent to an enabling process. While this may have occurred at the school level 
at a later point, there is an indication that it occurs earlier in the process, or at least the 
perception of the policy as deterrent begins to erode earlier than during the first year of 
implementation. A contributing factor to the erosion of the school’s deterrent perceptions 
may be the DOE’s attitude as professed by Daphne, “It’s not about blame. It’s about 
moving forward.” 
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After the School Panel Review visit, a report detailing the findings of the panel is 
submitted to the commissioner of the DOE. He then makes a determination about the 
school. The superintendent is notified by Daphne and told that one or more of the 
schools reviewed in his or her district will be declared underperforming, and that he or 
she should notify the school principal because the letter from the DOE with a copy of the 
report is being sent out in the next few days. Again, professional courtesy is paid to the 
district. It is used as an opportunity to strengthen the DOE and district relationship, and 
is an opportunity to encourage a stronger district and school relationship. 
After the notification Daphne goes to the district and meets with both the 
superintendent and principal. She discusses the meeting, 
And basically, here is what I say, ‘I’m here. You can put a face to 
the Department of Education. This is your opportunity to talk to 
me about why we got it wrong, if that is what you think.’ And, so 
some principals take advantage of that and really spout off about 
the DOE. And, then ultimately I say, ‘It is what it is. So, here are 
the choices. We want to work with you now. We know you don’t 
like this label. We wish there were a better way too.’ (Daphne, 
DOE) 
The DOE Director allows for the underperforming school principal to vent and uses the 
meeting as a push to start changing things within the school. She reinforces the 
partnership with the DOE and then details the next steps in the early intervention process. 
Underperforming Schools 
The principals interviewed were not present during the initial School Panel 
Review, but teachers, who were present, indicated that they knew the school was 
underperforming, as did the former principal, long before the school was selected for a 
state visit. Bridget recalls, “I wasn’t [surprised]. We had a feeling. I mean we were told 
this was probably going to happen just by the MCAS scores.” The teachers in the two 
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schools vacillated between feeling nervous or intimidated and feeling like they could use 
the help and let the state see what we deal with every day. 
Being selected for a School Panel Review is a big deal in the school. Teachers 
felt unsure about the process, though each indicated they had received information, 
questions, and schedules from their principal ahead of time. Still, the teachers did not 
feel like they clearly understood what was going on. As Anita explains, “There was no 
big picture.” They simply understood “the state is coming because we’re 
underperforming.” One teacher describes the feeling in the building once the school was 
selected for a DOE visit, 
... [Tjhere were mixed feelings. There was, ‘OK. Come on in 
state. I’m going to tell you everything that’s going on. I'm going 
to... complain. I’m gonna tell you everything that’s happening.’ 
And other people were like, ‘You know, I’m nervous. Am I going 
to be accountable? Am I going to lose my job? What’s going to 
happen here?’ So, there was a lot of mixed feelings going on. 
(Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
The mixed reaction ranged from tension because of the stress of being identified, to 
recognition that the school and the teachers needed help. This point was discussed by 
many of the teachers in the schools. 
...[I]t was tense. The principal you could tell was on edge. She 
was definitely on edge. She was nervous... She was new to 
administration, very new in the system, and she had a lot on her 
plate. There was a lot going on... It was tense. It was very tense. 
(Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
We knew we needed some serious changes, and uh, so, I think 
most people were looking forward to it. It can be sort of 
intimidating, but I think the general feel was, ‘Come on in and help 
us.’ (Amelia, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
Despite the tension and intimidation of a state visit, the hope that finally someone, 
even if it was someone from the state, would listen to them and see for themselves what 
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was going on in the school was clearly articulated. One teacher described her mixed 
feelings about the state coming in over the heads of the district, but knowing that it was 
the school’s only hope of improvement. Anita explains, 
But, at that point, I welcomed it. Because I said, this has got to 
mean something good because just getting to interview with DOE. 
They interviewed all of us at different times. Just to tell them.. .we 
have no textbooks. We don’t have [supplies]. We ran out of 
paper. We ran out of pencils. You know? 
They were like, ‘What do you mean you have no text books?’ 
I was like, ‘You know textbooks? We don’t have them.’ 
They were like, ‘What? You don’t?’ 
[I said,] ‘Papers, pencils, that’s on our own. It’s up to us.’ 
(Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
The DOE arrives to a tense yet conciliatory staff within the school. The schoolteachers 
really want to tell somebody, who will listen, that they have no “textbooks” or that they 
“ran out of paper” and to get a reaction of concern from the DOE makes the risk of 
sharing the information worth it. The tone of the DOE visit feels like they are being 
understood and gives a sense of reciprocity to those in the school. It gives those in the 
school hope. 
To the DOE’s advantage during early intervention, the staff in the schools found 
the panelists to be professional and courteous, and it gave the state credibility with the 
educators in the school. In turn, the teachers were more willing to share information 
because they saw the professionalism of the panelists. Brenda explained, “[The panelists] 
were very pleasant and you know they were very nice. They.. .told us their background 
and what they did. They.. .weren’t pointing fingers at anybody or anything like that.” 
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Having the “right people” on the state team was important to many of the teachers and 
contributes to a sense of DOE reciprocity within the school. 
Teachers in the schools supported the state level participants’ notion that 
matching the experience of the practitioner panelists with that of the underperforming 
school as important to the reliability of early intervention. It is important to the teachers 
to have panelists reviewing their school who have similar backgrounds and experiences 
as they have within their school. 
I think [the panelists] were very nice. You know? They were 
principals. I don’t know how long they were teaching, or if they 
had ever been teachers. You know? Or, if they even taught in a 
school like this, you know? Or, did they come from some little 
suburban town where they don’t have the same kind of problems 
that we do. I have no idea. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
I probably wish [the panel] had some Hispanic people because 
over 80% of [the] student population is Hispanic. I think that 
would have been, you know that’s a huge thing that’s missing from 
the school and other schools like it that nobody gets - the language 
barrier. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
Teachers are quick to identify deficiencies of the panelists. From the DOE, to ABC 
Consulting, to the practitioners, it is important to have people from similar types of 
districts and schools because otherwise the teachers felt they “don’t have the same kind 
of problems.” 
While neither of the school’s panels were a perfect reflection of the schools, all in 
all the teachers felt they were professional and courteous and just having them listen to 
what the teachers had to say gave them some credibility. Adeline explained that, “Just 
talking to them, [you could see among] the students and the teachers around here, there 
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was a difference. They had hope. There was hope” (Adeline, teacher, Alfred 
Elementary). 
When the report was released, each of the teachers stated that they knew the 
school would be declared underperforming, so it was not a surprise when it happened. 
Generally, teachers believed the report was an honest articulation of what was really 
going on in the school, which contributed to the credibility of the state team. They felt 
listened to, finally. 
Still, teachers expressed confusion about what the label of underperforming 
meant. They wondered if it was a sanction on the teaching in the school, and how it 
impacted them. With the principal who was on the way out the door as the primary 
communication link about the process to the district and the DOE, teachers had little 
information about what it all meant and had little opportunity to find out. Teachers 
expressed their confusion. 
Well, [the school being declared underperforming] was 
disappointing. It was. Because my thing is, is that kids here are 
low. The kids are low. You know, most of the city is, but they 
have no idea how hard a lot of us have worked. They’re low, yes, 
but they’ve come a long way some of these kids. And, that is what 
really upsets me... (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
We didn’t really know what to expect. We kind of had a lot of 
questions. What does this mean for the building? Can they come 
in and take it over? There wasn’t fear. Nobody was afraid. 
Nobody felt, ‘Oh, we’ve been caught,’ because we all knew how 
hard we’d all been working. With nothing you work a lot harder. 
So, we weren’t afraid for [the state] to come in. We thought once 
they came in, now they’ll see it. Now we have them here. (Anita, 
teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
Uncomfortable with the process, and wondering if the report was an indictment upon the 
teachers themselves, questions about the process abound. In each of the teachers’ 
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explanations mingles disappointment and confusion because they did not know what was 
going to happen next, along with a gratefulness that something is happening to change 
things in the school. In the uneasiness of understanding the process, and the more than 
likely removal of the top administrator (the principal), there was a dense feeling of 
confusion and concern. 
Perhaps at least partially because of the confusion and concern or not knowing the 
“big picture,” turnover in schools declared underperforming is high. It is a classic 
symptom of what happens after a school is declared underperforming. One of the teachers 
described that response, 
A lot of the staff was like, ‘You know, I’m out of here.’ ‘I’m out 
of here,’ was a big reaction... a lot of people did do that. That’s 
when the transfers were coming out, and they put in for transfers. 
‘I don’t want to be here. I don’t want the state breathing down my 
neck. I could lose my job.’ That was the major feeling. (Brenda, 
teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Fear of the unknown is at least part of the reason for the turnover. Additionally, the 
timing of the district transfer period matches up with the timing of the school being 
declared underperforming. 
By the end of the school year, an underperforming school more than likely has a 
new principal who must replace a large percentage of the teachers who have transferred. 
The staffing changes alone contribute to transforming the underperforming schools and 
make it easier for the new principal to implement new improvement strategies. What is 
lost from teachers leaving because the school is declared underperforming is unknown. 
Sincerity, reciprocity between the DOE and the school, and clear communication 
are major strands interwoven throughout the initial process. At that point involvement 
between the DOE staff and the underperforming school staff has increased and the 
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expectations for future involvement are clarified. Though trust in each party’s intention 
to implement the policy is varied, the professional nature of the visit and sincerity of the 
message of support is embedded throughout the visit. Much of the defensiveness and 
combativeness in reaction to a state visit is lessened or eliminated during this phase, and 
thus the actions taken during the School Panel Review begin to alter the school staffs 
perceptions of a deterrent system that can cause a defensive or paralyzing reaction to an 
enabling system that relies upon the internal expertise of those within the school. 
Fact Finding Review 
The Fact Finding Review is the state’s diagnostic criteria stage of early 
intervention. Prior to the Fact Finding Review, there has already been an introduction to 
the state (School Panel Review), so the Fact Finding Review Panel is seen as another 
state visit like one which the educators within the school have already experienced. From 
the perspective of those at the state level, the way the Fact Finding Review is received by 
the school is affected by factors similar to the School Panel Reviews including the level 
of preparedness, the level of involvement of the district, the level of understanding of the 
process, the right people on the panel and their professional manner. The Fact Finding 
Review is different from the Panel Review in that it is intended to provide a 
comprehensive diagnosis of a specific school. It moves beyond simply looking at the 
school improvement plan to conducting classroom observations and in-depth interviews 
with the principal and staff. 
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The State Level 
Though these visits are supposed to be customized for the school, the state has 
developed a uniform protocol and schedule for the Fact Finding Review. Still, the chair 
of the team emphasizes that, “it is really flexible” (Daphne, DOE). The information from 
the Fact Finding Report is to support the school. It is, therefore, centered on the unique 
context of a particular school and is negotiated to fit the needs of a school. Daphne 
describes the evolution of the Fact Finding Review, 
The Fact Finding Review...is something we’ve struggled with. 
We would like it to have a different feel for the school... The Fact 
Finding Review is really a team that’s coming in to give you 
feedback now. So, we urge principals and their staffs to prepare a 
set of questions that they are looking for answers to. For example, 
if the school has gone about the business of...developing a 
schedule that uses common planning time, principals may say, 
‘You know, I’m not sure how my teachers are really using that. If 
they are using it for planning for students or if it is just a session, 
you know where they sit around and complain about kids. And, I 
can’t get to all of them. So, I would like some feedback on that.’ 
In that case the team would structure their schedule to include 
observations of common planning time meetings. (Daphne, DOE) 
During the Fact Finding Review, the introductions and first impressions are over. The 
DOE immediately tries to engage the school principal and teachers in helping the team 
diagnose the problems in the school by having them “prepare a set of questions they are 
looking for answers to” (Daphne, DOE). The team is engaging them to work as partners 
with the state team and is supporting staff members of the school by helping them to find 
those answers. The Fact Finding Review marks a transition in the working relationship 
between the state and the school, one in which they must both actively participate. 
The state’s emphasis on making the Fact Finding Review feel different to those in 
the school is one of its strengths. The difference is in the participation of the educators as 
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well as the amount of time spent at the school, which allows the state team to conduct a 
closer in-depth analysis of the underperforming school. If the implementation of the 
review works as planned, the analysis and diagnosis are guided by the principal, who 
quickly validates findings as systemic problems or discredits findings as out of context. 
Daphne describes the review as “very collaborative.” As part of the collaborative 
approach, the school leadership is provided with feedback on a daily basis. 
There have been two important changes in the Fact Finding portion of 
intervention that, in the eyes of the state, have improved the reception of the state team. 
First, the time frame was altered so that both the School Panel and Fact Finding visits are 
conducted in the same academic year, which helps the school not to feel abandoned by 
the state after being declared underperforming. Involvement of the DOE liaison over a 
shorter time period creates continuity for those within the school, and it allowed the 
school team to enter into the PIM process with an in-depth analysis of some of the issues 
that exist within the school. 
Second, to the extent possible, the DOE now assigns the same ABC Consulting 
team leaders that conducted a school’s School Panel Review to its Fact Finding Review. 
Cited as a very influential change to the process, it allows for the relationship that had 
begun to develop during the previous visit to continue. It also contributes to a deeper 
diagnosis of the school’s needs during the Fact Finding Review. As Chuck states, 
Well, I think that if you’ve been able to establish some kind of 
connection with a school on a [School] Panel Review, and they felt 
that...the relationships were positive and that the nature of the 
visit, the content, [was] positive, that it’s helpful for the school to 
see the same people. (Chuck, ABC Consulting) 
Clearly, it is a change in implementation that takes into consideration relationship 
building between the state and the school. 
At the Fact Finding Review, the ABC Consulting team leads the panel of 
practitioners without the presence of the DOE liaison. Dianne explains the reason to not 
have a DOE presence, 
I think it’s to...ensure a level of objectivity. You know, that 
there’s not investment by the DOE about what is found at the 
school. And, it’s also to allow for another practitioner to be on the 
panel... During the Fact Finding they’re really spending a lot of 
time in classrooms and really trying to get at the teaching and 
learning and the curriculum and instruction of what might be the 
gaps in that. So...for that role it really does need to have people 
who are classroom people and teachers and principals and people 
who supervise teachers or principals...function best in that role. 
(Dianne, DOE) 
There is no DOE member on the staff to ensure “objectivity,” though it is not clear that 
the local level stakeholders understand there is no one from the state on the panel. To 
underperforming school staff it is a state visit. 
While objectivity may be one goal, it is likely that the decision is influenced by 
limitations in the DOE’s capacity to send a person to a four day review. Dianne also 
remarked on a capacity issue in matching DOE skills with the demands of the review. 
The intent of the visit is focused on curriculum and instruction, areas where the DOE 
staff generally have a limited level of expertise. It is better to have practitioners who are 
currently in schools in this role. The point is important because it shows the DOE staff 
have a self-awareness about its organizational limitations. Dianne expressed a level of 
understanding of the DOE’s strengths and weaknesses with regard to the early 
intervention process. Rather than cover them up, the choice was to expand capacity to 
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address the limitations. At once, it shows respect for the educators at the local level and a 
self-awareness of the DOE’s limitations that might surprise the local educators. 
Absence of the DOE places the ABC Consultants in charge of the state panel. 
ABC Consultants find that being the person in charge and having direct contact with the 
school, unlike that School Panel Review when it is the responsibility of the DOE liaison, 
makes them better able to manage the process and the working relationship between 
themselves and the school. During the visits the school is made to understand that the 
ABC Consulting team is representing the DOE, as are the panel practitioners. From the 
perspective of the ABC Consultants, it is unlikely that those in the school know that they 
are not the DOE. Put simply, at the school level the distinction was not important. 
To open up a rapport with the school, the first session focuses on discussing the 
report from the previous state visit (School Panel Review report). In an effort to enlist 
the school leadership’s cooperation and as an act of sincerity, the review team asks what 
the school team thought about the report, what they got wrong and what they got right. 
Because the information from the initial meeting shapes and influences what the review 
panel looks for during the review, Caitlin believes, 
... it’s a great way to start from those discussions of, ‘Did you read 
the report?’ ‘Were we right?’ ‘Was it accurate?’ ‘What did you 
agree with, what didn’t you?’ And, right away you’ve got a further 
understanding of what you already knew based on what their 
impressions are. I mean they’re the people that need to give you 
the information. (Caitlin, ABC Consulting) 
The meeting requires the school leadership to put forth information, and the way in which 
the state team listens is an act of reciprocity that sends a message of respect for the school 
principal’s professional opinion and the team’s willingness to listen and incorporate what 
the principal has to say. Caitlin articulates the need for cooperation with those in the 
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underperforming school because they “need to give you the information.” Chuck adds 
that he uses the approach to gain the cooperation of the school. 
I think that.. .if you’re able to convince people that you might have 
missed stuff, you know? If we got something wrong or that we got 
it right, but to be open to the possibility that we didn’t get it right. 
You know? OK, so we were there for one day [during the School 
Panel Review], now you’ve got to take a second look at it or tell us 
what, tell us what we misinterpreted. (Chuck, ABC Consulting) 
The willingness of the Chair of the panel (Chuck) to admit honestly that the first panel 
(School Panel Review) may have missed something and to listen to what was right and 
wrong within the report, strengthens working relationships by conveying a sincere 
interest in the opinion of the educators in the schools. 
As in the School Panel Review, information about what happens in the initial 
meetings of the Fact Finding Review travels fast among the educators within the school. 
Christie found that the “tone” of the opening session creates a relationship with more than 
just the school people that are in the initial meeting. 
... the opening sessions sets a tone that’s constructive and positive. 
Then I think that you’d be amazed how fast word travels around 
the school. You would be astounded. By the end of the first 
session, we usually have a quick break, you know, maybe a 
bathroom stop, and then we’re out in the classrooms, visiting 
classrooms, and interviewing teachers and word has already spread 
as to who we are. You know, like these are real people. These 
people know what they’re talking about, you know? And, we’ll 
hear that as we interview teachers through the day. (Christie, ABC 
Consulting) 
The “constructive and positive” tone of the first meeting sets the tone for the rest of the 
Fact Finding Review. The understanding of the human aspect of the process that ABC 
Consultants bring to early interventions really helps to build a working relationship 
between the DOE and the underperforming school. Every action the panel takes during a 
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visit is being scrutinized by the educators in the underperforming school, and the panel, 
led by ABC Consultants is made aware of the need to be consistent, professional, and 
respectful because they want to send a positive message. 
The Fact Finding Review brings new challenges to the school. A declaration of 
underperformance triggers the review, and the first opportunity for the teachers in the 
school to see the state is when the Fact Finding Review Panel walks through the school 
doors. Despite the variation in response, generally there is a change in the teachers’ 
reactions, because they are no longer fighting the “threat” of the “underperforming” label. 
With the deterrent system’s initial threat past, the educators in the school need to figure 
out what is next for them. 
DOE staff and ABC Consultants believe it is that question and the supportive and 
respectful nature of the Fact Finding Review panel that pushes the educators within the 
school closer to acceptance of the state intervention and all that it brings. Caitlin 
discusses that difference. 
Well, it’s not the experience in the [School Panel] review, but they 
are more likely to admit they do need help. We’ve told them that 
they need help by the time the Fact Finding had got there. (Caitlin, 
ABC Consulting) 
Getting the school staff to the point of admitting they need help brings them that much 
closer to accepting the enabling implementation style of early intervention. 
Throughout the Fact Finding Review the messages of being courteous, 
professional, respectful, and attentive to the principal and staff in the school are 
reinforced the by the state team. The ability of the school principal to direct the process 
and the flexibility of the ABC Consulting team contributes to moving the school from a 
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deterrent understanding of the process to that of an enabling process. As Daphne 
explains. 
So, sometimes despite the fact that a school is found to be 
underperforming, if we can help them understand that there are 
things they need to do differently. They don’t necessarily need to 
throw out the baby with the bathwater, but there are better ways to 
approach what they are doing, then they come to PIM with a sort 
of a more positive attitude. ‘OK, so this is how the DOE is going 
to help us figure this out.’ (Daphne, DOE) 
Daphne’s description of helping the school to understand that things can be done 
differently also discloses a consistent theme among all of the state level participants. At 
no time did any of the DOE staff members indicate they had answers as to how to 
improve a school. Each mention of school improvement focused on helping the school 
“figure” out how to improve and the belief that there are good things going on in each 
school. 
Once again, to convey the need for a working relationship with the 
underperforming school, at the end of the Fact Finding Review, the ABC Consulting 
team meets with the school principal and/or leadership team to debrief and discuss the 
final findings of the panel. At that time, the DOE liaison, who is assigned to be the state 
level person involved with underperforming school team during PIM and after the 
school’s improvement plan is approved by the Board of Education to monitor the 
underperforming school for two years, comes back into the picture. 
Dan, a DOE liaison describes his entry back into the early intervention process, “I 
mean by that time I would have a decent relationship with the principal.” In fact, the 
DOE liaison has become the state level advocate for the underperforming school. ABC 
Consultants find that the DOE liaison’s role as an advocate for the school during the last 
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Fact Finding Review meeting with the principal, reinforces the supportive nature of 
DOE’s partnership with the school. According to the consultants, DOE liaisons truly 
take on the role of support and present an “overly rosy” picture of what is going on in the 
school. The overly rosy perspective of the DOE liaison can cause some conflict between 
the ABC Consultants as the final report is written. Most of the conflicts are ironed out 
quietly and internally, but it can be a challenge for the consultants. 
Admitting that he may take an overly supportive role toward the underperforming 
school, the DOE liaison explained that during the Fact Finding Review exit interviews, 
he really likes coming in at the end and playing the good cop to the ABC Consulting’s 
bad cop. The exit interview is an opportunity to improve or establish the DOE liaison’s 
working relationship with the principal and educators in the underperforming school, and 
the DOE liaisons tend to take advantage of it. Caitlin explains the dynamic of the exit 
interview being a “stepping stone” toward developing a positive relationship with the 
underperforming school. 
[D]oes [the DOE liaison’s] presence there help in building a 
relationship with the school? I think it should be a stepping stone. 
I mean at this point [the school is underperforming]. ...You’ve 
been determined underperforming, and you don’t have a choice but 
to work with the state for the upcoming year plus. So, is that a 
good first stepping stone in establishing a relationship? I think it 
could be a very good stepping stone. (Caitlin, ABC Consulting) 
The Underperforming Schools 
Differences between the two schools are most striking during the Fact Finding 
Review. Because of changes in implementation, Alfred Elementary’s new principal and 
staff had been through the state’s PIM training prior to going through the Fact Finding 
Review. The team and school were therefore acutely aware of the tools, strategies and 
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expectations the state had for them and their school. Babson Elementary’s old principal 
and staff did not have as clear a picture about what would happen to them and the school. 
In fact, the district announced that the principal would be replaced during the state visit, 
which added to the confusion among teachers. 
Both schools’ teachers reported responding honestly to the panelists who 
interviewed them and observed their classes. In each school, the faculty believed they 
should “tell it like it is.” They felt as though the Fact Finding Review posed an 
opportunity to make some real changes in the school. According to teachers, they hoped 
the changes they had been clamoring at the district for would be heard by the state and 
their interviews with panelists gave them the opportunity to tell them what had not been 
heard by the district. 
The degree to which the teachers felt nervousness was different between the two 
schools for reasons stated previously. When the Fact Finding Review team visited, 
Babson Elementary participants reported that “they were nervous” (Brenda, teacher, 
Babson Elementary), but were still forthcoming with the state team. 
...[People in the school] were very honest. I know that. They 
were like, ‘Look, I’m going to tell it how it is, and this is what I’m 
upset about.’ They talked about the district. They talked about the 
principal. And, you know, some people were really willing to get 
their feelings out and let’s bring everything to the table here, 
because it needs to be told. This is why the school is 
underperforming. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Babson Elementary teachers were nervous, but according to Brenda, they were still 
willing to take a chance. They saw the opportunity and took advantage of it. 
The nervousness level was much higher at Babson than at Alfred. The teachers at Alfred 
Elementary had greater familiarity with the DOE, having already been through the PIM, 
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and had begun to implement changes within the school. Therefore, they felt less 
threatened by the visit as the comment below indicates. 
Well we, the building always welcomed the DOE and anybody 
involved in the process. There was never any anger or contention 
from the teachers toward them. We felt good about it because we 
wanted help. We wanted somebody to say, to do something. We 
welcomed them. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
As with the School Panel Reviews, participants found the Fact Finding Review 
team to be professional and pleasant. Brenda states, “I mean when I was interviewed, I 
was very comfortable. The people were very nice and I told the others too.” The word 
about what happens during the interviews and observations spreads fast around the school 
as with Brenda’s experience. So, while the principal and staff were nervous during the 
review, the style and manner of the state team did allay the nervousness enough for those 
in the school to be honest and comfortable with the state team. Alfred Elementary 
teachers reported the same. Again, their expectations were low, and when they found 
that the panelists “weren’t demeaning” (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) or “grumpy” 
(Adeline, teacher Alfred Elementary) they were happy with them. 
In both schools staff expressed doubt about how much of an understanding of a 
school’s issues a state team could get when the team is only in the school for a few days. 
In Alfred Elementary the visit was conducted in October after Mr. Arnold, the new 
principal, and the school team had been through PIM. Mr. Arnold felt the feedback from 
the state team was valuable, but the timing of the visit was awkward because so many 
dramatic changes (e.g. new principal, implementation of a new improvement plan) had 
already occurred. At Babson Elementary the school was visited prior to PIM, however 
the timing of the visit still posed a big issue for those in the school. The team visited in 
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June during the last few weeks of school. Teachers felt that arriving a few weeks before 
school ends is not representative of what is actually going on in the school. For both 
schools the timing of the Fact Finding Review was awkward for different reasons, and 
timing of visits turns out to be an influential factor in how the state is perceived by school 
principals and teachers. 
The state team met with district representatives over the course of the Fact 
Finding Review. A teacher commented about the district during the Fact Finding 
Review, 
I remember walking by going, ‘What are [the district 
administrators] talking about? They have no idea about this 
school.’ ...I remember saying that to myself. I looked and I just 
went, you know, I kind of shook my head. You know? They don’t 
know. They have no idea. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
The resentment toward the district was felt strongly by staff at both schools. From the 
teachers’ perspective the district had abandoned the schools up until the state expressed 
interest in visiting the school, and then the district administrators seemed to be acting like 
they were familiar with the school. Ms. Beth and many of the teachers at both schools 
expressed sorrow that it had to come to early intervention in their school for the district to 
show any interest in the obvious needs of the school. 
At Babson Elementary the Fact Finding Review Report identified a weak 
administrator and poor teaching as the major problems within the school. The teachers 
who read the report felt that it was “scathing.” Teachers explained the contents of the 
report. 
I mean they said that we were incompetent teachers. Almost the 
whole staff, how did they phrase it? Not non-professional, but 
they really degraded us I thought. It was awful. It was an awful 
report. It was like, and some of the things that supposedly teachers 
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said were like, ‘Oh my God.’ You don’t say things like that in 
front of [the state]. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
I remember reading [the Fact Finding Review Report], and I 
remember going through. I’m like you know what? This is really 
taken out of context... They didn’t name names. [T]he 
performance it said was very, very low. I mean they said teacher 
performance was just inadequate. (Brenda, teacher, Babson 
Elementary) 
The teachers who remained in the school felt shame about the things in the classroom that 
were reported. Though the report “didn’t name names,” the teachers felt awful about the 
results of the report and were embarrassed to be reading it with a new principal who was 
making judgments about the school and their teaching. 
Interestingly, teachers from Alfred Elementary, teachers had a less negative 
impression of the report. 
We thought [the report] reflected what we all talked to them about. 
We knew. You know? Everything that they said from the 
atmosphere, you know to lack of resources. We all knew that and 
so we felt it really reflected our discussions with the Department of 
Education. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
...[W]hen they did do criticism, it was very truthful. When they 
said, ‘You know what? You have these three things to correct in 
one year. You need to nail it down...’ It wasn’t harsh. (Adeline, 
teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
There are a few reasons why the comments and criticism within the report may have been 
perceived more positively. First, the report did not indict the teaching within the school. 
Rather, it concentrated on resources and other needs. Second, Alfred Elementary had 
already been through the PIM process, had a new principal, and a high percentage of staff 
turnover. It was a new year for the school and many changes had already been 
implemented. Teachers knew it, and the report reflected it. 
213 
Feeling negatively about the Fact Finding Report caused damage to the teachers’ 
view of the DOE. One Babson Teacher reacted to the Fact Finding Report, 
[The DOE staff] are in their little ivory towers. That’s how I look 
at them... My feeling is that they have no idea what goes on. 
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
The teachers felt the criticism was personal, even though they agreed that teachers in 
some of the classrooms were entirely ineffective. They even seemed to know who the 
ineffective teachers were, but when it was written in the report, they took personal 
offense to some of the things that were written about the teachers and felt that some of 
the criticisms were targeted at themselves. 
By the end of the Fact Finding Review, the DOE has shared the in-depth 
diagnosis (report) with the underperforming school principal and staff. Unfortunately, in 
a majority of the cases when a school is identified as underperforming, the school 
principal is removed. In both the Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools the principals 
were removed prior to attending the PIM. So, while the DOE has created a system built 
around a collaborative working relationship, the time and energy spent is lost because 
much the effort is primarily focused on the principal, who is removed by the district 
superintendent. Essentially, the DOE staff must rebuild the relationship with the new 
underperforming school principal during the PIM training. 
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM) 
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM) is the state’s corrective intervention 
into the underperforming school. The PIM is DOE’s professional development for 
underperforming school teams, used to analyze the weaknesses and strengths within their 
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schools using a data driven methodology. During the PIM training, the underperforming 
school team is empowered to customize improvement efforts for the unique context of 
their school. No matter how effectively the message that early intervention relies on the 
work of the underperforming school staff is communicated prior to PIM, the training 
session serves as the final opportunity for the DOE to clearly articulate this message and 
for the school to internalize it. The PIM is the catch all for driving that message home for 
the school team. 
The PIM portion of early intervention has several different stages that culminate 
in a workable school improvement plan to be approved by the Massachusetts Board of 
Education (BOE). First is the PIM training, which is composed of several facilitated 
training sessions where the principal and school team members go through a process of 
looking at their students’ MCAS results and making determinations about areas of need. 
More than data (MCAS) analysis training, it is a model for making decisions about the 
school based on data, rather than a gut feeling about what is working or not working in a 
school. Second is the improvement planning the school team does outside of the PIM 
training. Last is the school team working with the DOE to finalize a school improvement 
plan that accomplishes the immediate priorities within the school and that is in shape to 
be reviewed and approved by the BOE. Once a school’s plan is approved, the school 
exits the beginning of intervention and enters into a relationship with the DOE monitors 
for a period of two years. 
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM) training is provided by the DOE for 
underperforming school teams comprised of members (teachers) selected by the school 
principal. The previous points of intervention emphasize the need for the 
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underperforming school principal and teachers to understand that early intervention is 
intended to be an enabling system rather than a deterrent one. PIM is the last point of 
early intervention. The DOE has to make it clear that school improvement is in the hands 
of the educators in the underperforming school with support from the state. The amount 
of work the school teams are required to put into the analysis of data and improvement 
plan makes this clear. This is a remedy for the issue O’Day (2004) identifies: that 
schools will respond unevenly to state intervention. State level participants recognize 
that the underperforming school teams are coming from different starting points 
depending on where they are in the “grief cycle” (Daphne, DOE). Those teams that are at 
the point of acceptance are able to break through and make changes quicker than those 
school teams that are still feeling angry about the state designation of underperformance. 
The State Level 
According to the DOE, the PIM training is professional development and support 
for the underperforming school teams aimed at providing them with the tools to take 
improvement into their own hands. Dianne addresses how the PIM training is different 
than other aspects of early intervention. 
Well, I think that there is quite a burden on the PIM process. 
...[Y]ou know a lot of what happens in the early stages of that is 
very difficult for these schools and their teams. They have to 
break through...a lot of different things that are happening in the 
school. And, there are...a lot of different dynamics among the 
staff. ...They have to at some point say, ‘Look here’s where we 
are. Here’s where we have to get, and we have to do that. There’s 
something we’re not doing right, or we’re not doing well for our 
kids, and we have to do better.’ And that’s not an easy thing for 
most people to come to... You know they start in different places 
and some of it’s really just a question of having a good process for 
them to work through to get a plan. Others have a lot further to go. 
So, I think that ownership takes time. I think it starts in the PIM 
process. (Dianne, DOE) 
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The “burden” Dianne refers to is that the PIM is when underperforming school teams, no 
matter where they are starting from, must use the tools they are trained by the DOE to use 
to plan for their own school improvement. “Ownership takes time,” no matter how 
underperforming school teams enter the PIM training, but by the end, when they are 
presenting before the state Board of Education, they definitely realize that the state may 
help them, but they are going to be doing the work. 
There are several aspects of the PIM process that contribute to a change in the 
school team’s perception of new school accountability policy as an enabling approach 
rather than a deterrent one. PIM requires active participation of the school teams and 
reinforces that it is not about blame; it is about objectively looking at how to make 
improvements in the school. Dianne discusses how the PIM training and method are 
designed to objectify things in order to move the underperforming school team forward. 
I think what the PIM process does is it objectifies things a bit 
because it doesn’t say, ‘What aren’t you doing right?’ It says, 
‘Let’s look at this data and let’s figure out from this performance 
from these performance results, what’s going on here.’ And, it 
really brings the focus down to on the one hand, down to the data, 
but on the other hand on a school wide level. So, I think.. .there 
really is something that happens with a team that has never really 
done that - never really investigated the data - that is in a sense, 
um, empowering and also it doesn’t feel like a personal attack on 
them. (Dianne, DOE) 
Equipping the underperforming school teams with the tools to analyze the needs in the 
school empowers them to make small and big systematic changes. Rather than focusing 
on personal talent, it makes a team look at what they need to change to make 
improvements. By providing concrete methods and targets, the underperforming school 
team is focused and not overwhelmed. Daphne reiterates that point, 
217 
...it’s not about blame. It’s about: is it not in your curriculum? Is 
it because your teachers don’t feel comfortable teaching it? What 
is it? Why is that happening? And, when the shift begins to take 
place away from ‘it’s not bad teachers’ necessarily, it might be a 
lot of other reasons that you can do something about. And, they 
begin to build on the understanding that there are things they can 
do. And, if it is teachers that don’t know then we’ve got to get 
them the right professional development. (Daphne, DOE) 
The “bad teachers” idea is a concept that comes out of the “distrust” of education reform, 
and new school accountability policy. PIM alters that understanding. For the first time 
the underperforming school staff are shown what they can do to make changes in the 
school, so frustration can turn into “empowerment.” 
Support from the DOE staff and district staff help to move the teams during the 
PIM training. Daphne describes how the DOE works with and facilitates the PIM 
training with the underperforming school teams. 
PIM is a facilitated process, so they get help all the way through. 
We don’t do it for them. We do it with them. Our hope is that in 
addition to the end product, which is a viable school improvement 
plan, we are building their capacity to understand a process that we 
are expecting them to continue and get better at. (Daphne, DOE) 
The consistent message communicated by the state throughout the process is that the 
DOE is going to be working with you and that it is going to be a partnership. In the PIM 
training, the school team can actually see how it can be helped by the DOE and the help 
is put to the test. 
Finally, after what is admittedly a lot of hard work over the summer and the 
beginning of the school year, the DOE reviews the underperforming plan and begins to 
prepare them to present it before the state Board of Education (BOE). In yet another 
example of sincerity, respect, and a desire for cooperative working relationship, the DOE 
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staff assures the school that they will not go before the BOE until they are ready and have 
a solid improvement plan in hand. Daphne explains, 
We [DOE] will never say, ‘OK, you’re scheduled to come to the 
[BOE] meeting,’ and let [the BOE] decide your plan isn’t good 
enough... ‘You’re only going to go there when we all agree it’s 
strong enough for them to approve.’ 
[We are] always there with [the underperforming school principal]. 
So, I make all of the arrangements with them, schedule them on the 
Board agenda...I work with them on that so they are feeling as 
prepared as they can. (Daphne, DOE) 
The DOE’s hand holding of the underperforming school team during the presentation 
before the BOE, shows the school team the value of having DOE involved, and that the 
working relationship is a partnership, even if they had not seen it this way before. 
Underperforming Schools 
Universally within the schools, staff expressed frustration that the PIM process 
did not leave room to look at the whole school. The “narrow” approach to school 
improvement planning left out what are significant contributors to their students’ 
performance (e.g., LEP, no parental involvement, poverty). Teachers expressed a feeling 
that not looking at some of the uncontrollable factors makes it look like they are just not 
doing their jobs. The new principals within the schools agreed with the frustration. 
However, they also felt they were responsible for focusing the staff on what they can 
control within the school and making improvements based on these areas. 
The Babson Elementary principal and teachers were in the midst of PIM training 
during the study. One of the Babson teachers (Bridget) described the PIM as “very long, 
tedious, and tiring.” Principals and teachers in both schools found it to be long and 
involved. Barbara noted that, “.. .even though it was long and involved, and we had to 
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spend the summer doing it. We had to go. It seemed as though, this PIM process is 
better than the process I went through before [with the district].” Adeline described the 
long hours and hard work required of her and her school team during the PIM training, 
When we were in PIM, it was a lot to do within the first, I think it 
was two days. And, yes, we did stay over night but we were 
working until 9:00, 10:00, 11:00, but then we had to be right back 
the next morning at 8:00... But, I really thought that it was really 
informative. ... it’s very monotonous. It’s very time consuming. 
(Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary) 
Principals and teachers find the process to be intense, long, and hard, but in the end, they 
have a plan that is backed up by data to improve their school. The training equips them 
with the knowledge and the planning allows them the freedom to build on existing 
strengths within the school. During the hard work of PIM, it did seem that the school 
teams began to recognize that they are responsible for their school’s improvement and 
they are empowered and enabled to do take on the responsibility. 
Surprisingly, the teachers did not find the DOE to be as much of a support during 
the PIM training as they found the district/school support specialists to be. Teachers 
described the role of the DOE during the training as a person who stopped by their team 
infrequently and either encouraged them or asked them to change direction. The district 
had a more influential role, with the specialist acting as a facilitator of the school team. 
The involvement level of the district along with the level of expertise the specialist 
brought to the team about the process really marks a change in how the school team sees 
the district. 
The last step of the PIM process is to present the school improvement plan they 
have developed using the tools learned at the PIM training to the state’s Board of 
Education. Principals are the presenters of the plan, and it is the point where they truly 
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feel responsible for improving their school. Being new to the school, the principal faces 
many new challenges and starting off one’s tenure at a school by presenting before the 
state Board of Education is a trial by fire. It is rare for a principal to ever present to the 
BOE, and to be defending a new school (at least to the principal) is without a doubt a 
situation that feels tense and would make any principal nervous. Mr. Arnold says of the 
experience: 
It was nerve wracking. You know? You’re sitting next to your 
superintendent, and you’re just fielding questions about your plan. 
I can’t remember how long it lasted, but it was just...it wasn’t 
easy. But, they asked what was in your plan, but they just asked 
general questions as well. That made things easier. You know, 
one question they asked was about the kind of services that you 
offer students, did you offer parents, that wasn’t in the plan? I just 
talked about the cultural changes, and you know, appointing me, 
and you know what a great job the superintendent did in 
appointing me. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary) 
The presentation before the Board of Education is the point when the DOE administrators 
felt they provided the most support to the principal of the undeiperforming school. When 
asked about supports, Mr. Arnold replied, 
I think Stan [the district school support specialist] was very 
supportive. .. .1 think the superintendent was kept abreast of what 
was going on. I don’t know if he could speak to what we were 
doing himself. He could just talk about what he did. You know, 
change in administration. But, he was there [at the Board of 
Education meeting] next to me. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary) 
More than the busy superintendent, the specialist really becomes the district and the state 




The point of view of the state upon the working relationship between the state and 
the underperforming school is longer term and reveals the evolution of the beginning of 
intervention. A few things stand out as important facets of the beginning of intervention. 
First of all, district staff and superintendents are really important to the beginning of 
intervention. At every turn before any decision was made about a school, the DOE 
Director contacted the superintendent prior to contacting the school. Though new school 
accountability policy directly connects the state and the school, Daphne from the DOE 
had clearly decided to utilize the traditional hierarchy in order to expand their capacity 
and motivate the district to take on the responsibility of addressing the needs within the 
underperforming schools within their districts. The school support specialists, who reside 
within the district and are veterans of the district, are designated to build the district’s 
capacity to provide support to underperforming schools. In the end, the DOE believes its 
responsibility is to develop a support infrastructure, but it is the districts that must do the 
work to improve schools. 
Second, the removal of principals in the midst of the beginning of intervention 
can prove to be disruptive to the building of a working relationship between DOE and the 
underperforming school. The DOE-designed early intervention process has evolved into 
a design that builds the working relationship with the school by giving DOE liaisons 
regions, conducting preliminary preparation visits, setting up logistics, and using the 
liaisons as a point of contact at the state level. All of the interaction occurs primarily 
between the DOE liaison and the principal. When the principal is removed (by the 
superintendent) at the end of the school year, and prior to the PIM training, much of the 
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relationship building is lost. The loss of the principal may contribute to the sense of not 
knowing the “big picture” among teachers in the school and may partially contribute to 
the high turnover of the staff. 
Although using the principal as the DOE’s primary contact causes a disruption in 
the development of the working relationship because in a majority of the cases the 
principal is removed, the PIM serves as an opportunity for the DOE to connect with the 
new principal and school team. The connection is supportive to the school, and it allows 
the school principal and teachers to strengthen their relationship with district 
administrators (specialists). The PIM is the catchall point where the DOE delivers the 
message to school teams that it is the principal and the teachers within the school who 
will plan and successfully implement improvement strategies. The schools have been 
declared underperforming, but the team is empowered to make their own improvements 
to the school, under the guidance of the DOE. Empowerment removes any notion of a 
deterrent understanding of new school accountability that the school staff members may 
have had. 
Third, the environment that the DOE Director has developed is one that is 
supportive of schools but balanced with being firm about improvement that needs to take 
place within the schools. Over and over throughout the interviews, it is clear that the 
state level participants believe schools can improve and do improve. I say this because 
there are some who believe the intent of new school accountability policy undermines the 
public education system in and of itself. I do not disagree that there are people who 
would like alternatives to the existing system, but I did not find those people or beliefs 
among those who participated in the study. Every effort, whether it be selecting a 
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contractor that places personal relationships as a top priority or selecting liaisons that 
have an understanding of the school because they have worked in schools, was made to 
strengthen the connection between the underperforming school and the DOE within the 
organizational capacity limitations. 
Fourth, expanding capacity drives the implementation process, and rather than try 
and do it all, the DOE has decided to address a smaller number of underperforming 
schools relatively well. Using a district relationship to share information about the state 
strategies, the implicit hope is that the districts will take on the other underperforming 
schools before the DOE has to visit them. Another way the state manages its capacity 
limitations is relying on the “right people.” The staff, practitioners, and contractors all 
reported that they had worked with really talented people who were able to balance the 
role of evaluator with supporter of the underperforming schools. Though anecdotally 
there were a few stories of personality clashes between the state team and the school 
staff, for the most part the level of skill and expertise the state level people brought with 
them made for a smoother process that increased the likelihood of a cooperative working 
relationship between the state and the school. 
Fifth, the DOE has a respect for the different places and contexts an 
underperforming school may be coming from or living within. Rather than try to impose 
a one size fits all early intervention process upon the underperforming schools, the DOE 
designed a uniform protocol and process with built in flexibility to accommodate the 
needs of a particular school. Because of the uniqueness of each underperforming school, 
it is difficult to typify the working relationship between the DOE and the school during 
the selected points during the early intervention process. 
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In the end, it is apparent that the involvement level between the DOE and the 
underperforming school has increased. From the perspective of those in the 
underperforming school, the relationship between the underperforming school and the 
DOE changes over the course of early intervention, although throughout, the expectations 
the school participants had for the DOE staff were low. Involvement between the two 
naturally increases through the early intervention process. When you are coming from 
virtually no involvement to even a little involvement, it has to go up. I have to doubt that 
at any point the underperforming school feels the involvement level of the DOE is high 
because it seems they rely on the district for every day involvement with the 
underperforming school. 
As far as the trust level, the sincerely supportive nature of the DOE during the 
beginning of intervention is communicated to the underperforming principal and staff 
over a period of months of early intervention and by the time they are presenting before 
the Board of Education has likely reached its peak. I would have to conclude that the 
working relationship is a moving target between “coming apart with avoidance” and 
residing closer to “cooperative but autonomous.” The working relationship between the 
school and the DOE improves or begins during early intervention, but it never gets to 
“pulling together and synergistic” (Scheberle, 1997). Mr. Arnold describes a working 
relationship that sounds more like a “cooperative but autonomous” (Scheberle, 1997) 
relationship. 
Only with the DOE [liaison]- I’d call him if we had some issues 
with the report, or we needed information, and [the state] came 
down for a visit, and we would email each other and say, ‘This is 
accurate. This isn’t accurate.’ Before he would write the report, 
he would have me look it over and say, ‘Any factual things that I 
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need to change here?’ So, that’s what we’d do along those lines, 
but no, I wouldn’t call him. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary) 
Evidently there is a level of trust and comfort, but Mr. Anthony does not feel comfortable 
calling him for a question or support, for that sort of thing he relies on the district. 
I believe that ideally, the DOE would likely want a “cooperative but autonomous” 
relationship with the underperforming school. At first this seems wrong. Why not have 
high levels of trust and involvement? The truth is the DOE does not have the resources 
or capacity to achieve any more than a low level of involvement with the school. 
Consequently they leave the “pulling together and synergistic” type of working 
relationship to the traditional (local) partners in the public education system: the district 
and the school. 
This brings us to the last facet of working relationships during new school 
accountability policy implementation. It is clear throughout all of the state level 
interviews that in the face of early intervention, the district is ultimately responsible for 
improving the delivery of education within an underperforming school. After reviewing 
the interviews, one of the implicit goals of early intervention emerged. It is to improve 
the working relationship between the district and the underperforming school. The staff 
members of the DOE do not want the most effective working relationship between 
themselves (DOE) and the underperforming school. 
The DOE wants to reinvigorate or rehabilitate the working relationship between 
the district and the underperforming school. The district and school should have high 
levels of involvement, and more than likely do have increased levels of involvement with 
the institution of the school support specialist strategy. Trust may prove to be a challenge 
because they do work closely with one another and certainly do have a past that at least 
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from the perspective of those in the school that is neglectful. Once again the supportive 
nature of the specialists is a strategy that can improve and rehabilitate levels of trust and 
set the district and the school on their way to a “pulling together and synergistic” working 
relationship. 
The real relationship story is the dramatic change that occurs in how the school 
principal and teachers feel about the district administrators. In both schools the 
schoolteachers felt the relationship between the school and the district was marked by 
little to no level of involvement and extremely low levels of trust. Scheberle (1997) calls 
this “coming apart with avoidance” and finds the relationship to be shallow and full of 
misunderstanding and misperception of one another. 
The PIM training is a new beginning for schools and their districts. It becomes 
the arena for the new principal to learn about the school he or she will be running and to 
meet the team of teachers from the school. Also, the principal has an opportunity in a 
smaller planning team to set his or her agenda through improvement planning. It serves 
as an opportunity for the principal to develop a positive working relationship with the 
district (school support specialist), and it allows the teachers on the team to rethink their 
negative feelings toward the district. Through small acts of support, guidance and 
sharing of expertise the district specialist has a chance to chip away at the old idea of how 
the district and school working relationship once was and to start anew. Though the 
relationship remains tenuous, with the help of the specialist, it hovers closer to a “pulling 
together and synergistic” type of relationship characterized by a mutual understanding 
between the two organizations toward reaching a common goal of school improvement. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE “FIXER” DISTRICT 
Bardach (1977) first identified the “fixer” role in policy implementation and 
describes it as a policymaker who oversees, monitors, and cares about how a policy is 
implemented, and thus is there throughout the cycle of implementation to make 
adjustments so that the policy’s end goals are achieved. Lin (2000) takes a slightly 
different approach to the idea by delegating the “fixer” role to any entity that is 
negotiating and fitting the policy into the context of the organization. The “fixer” is 
anyone, a policymaker or a person implementing the policy who has the power and 
influence to negotiate implementation. Early intervention in Massachusetts places the 
“fixer” role at the district level and with the addition of school support specialists located 
at the large urban districts, they are wholly secured as the negotiators of policy. 
The school support specialists’ role in new school accountability policy 
implementation is not easily categorized as “state” or “local.” The position is funded by 
the state. However, the specialist is required to have experience working in the district. 
Specialists work in the superintendent’s office, and in the eyes of colleagues and other 
educators in the district the specialists are employed by the district, not the DOE. With 
the exception of regular meetings and trainings with DOE administrators, and the fact 
that DOE has final approval on who is hired to work as a school support specialist, many 
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of the decisions about the work of the specialists are made by the superintendent. The 
sense from the DOE is that the superintendent is the best judge of how the specialists’ 
time is best allotted, as long is it is used on school improvement initiatives. Without a 
doubt, the school support specialists are a strong connection between the 
underperforming school, the district, and the DOE. However, because they reside at the 
district, are from the district, and for the most part are perceived as district administrators, 
it is most appropriate to think about them as coming from the local or district level. 
Specialists are working and meeting with the DOE regularly to continuously 
refine the policy and ensure a common understanding of the outcomes, and they are 
working with the underperforming schools to accommodate their unique challenges and 
contexts and helping principal makes sense of the early intervention strategies for his or 
her particular underperforming school. The district and especially the school support 
specialists are designed to be the middlemen during the implementation of new school 
accountability policy. 
Working Relationship between the District and the DOE 
The selected points in time during the beginning of intervention for examining 
working relationships are less relevant to the district and DOE relationship because the 
relationship timeframe is greater than a single underperforming school review cycle. The 
working relationship variables of trust and involvement, however, are relevant and 
generally applied to the working relationship. 
The strength of the relationship between the DOE and the district is a surprising 
finding in the study because new school accountability policy skips the district and 
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connects the school and the DOE directly and because of the past relationship between 
the district and DOE. Stan explains the past relationship, 
I think historically [there was] almost no relationship. Sort of like 
the giant elephant in the room is DOE, but you don’t have to look 
at them or talk to them, unless you have to talk to them. (Stan, 
Charlesburg District) 
According to Stan, people in the district did not call the DOE unless it was a last resort. 
They believed it was better to try and deal with things on their own rather than bring in 
the DOE, which would inevitably make a bigger deal out of an issue than necessary. 
Bringing in the DOE did not mean state support would be coming to the district. Rather, 
it meant more scrutiny and more work for the district to comply with state demands. The 
incentive to work with DOE did not exist. Rooted in the old culture of SDE’s that 
focused on inputs and enforcing compliance, it is not surprising that district 
administrators did not want the state to make them jump through extra hoops or go 
through a detailed compliance review. No contact from the DOE was considered good 
news to those in the district, and the idea of bringing the DOE into the district was 
viewed as absurd. 
If you take a step back from knowing how a district feels about the compliance 
and administratively driven DOE, the organization of state public education systems in 
and of itself should make a partnership between the DOE and the district natural and 
automatic. The organization of the public education system is such that the DOE is the 
organizer and data gatherer at the top, and the districts oversee the schools in the actual 
delivery of education. State reliance upon the district to improve schools is natural 
within the existing context of state public education systems, because the educational 
knowledge and expertise resides at the district and school levels. It is also natural for the 
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district to play the role of supporting and implementing the mandates of the state into the 
school because the district is closer to the underperforming schools. However from 
Stan’s assessment, it is clear that the “natural” assumption that the DOE and district 
would work together is not necessarily true. 
Logically it makes sense for the DOE to work with the district to support 
underperforming schools when considering the organization of the public education 
system. The DOE has had to make an effort to create a partnership with the district as it 
implements new school accountability policy. As the more dependent party, the DOE, 
started off by making a few “magnanimous gestures” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 
2003) toward the district. The include consulting with the district superintendent about 
the potentially underperforming schools within his or her district and providing targeted 
funding for school support specialist who are from and reside within the district. These 
have led to an improved relationship between the two. 
Specifically, the new working relationship between the DOE and the district has 
been evolving since the interventions commenced in 2000. The first gesture was when 
the DOE began holding regular meetings between the urban district superintendents and 
the associate commissioner of Accountability and Technical Assistance at the DOE. The 
regular meetings are ongoing and have contributed to the evolution of how new school 
accountability policy is implemented in Massachusetts. The school support specialist 
strategy is one of the most influential components of implementation, and is a DOE 
innovation, but certainly sprang out of a need identified during the regular meetings with 
superintendents. 
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The second gesture was the decision for the school support specialists to be a 
respected veteran of the district where the underperforming schools they are supposed to 
help are located. Rather than having the schools look at the specialist as a “carpetbagger” 
(Stan, Charlesburg District), the DOE’s support of allowing experienced district level 
people to in turn provide support for their schools showed respect for the district and the 
importance of educational context in which each of the underperforming schools 
functions. As Stan states, 
What [DOE] could do is...grab some people, call them school 
support people, and put then in your urban centers. And, what 
DOE... decided to do is... go to Charlesburg, and [other 
Massachusetts urban districts]... and all those different places, and 
we’re going to find people, and ask the superintendent who might 
be the best at doing this job and then hire them there. I think that 
was a stroke of genius by Massachusetts. (Stan, Charlesburg 
District) 
The DOE gathers the School Support Specialists together on a regular basis to 
work as partners, provide training, and hammer out the early intervention process with 
one another. Allowing the districts (through urban superintendent and school support 
specialist meetings) a forum to discuss the challenges of early intervention and to develop 
a place for two-way, informal communication makes district administrators feel 
supported and connected to the process. Rather than having early intervention be 
something that is done to the district and the underperforming school, it is a partnership 
or collaboration in which both want to achieve the common goal of improving 
educational outcomes in the schools. The regular meetings have “opened the door” 
(Sandy, Charlesburg District) between the district and the DOE and are the place where 
trust, sincerity, and reciprocity between the two occurs. The gesture naturally allows for 
the relationship to strengthen. 
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Both school support specialists sincerely felt supported by the DOE in their 
efforts to improve the schools within the Charlesburg district. Fully integrated into the 
district, the school support specialists began to disseminate their newly gained expertise 
by working with all the district’s schools and by training them in a PIM style school 
improvement planning process. The school support specialists have a priority to work 
with the state declared underperforming schools, then the schools not visited by the state 
but designated in need of improvement by NCLB standards, and then the remaining 
schools within the district. Stan describes his experience as a school support specialist as 
“the best group of professionals I have ever been associated with.” 
The working relationship between the district and the DOE has improved as a 
result of the school support specialist strategy. The district specialists are critical players 
in connecting with the DOE, playing the role of fixer between the DOE, the district, and 
the underperforming school. The specialists facilitate and smooth out the process of 
understanding new school accountability policy and implementing the policy. 
The relationship between the DOE and district has changed since the beginning of 
intervention of new school accountability policy was implemented in 2000. Prior to 
implementation, the relationship between the DOE and the district was marked by low 
levels of trust and involvement and can be described as “coming apart with avoidance” 
(Scheberle, 1997). Often found in loosely coupled systems, Stan states that there was 
virtually “no relationship” prior to new school accountability policy. 
Changes to the relationship occurred when the DOE made gestures to the district 
about wanting to partner to improve public education in their districts. Sandy explains, 
“[DOE staff] have tried to team with us.” Involvement and a sense of partnership have 
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increased through regular meetings with superintendents and the DOE. The school 
support specialist strategy enhanced the involvement levels between the state and the 
district and increased the levels of trust that the district had for the DOE because the 
strategy was aimed at achieving a common goal of improving the schools within their 
districts. 
The state level administrators have shown their willingness to negotiate policy 
implementation aimed at the common end goal throughout the process. Sandy discusses 
one of the ways in which DOE negotiates with the district. “They try to work with us to 
streamline [early intervention] to make it better each and every year, to be clear about the 
communications about what the steps are along the way” (Sandy, Charlesburg District). 
Sincere acts of support and regular and clear communication have altered the 
working relationship between the DOE and the urban district so that it comes closer to a 
“pulling together and synergistic” type of relationship. The school support specialists 
perceive the working relationship, by no means perfect, as characterized by regular two 
way communication, a sincere understanding of the “human element” during early 
intervention, a mutual respect for the strengths and expertise each possess, and an 
understanding of the unique context in which each school and district operates. The type 
of relationship DOE has developed with the district allows for negotiation of the policy 
during implementation and ensures that the specialists will keep the policy relevant for 
the district through regular feedback to the DOE and making regular judgments about 
changes within the underperforming schools. 
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Working Relationship between the District and the School 
In the past the school district superintendent and administrators treated schools as 
separate and independent entities that could “sink or swim” (Stan, Charlesburg District) 
on their own. The attitude was such that, if the district administrators told the school 
what needed to be done, in minds of the district administrators it was done. District 
administrators rarely if ever checked on schools to find out whether it actually was 
implemented or if it was not implemented. It was left up to those in the school to seek 
support from the district and when support was sought, those in the school need to be 
ready and willing to be the recipients of whatever support the district provided. Not 
accessing resources or talking to the district was a school’s problem and not that of 
anyone in the district. Sandy discusses how the relationship (or lack of relationship) 
worked: 
You could have interviewed a school that had [poor test scores] 
and as long as the lid was on, and things were quiet and things 
were safe and there was nobody complaining, you weren’t going to 
be looked at closely. (Sandy, Charlesburg District) 
Basically, unless a school principal was asking for help or a parent was 
complaining or the local school committee had an issue with a school, students’ 
performance could be devastatingly low, and the district would still not be involved with 
the school. New school accountability policy impels the district to take an active role in 
the underperforming school. Additionally NCLB subgroup analysis of English language 
learners, special education students and students by race have forced the district to look at 
schools and the subgroups “in a real close way” (Sandy, Charlesburg District). 
Now, the district uses the state’s underperforming designations and NCLB 
designations to prioritize their interventions and connections with the schools. The 
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school support specialists are critical to altering the relationship from leaving the school 
alone to coming in with support during the early intervention cycle. By requiring every 
school in the district, regardless of performance status, to attend training and develop a 
PIM-style school improvement plan, the specialists have established themselves as 
knowledgeable experts in what the DOE is looking for in the even the school is chosen 
for a state visit. When a school is identified for a visit, the specialist makes contact with 
the principal and works closely with him or her to prepare for the visit and review the 
school improvement plan. Additionally specialists attend school faculty meetings to 
explain the process and provide feedback to plans. 
School support specialists specials work with the schools to “make sense” of early 
intervention. Sandy discusses the reaction of the school toward the district school 
support specialists. 
Generally speaking, they’re happy to have us because they 
recognize that we’re bringing support, and we keep trying to make 
sure that every time we’re there that we leave a document trail that 
helps them... (Sandy, Charlesburg District) 
District school support specialists approach their work with the underperforming 
schools with balance and focus. They feel empathy and provide support for all of the 
diverging issues a principal is faces in an underperforming school while they hold the 
school principals and staff accountable for decisions they make. The “art” of balancing 
support and accountability is a common theme in the stories specialists tell about going 
into schools. Sandy explains, “I’m working with a principal one day on their providing 
help and the next day I’m pushing on something.” Stan talks about the “human aspect.” 
You have to understand the human aspect of what you’re doing. 
And, if you are talking to a principal who is so stressed at this 
moment that nothing is getting through, don’t even bother talking 
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to her. Reschedule and go at another time. I mean that’s the part 
of what we’re doing. We have to be aware of just how much stress 
everyone is under. (Stan, Charlesburg District) 
Professional judgment of the specialists is critical to accomplishing school improvement. 
Specialists have to work with the principals and teachers of underperforming schools to 
wait for the teachable moments and to fit the demands of accountability so that they make 
sense within the immediate context of the school and the needs of the school staff. 
Sometimes this means the specialists must wait for the time when the school staff can 
handle critiques and proactively make decisions to remedy problems. The specialists are 
not interested in decimating the public education system or those within it. They are 
trying to improve it, and keep the schools on track to improve students educational 
outcomes. 
The specialists work with the school principal during each step of early 
intervention. As soon a school is identified for a School Panel Review visit, the specialist 
contacts the school and tries to turn the “devastation” of the principal into action. The 
specialist gives the principal the big picture and points to the areas where the state will 
question the principal and staff. Specialists feel that when the state asks the exact 
questions they gave the principal in advance, they gain credibility and the principal and 
teachers are then much more willing to listen to them. According to the specialists, the 
school principals and teachers experience a wide range of emotions during the various 
stages of the process ranging from anger, to self-blame, to not feeling good enough. 
Working with principals and teachers to transform what feels bad into a positive 
opportunity is a priority for the specialists. They are vital in changing the school 
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principal and teachers’ perceptions of early intervention as a deterrent system to one that 
is enabling. 
Increased involvement and support by the specialists toward the school change 
the relationship between the district and the school. In the past schools were left on their 
own to “sink or swim,” and were expected to comply with directives from the district 
given without support. The relationship was antagonistic and isolating for the school. 
Salary issues and a general lack of support have contributed to lower levels of trust 
between the schools and the district and make the relationship of the past closest to 
“coming apart with avoidance”(Scheberle, 1997). A relationship marked by distrust and 
isolation between the two entities. 
Since the school support specialists have come on board, the relationship they 
aspire to with underperforming schools is a “pulling together and synergistic” 
relationship, which has high levels of trust and involvement. As the district and school 
move toward that ideal, they move through a “coming apart and contentious” working 
relationship which has low levels of trust and high involvement levels. The specialists 
must work through the remnants of low levels of trust within the school by acts of 
sincerity and support. They accomplish this by sharing expertise and working more 
closely with the school to reinforce data driven decision making and improvement 
strategies. Most importantly, the specialists make the underperforming school a district 
priority, a new and different experience for those in the school who found the district to 
be neglectful and unsupportive for many years prior to intervention. The specialists 
strategy to balance the support and accountability is a strategy to improve the levels of 
trust between the school and the district. 
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Conclusion 
“Schools don’t exist on their own... anymore at all under [new school 
accountability]... So, much more than ever before, we’re tied in” (Stan, Charlesburg 
District). The school support specialist is discussing one of the major outcomes of new 
school accountability policy. The loosely coupled public education system is starting to 
become a system that has specific roles and responsibilities assigned to the school, 
district, or state levels. 
Most people may have assumed that these were the roles at the various levels of 
the public education system; however, that is not how they were functioning. The 
starting point of the working relationships between the district and the DOE and the 
district and the school are evidence of the isolation of each level of the state’s public 
education system. New school accountability policy has motivated each level of the 
public education system to take on the responsibility for educational outcomes. By 
“opening doors” between all of the levels, there is more two-way communication 
between the levels. The district is critical, because it is in the middle of the 
communication lines. 
The district school support specialists are the negotiators of policy at the school 
level. They know the district, and they have a working relationship with the DOE. They 
are in regular communication with the state and the school, and therefore must fit the end 
goal of new school accountability policy within the district and specific underperforming 
school. Balancing support and accountability when working with school principals and 
staff is a significant part of their job. Once again having the “right people” to balance 
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these roles and to feel comfortable working with all levels of the public education system 





Stone (1997) writes, . .the political analyst who wants to choose a wise course of 
action should focus less on assessing the objective consequences of actions and more on 
how the interpretations will go” (p. 8). Altering how we look at a policy, Stone (1997) 
shows how policy is perceived is often more important than its actual objectives. This is 
true for new school accountability policy on a number of levels. The perception of new 
school accountability is initially threatening to those in the school and according to DOE 
professionals, and it is at least partially intended to be threatening and motivating for 
educators within the schools. It is, however, most threatening to those who reside at the 
district level. Without explicitly pushing or even intervening in a district, it pushes 
superintendents and district administrators to realign resources and attention to 
underperforming schools that have been, dare I say, systematically ignored for years even 
before school accountability measures were in place. 
In both schools, when participants were questioned about whether these changes 
in leadership, as well as in the classroom, would have occurred without school 
accountability, the answer was no, with a caveat. Educators in both schools recognized 
problems within the school, and seemed to have an understanding of what it would take 
to improve. However, the changes that required a district response were either slow in 
coming or unlikely to occur because of issues that were beyond the control of the 
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educators within the schools. Principals and teachers believed the district may have made 
changes eventually, but felt as though their schools were languishing as they waited for 
the changes to be made. Once the caveat that the district might have eventually made 
changes to better the school was put out into the open, there was general agreement that 
the speed and number of changes would not have occurred unless new school 
accountability policy existed. The principals and teachers believed that the state’s 
decision to intervene in the school and triggered a new level of support and attention 
from the district. 
This is an interesting proposition. From the outside it appears that new school 
accountability policy will solely impact the school. Because new school accountability in 
Massachusetts is part of comprehensive reform legislation, the school accountability 
system is part of a larger statewide accountability system that includes holding districts 
accountable. For the underperforming schools the threat of state intervention is over at 
the point of early intervention, and the DOE works to transform the perceptions those in 
the underperforming school have about the policy. The transformation is intended 
change the local understanding of the policy as an enabling system in which the DOE and 
the school to engage in a working relationship that is at best “cooperative but 
autonomous.” 
Once intervention begins, policy has a less deterrent effect on the school. 
However, the district, still under the threat of the state’s district accountability system, is 
still motivated by the policy’s deterrent nature. The threat to the district, combined with 
the supplemental resources provided by the DOE in the form of school support 
specialists, provides the district superintendent with the targeted resources to work with 
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the underperforming schools in partnership with the DOE. The results of early 
intervention are in fact changes that come from the district level: selecting a new 
principal as leader, making new resources available, and developing district-wide school 
improvement programs and technical assistance aligned with the type of support provided 
by the DOE to underperforming schools. 
“Locating authority in many small jurisdictions leads to domination by local 
elites, policies that maintain the status quo, enactment of racial and other prejudices, and 
little or no redistribution of either power or wealth” (Stone, 1997, p. 366). The 
domination of local authorities over schools in which resources are not equally, 
adequately, or appropriately allocated to schools is the underlying reason for adding an 
external accountability system to the public education system. The tension between local 
school (and district) internal and state’s external accountability is the environment in 
which new school accountability policy is negotiated. 
Early intervention throws in a dash or more of external accountability into the 
context so that new school accountability in fact changes the recipe within the public 
education system and motivates changes in the distribution of resources towards schools 
that are underperforming. Within the tension between internal and external 
accountability systems lie many truths. It is true that the internal accountability system is 
lodged in the idea of decentralized government emphasizing customization of the 
resources to meet the needs at the client level. It is also true that an external 
accountability system is found within the idea of a more centralized government, which 
relies on the expertise of those far from the client, who are less likely to be prejudiced by 
local connections and politics. Therefore, external accountability is universally applied, 
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and helps to identify those areas that are either being underserved by or in need of more 
resources, attention, training, etc. Rather than moving from the pole of internal 
accountability to external accountability, Massachusetts new school accountability policy 
during early intervention changes the tension, without eliminating either. 
Negotiation of early intervention is about communicating the need for both an 
external and internal accountability system rather than eliminating one (external) for the 
other (internal). Having both has the potential to create balance. In a critique of new 
school accountability policy, O’Day (2004) states that one of the biggest problems with 
new school accountability policy is that it increases the bureaucratic control over the 
loosely coupled public education system, making those at the bottom, the principals and 
teachers less likely to take risks and develop an “adaptive learning system” (p. 32). 
Interviews with school level participants did not entirely support the notion that 
principals and teachers in underperforming schools felt early intervention would limit 
their ability. Rather, underperforming school principals and, more so, teachers believed 
that they needed more involvement of the district. Those in the school often welcomed 
state intervention in the hope that their voices and their professional insights about the 
problems within the school would be heard by the district. 
The capacity in the underperforming schools was not conducive to “adaptive 
learning systems” because of the problems within the schools. The teachers in the 
underperforming schools were trying to get by each day, and do the best job they could 
with the limited resources of text books, supplies, technology and appropriate learning 
services for students. By all accounts, teachers wanted the DOE to come in and see what 
they deal with on a daily basis, and they believed that the state involvement might just 
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gamer the attention of the district, which each principal and teacher in each 
underperforming school characterized as neglectful at best prior to early intervention. 
Much like a guitar being tuned, you need the bridge and the tuning peg 
connecting the guitar string to be able to play. Without the poles of internal and external 
accountability, the education system does not function. The idea is supported by 
O’Day’s (2002) assertion that a school cannot have state external accountability at the 
cost of its own internal accountability system. Instead of all or nothing, new school 
accountability policy is an attempt to retune a school and a district by adjusting the 
distribution of resources (encompassed by funds, training, district attention, principals, 
and teachers) to the school. Early intervention is an effort to strike a balance between the 
local authority and the adequate distribution of resources within the DOE’s early 
intervention framework. 
One Best Framework 
Each DOE participant emphasized the important role of the district during the 
implementation of new school accountability policy. At first it was difficult to 
distinguish where the DOE or the district responsibility for improving the delivery of 
education in underperforming schools began and ended. Debra clarified the roles: 
There’s a huge need for us to be helping low performing schools, 
and in fact, the responsibility is on the state to develop an 
infrastructure - a statewide infrastructure of support. NCLB 
requires us to do that. So, we knew that..., it made more sense for 
us as a state to build capacity at the school district level rather than 
for us to have any relationship between the state and the school and 
bypass the school district. (Debra, DOE) 
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The state develops the framework and the district is responsible for ensuring school 
improvement. 
Part of early intervention for the DOE is to strengthen and clarify the roles of 
educators at every level of the public education system. In the loosely coupled system 
the roles and responsibilities were not as clearly defined in the past, and the expectation 
was that when a directive was sent out from the DOE, the district or school complied 
(similar to the expectations between the district and the school). If a problem arose and 
was brought to the DOE’s attention, then a district or school risked being exposed to the 
scrutiny of a state compliance review. Now, the role of the DOE is to develop the 
framework in which the expectation is that policy implementation must be negotiated and 
fitted to the local context. The role of the district is to be responsible for school 
improvement and the role of the school is to use the frameworks and resources in the 
district to improve educational outcomes. Even though they did not have to by law, the 
DOE staff incorporated the district because they had a pre-existing relationship with the 
state and with the school. As Debra explains, 
The districts are there to stay.... [I]t is their job both under NCLB 
and state requirements to make sure that their schools are 
providing appropriate instruction for their kids. So, we really 
wanted to make sure that they...took on this 
responsibility...(Debra, DOE) 
At first it is surprising that all of the responsibility for school improvement is the 
district’s responsibility. What about new school accountability policy and the state and 
underperforming schools’ direct connection? What about the state’s constitutional 
responsibility to provide an adequate education to children within the state? During early 
intervention the responsibility, in the eyes of the DOE, remains in the hands of the 
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districts. Early intervention is only a mild intervention in which the local control is not 
taken away, but threatened with future interventions. By clearly holding the district 
responsible the DOE is fitting the policy, which some could argue places the 
responsibility in the hands of the state (DOE), into the existing organization of the public 
education system and may be attempting to strengthen the district and school relationship 
with the additional support of the district specialists. 
Rather than imposing one best system upon the schools that are underperforming, 
the DOE has developed a strategy that takes into account the unique local context. By 
allowing the district and the school to develop a strong working relationship ideally 
approaching “pulling together and synergistic,” the DOE administrators are allowing the 
two to “make sense” of new school accountability policy within the district’s and 
school’s unique, local context. In other words, the DOE has developed “one best 
framework” for early implementation that aims to enhance the roles of the district and the 
school through in-depth diagnosis (Fact-Finding Review), professional development 
(P1M), targeted resources (school support specialists) and continuing involvement (DOE 
liaison). 
Another interesting facet of the DOE’s relationship with the district is that in 
Massachusetts there is also a district accountability policy. The responsibility for district 
accountability resides outside of the DOE, but similar to new school accountability 
policy, district accountability is primarily focused on educational outcomes. So, while 
the school may have been declared underperforming and losing the “threat” of the 
deterrent policy, the district is still being threatened by a similar district based 
accountability policy. It is in the best interest of district superintendents to work with the 
247 
DOE to improve the district’s underperforming schools because it directly impacts the 
determination about whether the district needs to be taken over by the state. The 
motivation for reinvigorated relationships between the DOE and the district and between 
the district and the underperforming schools, therefore, is at least partially driven by the 
deterrent district accountability policy that threatens each time a school within the district 
is declared underperforming. 
During early intervention, it is easy to understand why the DOE focuses on the 
district as the unit responsible for the improving the underperforming schools because the 
district is still being held accountable by the state. In the context of district incentives to 
improve schools and cooperate with the state, the DOE staff must redefine their 
relationship with the district. Conveniently, the DOE is able to expand capacity through 
new relations with urban district superintendents and has helped the districts in their time 
of need by providing them with a designated person or persons to focus entirely on 
school improvement efforts, and consequently expanding the district’s capacity to 
improve. 
New school accountability policy is based on the premise that schools are the unit 
of change. Consequently, “[M]uch of the basic research on characteristics of effective 
schools ignored the role of the district or identified districts as partly to blame for 
allowing ineffective schools to exist..(Anderson, 2003, p. 1) Thus, in many states, like 
Massachusetts with “first generation accountability systems1” (Mintrop & Trujillo, 2004, 
p. 1), having the district play such an active role in the implementation of new school 
accountability policy implementation and partnering between the SDE and the district is 
1 First generation accountability systems are those in which states had pre-existing accountability systems 
before the passage of NCLB in 2001. 
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unusual (Bowles, et. al., 2002; Mintrop & Trujillo, 2004). The original idea behind 
school accountability policy was to skip over the district and directly connect the school 
with the state. However, the Massachusetts DOE’s efforts to have the district become 
such an active partner during early intervention have served the DOE well. First, it 
expands the limited capacity at the state level. Second, it improves DOE’s relationship 
with the district, which improves the chances for best practices and improvement efforts 
to be disseminated among schools district wide. Third, it gives the district additional 
capacity during their time of need and while still under the threat of the state’s deterrent 
district accountability policy. Fourth, it forces the district and underperforming school to 
partner and cooperate in a new way by modeling a supportive, respectful and accountable 
process of intervention and partnership. Regardless, the DOE participants declared the 
relationship with the district to be one of the most significant factors in forging a positive 
working relationship with a school. As Debra describes it, 
It is about respecting each other’s vantage point, listening, 
hearing... hearing what’s working and what’s not working and 
trying to adapt and adjust the way you work together to make sure 
it actually accomplishes what you’re trying to accomplish. And, I 
think because we meet all of the time, because we have open 
relationships with them, we can accomplish a whole lot more. 
(Debra, DOE) 
Because of the “open relationship” Debra speaks of, most of the negotiation of the 
implementation of new school accountability policy occurs between the DOE and the 
district. Negotiation between the state and the district is engrained in the early 
intervention process. A formal example of the state and district negotiation is described 
by Daphne, 
First I make calls to the superintendents... Now, what we typically 
do is, in the conversation with the superintendent, I will say, for 
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example, in Charlesburg, we picked six schools there to visit. 
When I talk to the superintendent, I say, ‘Here are the six schools 
we are going to visit. What do you think about this list? Do you 
think there is a school or two on this list who would not benefit 
from having a School Panel Review?’ 
Often superintendents will say to me, ‘I think you should definitely 
go to this school. They need a wake up call,” or, ‘The principal is 
working really hard. The staff is not on board with really 
supporting improvement work in this school. They need a visit.’ 
Or, ‘I’ve been working with this school for a while, the principal I 
really don’t think is cutting it. Definitely go for a visit.’ Or, they’ll 
say, ‘You know what? I just put a new principal in that school... 
he’s made some inroads with the staff. They’re working well. I 
think a panel review would be really disruptive.’ (Daphne, DOE) 
Prior to the any underperforming school visit Daphne consults with the superintendent of 
the district in which the school resides. The superintendent is given professional respect 
and courtesy by Daphne by giving the superintendent discretion about which schools are 
visited within his or her district. 
The DOE participants characterize the state’s relationship with the district as a 
positive one. It certainly has been influenced and developed over many years of new 
school accountability implementation. Christie described the changes since the early 
years of new school accountability policy and said that the district should be a “hand in 
hand partner” during early intervention. She went on to say. 
In fact... [i]n the past the principal was hung out to dry [by the 
district] [T]he principal was considered fully and totally 
responsible for any... gain or failure that came across in their time 
in office. So, that was the original belief. And, more so, and I 
believe this is probably due to [the Accountability and Targeted 
Assistance Associate Commissioner’s] influence, the districts are 
being held to a much higher standard of support for their schools. 
They’re being held accountable too. So, we’ve seen in the more 
recent years a greater involvement of the district staff in support of 
the schools. (Christie, ABC Consulting) 
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Christie provides evidence that the relationship between the state and the district has 
changed and led to a rehabilitation of the relationship between the school and the district. 
Over the years of new school accountability policy the role of the district has been 
defined and clarified and the “greater involvement” of the district is a result of the change 
in the state and district relationship, leading to a change in the relationship between the 
district and the underperforming school. 
Regular superintendent meetings and the bridge of the school support specialists 
provide a forum for the district and the state to hash out new school accountability 
implementation issues. The formal and informal feedback mechanism created by regular 
contact between the two has in the eyes of the DOE staff allowed them to clarify 
misunderstandings quickly and informally, and accommodate the unique context in 
which new school accountability policy is being implemented. 
Put simply, the district superintendents and school support specialists have 
informed the DOE’s “one best framework” and continue to add to the refinement of the 
framework as the partners who are responsible for school improvement they in turn have 
received support, cooperation and respect from the state. The new working relationship 
between the state and the district is the medium for redefining the state-local relationship 
to be less focused on compliance and top down mandates and more focused on mutual 
problem solving and support toward a common goal of improving the delivery of 
education within the state. 
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Results of the Beginning of Intervention 
In both schools there are short-term results of early intervention and new school 
accountability policy. The teachers (and new principals) do agree on one thing. The 
district would have never put in a new, effective principal in the schools had they not 
been identified as underperforming by the state. Also, the restructuring and positive 
administrative things that are going on in the school would not have occurred. In many 
ways these schools had been neglected by the district for years (over five years in each 
school according to teachers). Without state intervention, change appeared unlikely, and 
the teachers seem to recognize this. For this the teachers expressed gratefulness for the 
state intervention. 
Changes in the relationship between the district and the school and the support 
from the state helped to build morale within the school. Inside the schools major changes 
occurred with the primary and most influential facet of schools: the human factor. Each 
school had new and seemingly better respected (by the teachers) principals along with a 
major turnover in the teaching staff. 
When teachers were asked to compare the current situation within their schools 
versus when they were declared underperforming, they found it difficult because these 
staffing changes made it an entirely different school. All reported improvement in 
morale and indicated feeling of being empowered to make change. The Alfred 
Elementary principal and teachers had made some gains and were certainly more positive 
than the principal and teachers at Babson Elementary, who were still in the thick of 
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completing their PIM (school improvement) plan. More than anything I attribute the 
difference to the point in early intervention that they were facing. 
Clearly one of the fundamental changes that occurred in the schools as a result of 
new school accountability policy is the additional attention they receive from the district. 
In each school, teachers claimed that the troubles the school faced had been going on for 
five or more years with no intervention by the district. The schools’ principals and 
faculties reported little to no district help occurring prior to the schools’ being declared 
underperforming. Barbara describes what was going on before state intervention, 
I think it’s about time. For years.. .everybody did their own thing, 
unless you had a very strong leader in the school. I’ve been in 
several schools where teachers have just.. .done their own thing 
and very little teaching was done and kids didn’t do well, and it 
was just terrible. (Barbara, Babson Elementary) 
There was little connection between teachers in the schools and even less between the 
school and the district. Adeline believes that state intervention led to an improvement in 
the relationship between the school and the district. 
Well, I think [our relationship with the district] definitely has 
[changed]. [The district administrators]...see Mr. Arnold as the 
best thing in the world because we’ve come so far in just a year. 
And I think they realize that we really.. .weren’t lying when we 
went down [to the district] and ...submitted complaints. ...I think 
they feel better about us. (Adeline, Alfred Elementary) 
Adeline’s comment about the district believing the teachers were “lying” about the 
troubles the school was facing prior to intervention reveals the type of relationship the 
district and the school had in the past. Teachers at Alfred Elementary took the risky step 
of going over their former principal’s head and complaining at the district level. The 
complaints were met with no response from the district, making the teachers feel like the 
school was being neglected. State intervention, which resulted in a change in the 
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principal and the addition of school support specialists to work with the underperforming 
school, has contributed to improvements in the dynamic between the school and the 
district. 
The schools and district communicate primarily through the school support 
specialist and the principals. Consequently, many of the teachers had a sense that there 
was a change in the relationship because they saw “district people” in the school with 
much more frequency, and they heard about it from their principal. District support is 
mainly focused on the principal. Mr. Arnold discusses the role of the district school 
support specialist and how he could depend on him for support. 
So, [the school support specialist] is the one I can talk to, not only 
about the school improvement process, but he also has a history. 
He was also around during the Panel Review [Mr. Arnold was not 
principal then], and the school Fact Finding as well as the 
presentation to the Board of Education. So, he’s seen full circle. 
And, he’s the one who I could really lean on because he knew what 
was going on under the previous administration. He knew what I 
was trying to do here and the success we’ve had of moving our 
plan forward. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary) 
The school support specialist provides valuable assistance to the principal and is the 
primary contact between the school, district, and state. 
Since the school support specialist is the primary conduit of communication for 
the school, a couple of issues or questions arise. First, prior to the inception of the school 
support specialist position at the district level, how did the district communicate with the 
schools? Teachers felt that the district simply was not present in their school even when 
complaints were filed. 
Second, in both instances the former principals, who were more than likely the 
main contact between the teachers and the district, were removed and teachers alluded to 
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personality problems between the principal and district staff. Could it be that a personal 
relationship led to district neglect even though test scores were plummeting? And, what 
could lead the district to ignore complaints matched with the many years of 
underperformance the teacher discussed? Is it merely because they had no mechanism or 
are there other reasons? Because they change the relationship between the school and the 
district, the school support specialist is a critical component to state early intervention. 
In both schools, staff believed that the reason the district started to become 
involved with the school was because the district felt threatened by the state intervention. 
In the eyes of those in the schools the state intervention pushed the district into playing a 
more active and supportive role within the school and the first sign of the push was the 
replacement of the principal. In each school, principals and teachers described a sense 
that the district felt threatened by the state intervention into the school, and the threat at 
the district level pushed district administrators into action and engagement with the 
school. Brenda discusses the district’s reaction: 
It did put a scare into the district. I believe. ... [I]t’s like finally 
the state is coming in and taking a look at these schools. [The 
district staff are] saying, ‘Alright, well now, I guess we need to 
help.’ But, what I’m saying is you should have done that a long 
time ago. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary) 
Beyond changes in the district-school relationship, early intervention resulted in 
dramatic changes within the school. Both schools received a new principal within 
months of being declared underperforming. Additionally each had a major change in 
their teaching staff with a 45% turnover at Alfred Elementary and an 80% turnover at 
Babson Elementary. In both cases, especially at Babson, they are practically entirely new 
schools. 
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Both principals indicated that moving to an underperforming school was not 
desirable. Ms. Beth felt like she had no choice but to move to Babson Elementary. Mr. 
Arnold, new to being a principal, said the only reason he got the opportunity to be a 
principal was because no one inside the district wanted the job, so they opened it up to 
applicants who were not principals and who were not in the district. He does not think he 
would be a principal now, if it had not been for the opportunity. 
As far as the teachers are concerned, I spoke with staff that decided to stay. 
Mostly they stayed at their schools because they felt they had an obligation to the school. 
They fell back on their professional dedication for a reason to stay in an underperforming 
school. It is not to say the teachers did not consider leaving. Some teachers talked about 
transferring or leaving the underperforming school, but they decided to wait it out to see 
if the new principal changed things in the school. 
There is a potentially positive side to teacher and principal turnover in a 
designated underperforming school. By bringing in new leadership into a school, there is 
a chance to make changes in the school for the better. Also, in some cases 
underperforming schools can become dumping grounds for ineffective teachers. The 
natural selection process of teachers leaving after a school is declared underperforming 
creates a sort of voluntary reconstitution of the underperforming school. With new 
leadership and many new teachers, the climate within the underperforming school is 
bound to go through a dramatic transformation. 
The real difference between before and after a school is declared underperforming 
is best summed up in the words of a teacher. 
This is the best thing for our kids. Everything is documented, 
everything with this new principal. Nothing is swept under the 
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rug. Everything is right on the carpet and everybody knows what’s 
going on. It needs to be. (Adeline, Alfred Elementary) 
The Early Intervention Process 
Continually respecting the existing public education hierarchy, the DOE informs 
the superintendent and then begins to work directly with the underperforming school 
principal. The transfer of information about early intervention is given from the DOE 
liaison to the principal. The DOE liaison leaves it up to the principal to share the 
information with the school faculty. Because all of the information is shared, the state 
considers the early intervention process to be open and explicit. The DOE liaisons 
believed that because the principal was not calling them with questions, the preparation 
meetings and materials were thorough and effective. 
However, there are a few problems with the DOE’s strategy. First, the original 
principal is often removed from the school, and with him or her goes all of the 
information, which was shared with the principal for the underperforming school. 
Switching the principal in the midst of DOE’s early intervention challenges the 
development of a working relationship between the state and the school because any 
effort to build a relationship with the school is lost when the principal, who is DOE’s 
primary contact, is removed. Because the relationship building efforts are not directed 
toward the teachers, who are more likely to remain in the school, any goodwill or 
relationship that is developed through the process goes with the principal who is 
removed. Continuity of the relationship building process is therefore interrupted, though 
it is not lost. 
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As a new principal to the school, Ms. Beth felt that there was very little support 
coming from the DOE or from the district. She was placed at Babson Elementary at the 
end of the school year, about a week prior to the beginning of PIM training. PIM training 
is the “catch all” point when the school team is obligated to take on the school 
improvement efforts (switch from a deterrent to an enabling approach). 
During the PIM, the issues facing the underperforming school are examined in 
excruciating detail by the school team (principal and teachers), and those in the school 
are faced with the reality that school improvement is in the team’s hands, a difficult task 
for any new principal. The process can be overwhelming. The school support specialist 
has a role to play in continuing the relationship between the underperforming school and 
the DOE. Mr. Arnold describes one of the benefits of the support from the district school 
support specialists is the “history” they provide. The school support specialist is present 
during the entire process before and after the new principal comes on board. He or she is 
able to provide background and valuable information about the past administration and 
issues or challenges within the school to the new principal. This insight proves to be 
invaluable to the new administrator of an underperforming school. 
Second, the teachers interviewed felt they never got “the big picture” of the early 
intervention process. They did recall receiving information about the state visits, 
schedules and questions; however, because it was disconnected from an overall 
understanding of the process, it was meaningless. So, even though it is considered to be 
an open process, the loss of a principal in the middle of intervention combined with the 
relatively “small picture” information provided to the teachers, leaves underperforming 
school teachers in the lurch. A new administrator brings a certain level of the unknown 
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to any school, but compiled with state intervention and being declared underperforming, 
teachers felt lost and uncertain about the future. 
This brings me to the last point. New school accountability policy is designed to 
be a transparent process, but it is built on an assumption that those at the lower levels of 
the public education system (principals and teachers) will seek the information from the 
DOE. The habit of those in the school looking up to the DOE for information appeared 
to be foreign to the principals and teachers in the underperforming schools. Evidence of 
this was found in a survey of Massachusetts superintendents, principals, and teachers. 
Nearly 68% of the respondents reported that it was difficult or very difficult to obtain 
information from the DOE (McDermott, et al., 2001). This is despite the fact the a 
majority of the information and documents on early intervention, including the school 
specific reports, were found on the DOE’s website. 
Perhaps principals’ and teachers’ understanding of the DOE is a reflection of the 
traditional hierarchy, in which the DOE shares information with the district and the 
district informs the school of anything it needs to know. Or, perhaps it is because those 
in the school are in the habit of looking to the district rather than the DOE for 
information. Explanations of how information was communicated from the DOE to the 
district to the school was one in which information was disseminated from the top down. 
There is very little information moving up the hierarchy. Before new school 
accountability policy was implemented, the district would never think to contact the 
DOE, and the teachers were hesitant to contact the district about problems with their 
principal despite significant abuses occurring in the school. New school accountability 
policy, and particularly early intervention, functions in an environment in which two-way 
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communication is frequent and expected. The DOE seems to have changed the 
relationship between the state and the districts through the specialists and communication 
with the superintendents. However, they have had a number of years to change their 
relationship. Prior to the beginning of intervention, the more traditional mode of 
communication exists, where those in the school receive information from above, and 
have no habit of asking for or looking to the district or the DOE for information. 
Teachers consistently did not know where to look for information or seek to 
understand the policy or the resulting reports about their school, or who was requiring a 
school improvement plan. For example, the Charlesburg district staff required each 
school to go through a PIM style school improvement planning process for developing a 
school improvement plan separate from the state’s early intervention. Teachers 
interviewed were on these teams for the district school improvement planning, yet they 
were not clear on who was placing the demand upon them. One teacher explains, 
...[W]e started the SIP [School Improvement Plan] plan a year and 
a half ago...because we had to... 
Interviewer: Who said you had to? 
The district? Maybe the state? I don’t know. Somebody said we 
had to write a SIP plan. It came down from whomever, and we 
went to training and all of this by the district. (Bridget, Babson 
Elementary) 
Teachers had a limited understanding of new school accountability and were not 
clear that it is even a policy. As Maynard Moody and Musheno (2004) suggest, policies 
are something that happen to street-level bureaucrats, like teachers. Connection to the 
policies and the idea of forming or shaping policies is not part of their professional 
framework, nor are they generally engaged by policy makers. Without two-way 
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communication between the underperforming school and the district or the DOE, the 
opportunity to negotiate policy implementation in partnership is lost. 
The teachers interviewed were all intelligent and professional, and this 
observation is by no means meant to imply a problem with them in particular. It is not 
surprising that the teachers who are managing the multiple demands on their time coming 
from students, parents, principals, district administrators, state level administrators and 
policy makers, do not find the time to understand fully what a policy means to them. 
Until they are faced with early intervention, any understanding of state policy, like new 
school accountability, is shaped by rumors and informal discussions among colleagues 
within the public education arena. 
Even as principals and teachers are going through early intervention, they are 
overwhelmed and find it difficult to take the time to think or reflect upon their role or the 
policy. They are working in schools with tremendous challenges and needs, and are often 
running to put out one fire after another. State visits were nearly indistinguishable for the 
interview participants except as they related to different months in the academic calendar. 
Also, the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports, which are available to 
the public on the DOE’s website, were not read by the school staff members who were 
not handed the reports to read as members of the PIM planning team or who were not 
specifically shown the reports by the principal. 
In both schools teachers described reading the reports as something that was 
shared with them, but not with others. One teacher sheepishly described cleaning out the 
old principal’s office to prepare for the new principal and stumbling upon the report, 
which she subsequently read. Another teacher talked about the new principal sharing the 
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report with herself and another teacher as if it were confidential and an act of trust. In 
both schools I was assured that the other teachers in the building had not read the publicly 
available reports. 
Even as they were going through early intervention, it was treated like something 
that other people had to deal with. Teachers in the schools were busy trying to 
implement portions of a school improvement plan or deal with the relatively dramatic 
changes within the school after it was declared underperforming, and they simply did not 
have the time to look at the reports about why they were declared underperforming. 
Teachers who are not involved in the improvement planning process rely upon the 
principal and the teachers who are involved to inform them about the shortcomings of the 
school cited in the reports. 
I am not certain how this finding impacts early intervention. Regardless, it is 
prevalent in both schools. Perhaps it is simply a product of each of the schools only 
going through early intervention one time, so school staff did not understand different 
parts and concepts of it as well as district and DOE administrators might. It may also be 
that principals and teachers in underperforming schools are placed under enormous stress 
during early intervention, a finding supported by participant interviews, and simply do 
not have the time to react and think about the policy, who is requiring things of them, or 
the resulting reports. Evidently, to cope with the many demands placed upon those 
within the school, they depend upon a division of labor within the school in which the 
principal and the teachers on the school improvement planning team are the informants 
about the process and the changes within the school. 
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It puts into question how much of an impact early intervention can really have 
upon a school if those in the school are not paying attention to it. Developing the 
working relationship with the school may be in part the development of a communication 
line that is two-way, and empowers the principal of the underperforming school to reach 
up to the district or to the state for the help and support it needs. However, making a 
connection and developing a working relationship between the school and the DOE leads 
to a new partnership that has the potential to create change. 
New State and Local Partnerships 
Partnerships are indicative of the positive working relationship the DOE is 
developing with the local underperforming school and the district. However, there are 
some informal partnerships between the different levels of the public education system 
that are used to induce support and ultimately improvement of the delivery of education 
to students. These partnerships include a partnership between the DOE and the 
underperforming school, focused on engaging the district, as well as a partnership 
between the DOE and the district in an effort to support the district’s involvement with 
the underperforming schools. 
The DOE and the underperforming school are obviously connected during the 
beginning of intervention. More than providing a diagnosis, professional development 
and infrequent supports, the partnership between the DOE and the underperforming 
school is seen as a threat to the district and hence increases the involvement between the 
district and the underperforming school. By simply shaking up the traditional hierarchy 
of the public education system (connecting the school and the DOE), intervention causes 
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the district administrators to increase their involvement in the school. Principals and 
teachers in the schools articulated the fact that the district appeared to be more threatened 
by the DOE visit than they were. The DOE was less explicit, though they continually 
stated that the district is responsible for supporting its underperforming schools. 
The principals’ and teachers’ understanding that the district administrators were 
threatened by the state’s early intervention gave them a new feeling of power, when they 
had previously felt powerless. The power dynamic helps the principals (and teachers) to 
leverage the resources they need to improve the educational outcomes in their schools. 
Simply having regular access to the district administrators, rather than being left on their 
own, gave hope to the principals and teachers within the underperforming schools. 
Likewise, the DOE wisely partnered with the district to support its efforts to 
improve the underperforming schools. By developing regular, two-way communication 
with the urban superintendents and by providing the district superintendents with the 
school support specialists, the district and the DOE have created a solid partnership. The 
good faith gesture of listening to the superintendents and providing them with the support 
they need to improve the delivery of education within the schools is largely what the 
partnership is based upon. The act is seen as supporting the district in the face of the 
threatening district accountability system. Because the state’s district accountability 
system is administered outside of the DOE, the partnership is more likely to flourish 
because the DOE, as an organization, is seen as an ally without having to balance district 
support with holding districts accountable. 
Additionally, there is a sense at the district level that the cooperation and support 
coming from the DOE is largely due to threats felt by those in the DOE. The threat may 
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be that the DOE might have to take over a school or a district. It is widely understood by 
those at the district level and many at the school level that the DOE simply does not want 
to take over a locally run district. So, whether the state policy makers are going to hold 
the DOE accountable is negligible compared to the threat that the DOE might actually 
have to start running schools, which state level administrators fully recognize they are not 
equipped to do. 
In the larger picture of state education reform, the DOE functions as the “fixer.” 
The DOE is facilitating the implementation of new school accountability policy 
concentrated upon early intervention that results in improvement, so as to avoid having to 
take over the schools and districts. By listening to those in the district and respecting the 
pre-accountability hierarchy of the public education system, the DOE administrators have 
placed themselves in the role of facilitator by using, developing, and strengthening the 
expertise at the lower levels and focusing it using a common framework. 
Underperforming Schools are a District Problem 
The bond between the school and the DOE in their partnership is that they both 
feel the district is truly responsible for school improvement. In the eyes of those in the 
school, the DOE or the state is simply not that significant of a player during early 
intervention. Early intervention for them is a means to an end. The means is the state 
visits and early intervention and the end is the result of more attention and support from 
the district. The relationship between the underperforming school and the DOE made the 
school level people nervous initially, but generally teachers and principals became 
comfortable with the process. Credit should be given to those in the DOE who have 
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made early intervention a thoughtful, gentle, and sincere process that focuses on 
identifying issues within the school and supporting the school staff to work to address 
these issues. 
The DOE administrators believe that school improvement is a district’s 
responsibility in adherence with the traditional organization of the public education 
system. Plus, the districts are more experienced and thus better equipped to support 
school improvement than the DOE. The past district and school relationship is deficient 
at best in the two underperforming schools studied. One teacher said she felt like even 
though they complained that the district wasn’t hearing them, so at least by being 
declared underperforming these schools have a chance. 
In many ways new school accountability is just part of an overarching plan by the 
states to fine-tune the organization of the public education system. They are looking at 
the schools and gently pushing the district to play a strong role and take on greater 
responsibility for accountability within its domain, and the states are implementing a 
district accountability system which directly pushes the district participate in the 
improvement of educational outcomes in all of its schools. 
The state relationship was less important to those in the school, except that they 
found the people who visited them to be professional and courteous and that the reports 
reflected what they said. From the local perspective, a more important piece of state 
intervention was the district engagement with the underperforming school. State 
administrators agreed that the district’s involvement in early intervention is critical 
because the district is responsible for improving the educational outcomes. The 
relationship the DOE developed with the school was important only in that the DOE 
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liaisons were able to monitor the school’s progress and ensure the district administrators 
were playing an active role. 
Conclusion 
The working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school does 
change over the course of early intervention. Generally, the change is positive, because 
the expectations those in the underperforming school have for the SDE are low, so any 
involvement is an improvement. Still, the SDE only takes the relationship so far. The 
expectation seems to be that they move from a coming apart with avoidance type of 
relationship to a cooperative but autonomous relationship. It is an inexact determination 
because involvement levels between the two definitely increase, but from the SDE 
administrator’s perspective, the relationship remains somewhat distant despite a growing 
respect and trust. From the underperforming school staffs perspective the SDE plays a 
minimal role when compared to the change in relationship with the district. 
The district, still under the threat of district accountability, actively improves its 
relationship with the state identified underperforming school during early intervention. 
Prior to state intervention, the relationship between the district and school can be 
characterized as coming apart and contentious. It is a type of relationship that can only 
be changed if something or someone intervenes to break the vicious, downward cycle 
(Scheberle, 1997). Early intervention serves as the catalyst to change the relationship 
between the underperforming school and the district. The SDE works with the district to 
support its efforts, and improve their own relationship. The school support specialists are 
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a resource the SDE provides to the districts in an effort to persuade (Gormley, 1998) 
them to partner with them and implement the SDE’s “one best framework.” 
Consequently, the state provided and supported district school support specialists 
become the “fixers” of policy implementation. They are in the middle of early 
intervention. As advocates, ambassadors, and negotiators of the implementation of new 
school accountability policy, they are in charge of what Lin (2000) describes as important 
to the implementation process: fitting the policy into the local context. Brought in as 
partners to the SDE and embedded in the district, they are the bridge between the state’s 
external and the school’s internal accountability systems. The connection is a critical 
component to improving the delivery of educational outcomes in the underperforming 
school. 
It is not entirely clear whether those in the underperforming school recognize the 
SDE’s dependence upon a cooperative relationship. What is more clear is that 
professional educators within the school, once they meet SDE representatives who are 
sincere, courteous, and respectful, are more than willing to cooperate. Interestingly, 
those in the school tended to recognize the district’s dependence upon them more than the 
state’s dependence. Principals and teachers mentioned that sometimes they felt like the 
district was afraid of what they would say to the SDE. That sense contributed to their 
feeling of empowerment, and power over the district, especially after years of feeling 
neglected by the district. 
Implementation of new school accountability is constrained by limitations in the 
SDE’s resources. However, the working relationship with the school, but more 
importantly the district, helps to expand the state resources. Providing school support 
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specialists to the district helps the state to connect to the district and to use the expertise 
and knowledge that exists within the district. By adding specialists whose primary 
objective is to impact school improvement, the district in turn has expanded its capacity. 
The working relationship between the SDE and the district has changed into one that 
approaches, however imperfectly, a “pulling together and synergistic” type of 
relationship with growing levels of involvement and trust that improve over each 
underperforming school review cycle. 
The problem of the locals’ understanding of new school accountability policy as a 
deterrent versus an enabling system was lessened for the school because the early 
intervention strategy focuses on identification, diagnosis and support guided by the state. 
Additionally, the teachers in the schools are professionals, and embedded in the 
profession is the idea of taking the responsibility to make improvements. With direction 
from the DOE and the support of the district, schools were given a focus and had a 
greater feeling of empowerment, especially after major changes in staff and the change in 
principal occurred. At least this is the case in the short term. How long the change or 
improvements last is beyond the parameters of this study. Certainly, new school 
accountability policy is a deterrent policy, but what it has going for it is the professional 
educator who, because of professional training, innately feels enabled to improve the 
educational situation within his or her school. Even the deterrent nature of new school 
accountability cannot undermine an educator’s professional ethic. 
In Massachusetts, the SDE has developed a framework for early intervention that 
enhances and builds upon the pre-existing strengths within the state’s public education 
system. I expected to find an SDE that was fumbling and trying to be more controlling of 
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the early intervention process, and what I found was staff in the SDE who were 
abundantly aware of their limitations and who were willing to learn from the mistakes 
made in other states. In other words, I found an SDE which was much more adept than I 
expected at implementing complex reforms. By engaging all of the local levels the SDE 
broadens its capacity, expertise and ability to implement new school accountability in the 
local context, a point that is often found to be important to successfully impact school 
improvement (e.g., Fullan, 2001). 
New school accountability policy as part of a systemic accountability system 
(including districts) and education reform package does effectively change schools in the 
short term by changing district and state priorities. If understanding the working 
relationship between entities influences the effectiveness of policy (Agranoff & Lindsay, 
1983; Scheberle, 1997; Seidman, 1980), then the positive working relationships 
developed between the SDE and the underperforming school, the SDE and the district, 
and the district and the underperforming school may be helpful in improving educational 
outcomes and avoiding further interventions. 
When policymakers envisioned school accountability policy, it appears that they 
wanted a deterrent policy that motivated schools into compliance. The idea behind the 
policy seems to be that if resources were aligned at a common target then the focus would 
increase efficiency within a school so that it would improve. In the cases when a school 
was found to be underperforming, the DOE would intervene and tighten up the focus of 
the educators within the school. Then the school could accomplish the student 
achievement goals set before it, and in doing so, ensure the state was meeting its 
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constitutional responsibility of providing an adequate education to all students within 
Massachusetts. 
Anyone involved in education knows that establishing goals and providing 
increased focus are not as simple as the new school accountability policy implies. More 
than that, in the process of requiring SDE’s to hold schools accountable, there was little 
to no recognition of the dramatic changes it would require within the organizations that 
comprise the public education system in terms of skills, capacity and culture. 
Consequently, SDE’s are forced to use strategic criteria to make decisions about which 
schools will receive state services and which schools will not. 
Mintrop and Trujillo (2004) found that states use a number of methods to balance 
their capacity limitations with the need at the local schools. In some states there are 
never more schools in need than the SDE can handle in a given year. In others the state 
intervention is distant and dependent upon the educators within the local school and 
district. Massachusetts falls into the category of “ambitious goals” (Mintrop & Trujillo, 
2004) but lacks the capacity to fully implement them. If improvement in 
underperforming schools is truly the intended outcome of the policymaker, it cannot have 
been their intention to water down policies so that underperforming schools were given 
weak supports to improve on their own. Nor can it have been their intention to only 
intervene in the worst schools and leaving the other underperforming schools to fend for 
themselves. 
Declaring schools underperforming without injecting capacity building activities 
necessary in the mild and moderate forms of intervention is irresponsible. It places 
SDE’s in a position in which they must make choices about values and priorities as to 
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how they will approach school accountability measures. Will they water them down so 
that the number of underperforming schools is never more than the number the SDE can 
manage in a given year? Or will they prioritize the underperforming schools based on 
those with the most need and work from the bottom up? Will they ever be able to truly 
develop local capacity so that no student is placed in an underperforming school? 
In a sense the approach the DOE took in Massachusetts is contrary to a traditional 
bureaucratic approach which typically distributes its limited resources to as many of the 
entities (e.g., underperforming schools) in need as it can, thus watering down the impact 
any resources or interventions might have upon an underperforming school. Even more 
typical in the public education system is to work with the schools that have problems, but 
need the least help. These schools tend to be more receptive to outside help because 
there is a level of internal infrastructure that allows them to use outside help. 
Additionally, by expending resources upon the less troubled schools, fewer resources are 
expended on easier to accomplish solutions (or supports) before getting to the schools in 
the most need. In fact, the schools that are most in need of help are often the ones that are 
least able to access outside assistance and effectively use outside support. Their needs 
for resources are therefore greater and solutions are not easily found or known. 
The approach in Massachusetts turns this upside down by intervening and 
building capacity into the schools at the bottom first. The bottom up approach speaks to 
the need for a strategy for those schools that are not the worst in the state, but clearly 
performing at insufficient levels. Perhaps these schools do not need as much intervention 
as the worst schools; however, they are still underperforming and are in need of some 
supports and some assistance. Policymakers should allocate resources to target these 
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schools specifically, while carefully avoiding temptations to water down the existing 
capacity and system of DOE intervention in the worst underperforming schools. In a 
way, the school support specialist position is an attempt to manage the other 
underperforming schools in the state. DOE hopes that by placing the specialists in the 
district, practices and capacity building strategies will be disseminated and used in other 
underperforming schools not being intervened in by the DOE. The DOE has created a 
framework, which is modeled for the district and the school support specialists within 
them, to implement in the other schools in the area. By injecting the ongoing capacity 
and training into the urban districts, the DOE has gained a partner and expanded capacity 




There are many directions future research on the subject of new school 
accountability and the state and local working relationship can take. Potential future 
research topics are varied, ranging from working relationships, roles and responsibilities, 
reorganization of state public education systems and local governance. 
This research shows that state intervention in an underperforming school can have 
a positive outcome. In the schools studied, participants reported years of neglect from the 
district, poor leadership by the principal, and little to no accountability for the teachers. 
State intervention really shed some light onto these issues. Changes that were slow in 
coming, if they were coming at all, began to happen very quickly. Changes in staff and 
replacing the former principal, along with improved relations with the district, created a 
new dynamic in the school that teachers could really feel. It would be worthwhile to see 
how typical the experience of these schools and the Charlesburg district are when 
compared to other states, other districts and other schools. Is the Massachusetts DOE 
taking a particular approach that is more likely to lead to a positive outcome? Are the 
findings a result of a change in how the district superintendent and administrators 
understand their role? Further research is necessary to see how typical these findings are. 
A study should be designed to answer the looming question of whether the threat 
of district accountability actually does motivate a district to engage in a meaningful 
relationship with the underperforming school. Is the threat of state intervention in the 
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district really a motivator for the district to engage with the school and make rapid 
changes in the school for improvement? One suggestion for study would be to compare 
the findings in a district that has not been taken over, like Charlesburg, with a district that 
has been taken over by the state. Questions about how the state taking on a strong role 
with the district would impact the DOE’s relationship with the underperforming school 
would need to be answered. Additionally, it would be interesting to find out how the 
DOE’s expectations for the district’s relationship with the underperforming schools 
would change in the circumstance when the DOE is intervening in the district as well. 
Another area of interest in the area of identifying how typical these findings are 
would be to compare the two Massachusetts districts designated as underperforming, 
since one is urban and one is rural. The manner in which the SDE approaches these 
schools and how they interact with the districts would likely be different. Such a study 
would truly test the “one best framework” finding in this study. Additionally, in a 
smaller rural district there may be much different results. For example, underperforming 
school principals and teachers may be less likely to leave the school if they are in a rural 
setting because there are a limited number of alternative opportunities. In those cases 
SDE and districts would need to work with existing staff and would not have the 
opportunity to “start over” as the schools from the Charlesburg district did. Also, there is 
likely a lot less district capacity for a smaller rural district to become the “fixer.” 
New school accountability policy and NCLB in particular provide for one policy 
to suit many districts. Right now, many urban districts have an abundance of 
underperforming schools, but what happens when a school is declared underperforming 
in a rural district? How does the working relationship change between the DOE and the 
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district, the DOE and the underperforming school and the district and the 
underperforming school? Are the strategies different in an urban verses rural district? 
Questions about the roles and responsibilities of the SDE, the district and the 
school abound. Throughout the examination of the working relationship, some of the 
ideas suggested by participants about their roles and responsibilities and those of the 
organization they are affiliated with seemed self-evident. I assumed, as I suppose many 
do, that the district held schools accountable and communication between them is 
frequent, but at least in Charlesburg, it did not seem to be the case. As far as the SDE is 
concerned, when discussing new7 school accountability the discussion about centralizing 
the control of state public education systems, and taking away local authority is never far 
behind. 
My findings, however, indicated that there is at least some expectation by those in 
the school and district that there would be some direction, focus and support provided by 
the entity above their organization in the loosely coupled hierarchy of the public 
education system. Could it be that local control is a way of avoiding responsibility at 
higher levels of the public education system? Certainly local control could be used this 
way, but it is more likely that there is an imbalance in the system that needs to be 
remedied. Research on the imbalance and where local control stops and state 
responsibility begins within a state would be an interesting endeavor, especially in the 
context of new accountability systems imposed by the state and federal governments. 
Governance structures in terms of local school boards are really not examined at 
all. I have to admit that I did pose the question about the local school committee to 
interview participants at the school and district levels, but the answers to the question 
proved difficult to interpret. Surprisingly, this was not because the involvement of the 
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school committee is so complicated. Rather there seemed to be a limited response (if any 
at all) by the members of the school committee. A review of local school committee 
meeting minutes hardly registered a comment about the number of underperforming 
schools in the Charlesburg district. Is it simply that the local school board members do 
not feel they have a responsibility toward the district and its underperforming schools? Is 
it a sign of the failing of local governance in and of itself? Have local school boards 
become irrelevant? 
All these are interesting questions, but the role is likely more complicated than 
they suggest. I believe that the members of the local school committees feel school 
accountability and underperformance is something for the knowledgeable professional 
educators to attack and remedy, though I did not test this hypothesis. As the lay 
committee members, they are able to allocate the funds, though under the current fiscal 
constraints that authority is limited, and advocate for pet projects of the community, but 
they do not consider themselves expert educators, and thus leave such issues to those who 
are. A study of the reaction of school committee members and what they believe their 
responsibilities are under new accountability would be interesting and provide insight 
into the ever evolving nature of public school governance. 
This study is a first foray into understanding the beginning of intervention in the 
context of new school accountability policy. Within the subtext of the policy one can see 
the changing role of the SDE, and the revitalization of the district’s role as it relates to the 
underperforming school. There is a different kind of focus in the public education system 
because of external accountability, but its real strength is when it has meaning to the 
educators in the classroom. A positive working relationship, or any working relationship 
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amongst the SDE, the district and the school is a start, but it is clear that there are many 




Dissertation Title: The Beginning of Intervention 
Massachusetts Department of Education 
 Interview Questions 
To: 
From: Susan Bowles Therriault 
RE: Interview on DATE, 2004 at TIME 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The following information is being 
provided for your review prior to our interview. While, it is unlikely that we will address 
all of the interview questions within the 60 minute time block allotted for the interview, I 
have still provided you with them so that you are able to understand the direction of this 
research. Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns. 
Researcher: 
Susan Bowles Therriault 
Education Policy & Leadership 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA 01003 
Phone: 978.369.1532 
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu 
Introduction/ Project Description: 
This research is being conducted for my dissertation. I am particularly interested in the 
early phases of intervention and the working relationship that develops between the state 
and the school. My questions are mainly focused on understanding the intricacies and 
complexities of that relationship from your perspective. Your perspective is of the 
utmost importance, and I appreciate your honesty and sincerity. Please know that the 
results from this research will be part of my dissertation, but all individuals and schools 
will remain anonymous. 
INTKVIEW QUffiTIOlS 
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Massachusetts Department of Education Interview Questions 
Personal Information 
1. How long have you been working at the Department of Education? 
2. What did you do before working at the DOE? 
3. Have you ever worked in a school and/or district? If yes, how long and in what capacity? 
Understanding of New School Accountability Policy 
4. What do you think of the school accountability policy within Massachusetts? 
5. What do you believe its purpose is? 
6. How well or not so well does it achieve its purpose? 
7. How well or not so well is the DOE supported when implementing school accountability? 
Working Relationship 
8. If it is possible to generalize, what kind of a relationship do you (or DOE) try to develop with a 
school/staff that is under review? That is declared underperforming? 
9. Having been through several cycles of reviewing and identifying underperforming schools, do you 
think the “school” perceptions about the state/DOE change as they go through the panel reviews, 
and the fact finding reviews, and thereafter If yes, how? If no, why? 
10. Do you find your (DOE) perceptions of the school change during the review process? If yes, how? 
If no, why? 
11. Is cooperation between the DOE and the school important? 
12. Do you find the schools to be cooperative? Does this change over time/ during the Panel Reviews 
or Fact-Finding Reviews? 
13. What factors increase or decrease the ability for the DOE to work with a school? 
14. What are your expectations of an underperforming school that DOE is working with? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Identification of the School for Review 
15. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of selecting as school for review? 
16. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is selected for review? 
17. How would you characterize the DOE’s relationship with a school selected for review? 
The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review 
18. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the School Panel Review? 
19. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Panel Review? 
20. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC 
Consulting during the School Panel Review? 
21. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are 
going through a School Panel Review? Is this different from before? 
22. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming 
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the School Panel Review? 
23. After the School Panel Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship 
with the underperforming school? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Determination of School Underperformance 
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24. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of identifying a school as underperforming? 
25. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is identified as 
underperforming? 
26. How does a school being identified as underperforming impact the DOE relationship with the 
school? 
Contractor Interview Questions 
Personal Information 
27. How long have you been working at ABC Consulting? 
28. How long have you been participating in School Panel Reviews and Fact-Finding Reviews? 
29. Do you come from the field of education? If yes, what did you do there? 
New School Accountability Policy 
30. What do you believe is the purpose of school accountability policy within Massachusetts? 
31. Do you think the policy suits its purpose? 
32. If you can recall, how did you find the relationship between the state and the underperforming 
school during the first visit you conducted? Has this changed? How? 
33. How are you prepared/trained to conduct school visits? 
34. How do you think those in the school staff feel about school accountability policy before they are 
visited? Did this change? 
Roles 
35. What do you consider your role in this school accountability process? 
36. Do you think that others that work for ABC Consulting approach this role differently? If yes, 
how? 
37. What do you believe is your role during the beginning of intervention (school panel review, 
identification of underperformance, and fact finding review)? 
38. What do you believe is the role of the Department of Education during the beginning of 
intervention? 
39. What do you believe is the role of the district during the beginning of intervention? 
40. What do you believe is the role of the Principal and school staff is during the beginning of 
intervention? 
41. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention? 
42. Is there anyone else that has a significant role during the beginning of intervention? 
Working Relationship 
43. How would you characterize the relationship between the school and the Department of Education 
prior to being identified as underperforming? How did this change when the school is: 
1. Visited for a School Panel Review? 
2. Identified as an Underperforming School? 
3. Visited for a Fact-Finding Review? 
4. “Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)? 
44. What do you believe the working relationship between the Department of Education and the 
school should ideally be during the beginning of intervention? 
45. Is the early school accountability process (visits, diagnosis) designed to establish this ideal 
working relationship? 
46. What do you believe the working relationship between the District and the school should ideally 
be during the beginning of intervention? 
The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review 
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47. What do you think about the school panel review and the process? 
48. If you can generalize, how do you think potentially underperforming schools (principal and staff) 
feel about the School Panel Review? 
49. Generally, how do you think the Department of Education School Review Panel is perceived 
during the review? 
50. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
51. How would you characterize the relationship between the DOE and the potentially 
underperforming school during the review? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Identification as an Underperforming School 
52. Do you get any information about the reaction of those in the school when they are identified as 
underperforming? 
53. How involved in this part of the process are you or is ABC Consulting? 
54. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
55. How would you characterize your relationship with the DOE at this point in time? Is this different 
from before? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review 
56. How is the ABC Consulting chaired panel perceived by the principal and staff during the review? 
57. How is the DOE perceived by the school during the review? 
58. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
59. How would you characterize the relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school 
during this review? Is this different from before? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support 
60. Do you think the school staffs perceptions of the DOE changed during the process? 
61. Do you think the DOE’s perceptions about the school change during this process? 
62. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the 
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process 
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school? 
63. Does the district have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement 
strategies? 
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District School Support Specialist 
Personal Information 
64. How long have you been working as a School Support Specialist? 
65. What did you do before this? 
66. Have you ever worked in a school and/or district? At the DOE? If yes, how long and in what 
capacity? 
Understanding of New School Accountability Policy 
67. What do you think of the school accountability policy within Massachusetts? 
68. What do you believe its purpose is? 
69. How well or not so well does it achieve its purpose? 
70. How well or not so well is the are you supported when implementing school accountability? 
Working Relationship 
71. If it is possible to generalize, what kind of a relationship do you (or DOE) try to develop with a 
school/staff that is under review? That is declared underperforming? 
72. Having been through several cycles of reviewing and identifying underperforming schools, do you 
think the “school” perceptions about the state/DOE change as they go through the panel reviews, 
and the fact finding reviews, and thereafter If yes, how? If no, why? 
73. Do you find your (DOE) perceptions of the school change during the review process? If yes, how? 
If no, why? 
74. Is cooperation between the DOE and the school important? 
75. Do you find the schools to be cooperative? Does this change over time/ during the Panel Reviews 
or Fact-Finding Reviews? 
76. What factors increase or decrease the ability for the DOE to work with a school? 
77. What are your expectations of an underperforming school that DOE is working with? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Identification of the School for Review 
78. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of selecting as school for review? 
79. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is selected for review? 
80. How would you characterize the DOE’s relationship with a school selected for review? 
The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review 
81. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the School Panel Review? 
82. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Panel Review? 
83. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC 
Consulting during the School Panel Review? 
84. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are 
going through a School Panel Review? Is this different from before? 
85. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming 
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the School Panel Review? 
86. After the School Panel Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship 
with the underperforming school? 
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The Beginning of Intervention - Determination of School Underperformance 
87. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of identifying a school as underperforming? 
88. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is identified as 
underperforming? 
89. How does a school being identified as underperforming impact the DOE relationship with the 
school? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review 
90. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the Fact-Finding Review? 
91. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Fact-Finding Review? 
92. How involved is the DOE in this process? In what capacity? 
93. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC 
Consulting in the FFR? 
94. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are 
going through a Fact-Finding Review? Is this different from before? 
95. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming 
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the Fact-Finding Review? 
96. After the Fact-Finding Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship 
with the underperforming school? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support 
97. Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves 
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs? 
98. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the 
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process 
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school? 
99. Do you (SSS) have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement 
strategies? 
100. Has your understanding of the school’s, district’s and DOE’s role change during this process? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review 
101. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the Fact-Finding Review? 
102. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Fact-Finding Review? 
103. How involved is the DOE in this process? In what capacity? 
104.Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC 
Consulting in the FFR? 
105. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are 
going through a Fact-Finding Review? Is this different from before? 
106. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming 
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the Fact-Finding Review? 
107. After the Fact-Finding Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s 
relationship with the underperforming school? 
The Beginning of Intervention - ReflectiA/Expectations/Support 
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108.Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves 
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs? 
109.It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the 
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process 
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school? 
I lO.Do you (DOE) have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement 
strategies? 
II l.Has your understanding of the school’s, district’s and DOE’s role change during this process? 
287 
Underperforming School (Principals and Teachers) Interview Questions 
Personal Information 
112. How long have you been working at this school and/or district? 
113. What did you do before working at this school? 
114. How long have you been in the field of education? 
New School Accountability Policy 
115. What do you believe is the purpose of school accountability policy within Massachusetts? 
116. Do you think the policy suits its purpose? 
117.If you can recall, how did you feel about the policy before your school was visited by the state? 
Did this change after you were visited? 
118. Where did you get information about school accountability before the school was visited? 
119. How do you think the school staff felt about the policy before your school was visited? Did this 
change? 
120. Have you participated on a school panel review or fact finding review panel for another school 
beside your own? If yes, did this change your perspective on the process at all? If not, why not? 
Roles 
121. What do you consider your role in this school accountability process (as part of a school that is 
presently in need of improvement)? 
122. Do you think that others in the school approach this role differently? If yes, how? 
123. Did you talk to others that had been in this position before? If yes, do you find that your 
experience has been similar or dissimilar? 
124. What do you believe is your role (and the role of those within the school), during the beginning of 
intervention (school panel review, identification of underperformance, and fact finding review)? 
125. What do you believe is the role of the Department of Education during the beginning of 
intervention? 
126. What do you believe is the role of the district during the beginning of intervention? 
127. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention? 
128.Is there anyone else that has a significant role during the beginning of intervention? 
Working Relationship 
129. How would you characterize the relationship between your school and the Department of 
Education prior to being identified as underperforming? How did this change when your school 
was: 
1. Visited for a School Panel Review? 
2. Identified as an Underperforming School? 
3. Visited for a Fact-Finding Review? 
4. “Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)? 
130. What do you believe the working relationship between the Department of Education and your 
school should ideally be during the beginning of intervention? 
131. How would you characterize the relationship between your school and the district prior to being 
identified as underperforming? How did this change when your school was: 
1. Visited for a School Panel Review? 
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2. Identified as an Underperforming School? 
3. Visited for a Fact-Finding Review? 
4. “Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)? 
132. What do you believe the working relationship between the District and your school should ideally 
be during the beginning of intervention? 
133. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention? 
The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review 
134. How did you feel about the review? 
135. How did the staff within the school feel about the review? 
136. How did you perceive the Department of Education Panel during the review? How did the staff 
perceive the state panel? 
137. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
138. How would you characterize your relationship during this review? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Identification as an Underperforming School 
139. What was your reaction when your school was identified as underperforming? 
140. What was the reaction of the staff within the school when your school was identified as 
underperforming? 
141. What was the reaction of the district when your school was identified as underperforming? 
142. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
143. How would you characterize your relationship with the DOE at this point in time? Is this different 
from before? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review 
144. How did you feel about the review? 
145. How did the staff within the school feel about the review? 
146. How did you perceive the Department of Education Panel during the review? How did the staff 
perceive the state panel? 
147. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process? 
148. How would you characterize your relationship during this review? Is this different from before? 
The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support 
149. Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves 
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs? 
150. Do you think the school staffs perceptions of the DOE changed during the process? 
151. Do you think the DOE’s perceptions about the school change during this process? 
152. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the 
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process 





INFORMATION VOR PARTICIPANTS I^^Hg OBSERVATIONS 
Title of the Study: 
Name of Researcher: 
ConaK Information: 
The Beginning of Intervention: Working Relationships between the 
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School 
Susan Bowles, Doctoral Student, Education Policy and Leadership, 




Hello, I am a doctoral student enrolled at the University of Massachusetts in the Education Policy, 
Research and Administration program. Currently, I am conducting a research project in an area of 
educational policy that has captured my interest over the past four years. This study focuses on the 
working relationship between the Massachusetts Department of Education and the underperforming 
school as it enters into the early phases on school accountability intervention. 
Objective: 
To research the evolution of the working relationship between the staff in the Massachusetts Department 
of Education (DOE) and underperforming schools during the earliest phases of diagnosis and intervention 
under the state and federally mandated school accountability system. The project will be informed by a 
combination of data gathered through observations of the school accountability process and through 
loosely structured interviews aimed at gaining insight into the perceptions of the state: Department of 
Education staff, School Works staff, and school support specialists that are working with 
underperforming school(s) and the perceptions of the locals: underperforming school staff, and district 
staff that are working with the DOE. 
Study Description 
This is both a study of policy implementation and intergovernmental working relationships. Essential to 
both of these topics is an understanding of the context in which policy is implemented and the attitudes 
and perceptions that are developed as two organizations negotiate school accountability policy 
implementation. Within the study your perceptions of and attitudes toward the policy, and toward the 
Department of Education/underperforming school are key to understanding this context. 
This investigation will primarily consist of observations of the process of diagnosis and intervention as 
well as loosely structured interviews with individuals involved in school accountability intervention at the 
state level (Massachusetts Department of Education officials, School Works consultants, district school 
support specialists) and individuals at the local level (School principals, school staff, and district 
superintendents). 
As part of the public education system within Massachusetts, you have first-hand experience dealing with 
school accountability intervention. Observing the process the state and the school go through during 
diagnosis and intervention is important to understanding the school accountability process. As you know, 
the many mandates of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and the federal No Child Left 
Behind Act, 2001 have brought new challenges to public schools within the state. This study will increase 
the understanding of how this state law manifests itself within the Department of Education and in the 
school and district. 
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The results of this study will be written up as a formal research paper, for my dissertation, and will 
possibly used as a reference in any future research I may conduct. During the observation portion of this 
study emphasis is placed upon the process and the interaction between the state and the school. 
Individual names and organizations will not be named specifically. Every effort will be made to protect 
your identity when disseminating results in both the oral and written format. 













o Department of Education Officials (Associate Commissioner, Managers, 
Department of Education Liaisons) 
o School Works Staff (staff and consultants hired to participate in diagnosis 
and intervention in underperforming schools) 
o School Support Specialists located in the districts and trained by the 
Department of Education 
Local 
o District Superintendent and staff 
o Underperforming School Principal 
o Underperforming Staff involved with DOE 
Questions 




Thank you for agreeing to participate in the OBSERVATION portion of this study. 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
Title of the Study: The Beginning of Intervention: Working Relationships between the 
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School 
Name of Researcher: Susan Bowles, Doctoral Student, Education Policy and Leadership, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Contact Information: Phone: 978-369-1532 
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu 
Introduction 
Hello, I am a doctoral student enrolled at the University of Massachusetts in the Education Policy, 
Research and Administration program. Currently, I am conducting a research project in an area of 
educational policy that has captured my interest over the past four years. This study focuses on the 
working relationship between the Massachusetts Department of Education and the underperforming 
school as it enters into the early phases on school accountability intervention. 
This is both a study of policy implementation and intergovernmental working relationships. Essential to 
both of these topics is an understanding of the context in which policy is implemented and the attitudes 
and perceptions that are developed as two organizations negotiate school accountability policy 
implementation. Within the study your perceptions of and attitudes toward the policy, and toward the 
Department of Education/underperforming school are key to understanding this context. 
This investigation will primarily consist of loosely structured interviews with individuals involved in 
school accountability intervention at the state level (Massachusetts Department of Education officials, 
School Works consultants, district school support specialists) and individuals at the local level (School 
principals, school staff, and district superintendents). 
As part of the public education system within Massachusetts, you have first-hand experience dealing with 
school accountability intervention. Your insight and voice are important to the school accountability 
process. As you know, the many mandates of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 have 
brought new challenges to public schools within the state. This study will increase the understanding of 
how this state law manifests itself within the Department of Education and in the school and district. 
The results of this study will be written up as a formal research paper, for my dissertation, and will 
possibly used as a reference in any future research I may conduct. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or prejudice. Every 
effort will be made to protect your identity through the use of pseudonyms or by referring to your 
comments by your position, rather than your name or organization, when disseminating results in both the 
oral and written format. 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
Title of the Study: The Beginning of Intervention: Working Relationships between the 
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School 
Directions 
If you agree to participate in this study it will require you to set aside time for an interview. The purpose 
of the interview is to obtain you general thoughts, ideas and perceptions of the state school review. The 
interview will take approximately 45 minutes. 
You have been given two copies of this informed consent. If you agree to participate, please sign and 
date each copy. This signature indicates that you have read and understand the information within this 
consent form and your willingness to participate in this study. I will keep one copy of this informed 
consent. Please keep the other copy for your records. If you have any questions, at any time during this 
study, feel free to contact me at 978-369-1532 or email me at sbowles@educ.umass.edu. 
Consent for Voluntary Participation 
I volunteer to participate in this qualitative study and understand that: 
1. I will be interviewed by Susan Bowles using a loosely structured interview method. 
2. The questions I will be answering address my views on issues related to the early phases of 
intervention under school accountability policy with specific emphasis on the relationship 
between the state and local organizations involved in this intervention. 
3. The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate analysis of the data. 
4. My name will not be used nor will I be identified personally in any way or at any time. I 
understand it will be necessary to identify participants in the dissertation by position (i.e. 
principal, teacher, department of education liaison) and organizational affiliation (i.e. state, 
district, school). 
5. I may withdraw from part or all of this study at any time. 
6. I have the right to review material prior to the final oral exam or other publication. 
7. I understand that results from this interview will be included in Susan Bowles’ doctoral 
dissertation and may also be included in manuscripts submitted to professional journals for 
publication. 
8. Iam free to participate or not to participate without prejudice. 
9. Because of the small number of participants, I understand that there is some risk that I may be 
identified as a participant in the study, though every effort will be made to maintain anonymity. 
Researcher’s Signature Date: Participant’s Signature Date: 
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APPENDIX C 
CHARLESBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
Table C.l: Individual School Enrollment Report October 1, 2004 
Grade K 1 2 3 4 5 k-5 TOTAL 
CharlesburgDistrict 1980 2171 2021 1955 2041 2045 12213 26031 
Alfred Elementary 49 51 44 48 43 45 280 280 
Babson Elementary 53 61 50 47 60 50 321 321 
Table C.2: 1999 and 2003 Charlesburg Public School District and State Comparison of 
Total Per Pupil Expenditures 
District State 
1999 2003 1999 2003 
Total Day 
Program 
Expenditures $177,401,550 $209,953,632 $6,395,235,205 $8,024,795,656 
Number of 
Pupils (FTE) 26,171 26,374 955,592 969,995 
(Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004) 
Table C.3: 1999 and 2003 Charlesburg Public School District and Massachusetts 
_Comparison of Per Pupil Expenditures, by Category_ 
District State 
1999 2003 1999 2003 
Regular 
Education $5,289 $6,212 $5,487 $6,779 
Special 
Education $10,938 $13,062 $10,249 $13,542 
Bilingual 




Education $7,605 $8,118 $9,404 $11,154 
All Day 
Programs $6,779 $7,961 $6,692 $8,273 
(Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004) 
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